ACODE

ADVOCATES COALITION FOR DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENT

LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCILS
SCORE-CARD ASSESSMENT 2013/14

A COMBINATION OF GAINS, REVERSALS AND REFORMS

Arthur Bainomugisha • Lillian M. Tamale • Wilson W. Muhwezi
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Cover Photos: A selection of service delivery units taken during field visits in Kabarole, Lira, Amuru and Agago districts in 2014. (Credit: ACODE Digital Library, 2014)

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ABBREVIATIONS

ACODE	Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment
CAMs	Civic Awareness Meetings
CAOs	Chief Administrative Officers
CBOs	Community Based Organizations
CBTIC	Citizens' Budget Tracking and Information Centre
CG	Central Government
CICO	Chonging International Construction Corporation
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
DEC	District Executive Committee
DGF	Democratic Governance Facility
DP	Democratic Party
DPAC	District Public Accounts Committee
DSC	District Service Commission
ESSAPR	Education and Sports Sector Annual Performance Report
FAL	Functional Adult Literacy
FDC	Forum for Democratic Change
FGD	Focus Group Discussions
FY	Financial Year
GAPP	Governance, Accountability, Participation and Performance
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GT	Graduated Tax
HSAPR	Health Sector Annual Performance Report
KIs	Key Informants
LC	Local Councils
LGC	Local Government Council
LGCSCI	Local Government Councils' Score-card Initiative
LGFC	Local Government Finance Commission
LHT	Local Hotel Tax
LLG	Lower Local Government
LST	Local Service Tax
MoFPED	Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development
MoLG	Ministry of Local Government
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding

NAADS	National Agricultural Advisory Services
NDP	National Development Plan
NPPAs	National Priority Programme Areas
NRA/M	National Resistance Army/Movement
NRM	National Resistance Movement
NUSAF	Northern Uganda Social Action Fund
OBT	Output Budgeting Tool
PRDP	Peace Recovery and Development Programme
PWDs	Persons with Disabilities
SFG	School Facilities Grant
UFA	Uganda Federal Alliance
UGX	Uganda Shillings
ULGA	Uganda Local Government Association
UPC	Uganda Peoples' Congress
UPE	Universal Primary Education
URA	Uganda Revenue Authority
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WESAPR	Water and Environment Sector Annual Performance Report

Government has invested alot of resources in the Education Sector. However, alot more needs to be done to deal with overcrowded classrooms: Pupils at Rec-Kiceke Primary School in Amuru District.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This is the fifth Local Government Councils Score-card Report. The report presents the findings of the annual assessment of the performance of elected district leaders in 30 districts during FY 2013/14. The initiative also supports capacity building for elected political leaders to understand their mandate as stipulated in the Local Government Act (CAP 243) Laws of Uganda and the Constitution of Uganda. Beyond the annual assessment and capacity building, ACODE works in partnership with ULGA to conduct a robust outreach program to enhance civic consciousness and empower citizens about what they should expect from their local leadership.

The assessment covers the following district elected leaders and institutions: District Councillors; Chairpersons; Speakers; and the District Council. These political leaders and institutions are assessed on the following mandates: legislative role, accountability to citizens, planning and budgeting; and monitoring service delivery on National Priority Programme Areas. The Score-card is designed to fit into what is largely seen as the "missing middle" of social accountability initiatives, turning uninformed citizens into informed citizens, unresponsive government into responsive government, and unaccountable government into accountable and effective government.

LGCSCI is informed and premised in the theory of change where the main postulate is that as citizens are informed about the performance of their councils and councillors, their demand for effectiveness in public service delivery will be channelled upwards through the local government council system. The Score-card uses an action research methodology combining quantitative and qualitative techniques and approaches that increase the skills of elected leaders, raise civic consciousness of the citizens while monitoring progress in the quality of public services and assessing elected political leaders.

The 2013/14 Score-card contains five key messages based on the results from the assessment. First, there is remarkable improvement not only in the overall performance of the elected political leaders since the Score-card was first introduced in 2009 but also in planning and budgeting and monitoring of priority program areas. Second, districts still face a myriad of challenges, including inadequate financing and overdependence on central government for financing their day-to-day operations. Third, while there is increased awareness about the accountability relationship that

should exist between citizens and their elected leaders, the low levels of human resource capacity, instances of elite capture, marginalization by minority groups, low levels of civic competence, political conflicts and low levels of a democratic culture, modest education of many of elected leaders, marginalization of women and youth and reluctance by the central government to decentralize all combine to weaken the functioning of local governments. The fourth message is that while the Score-card and associated interventions have engineered positive pressure on district councils and elected leaders to improve their performance, there has not been much progress in stimulating citizen action to demand efficient and effective service delivery and political accountability as envisaged in the demand-side component of LGCSCI theory of change.

The 2013/14 assessment identified obstacles to the attainment of a fully functional local government system. These are: multiple leadership conflicts; low levels of revenue collection and financial autonomy; distortions inherent in the decentralization policy; and centralized control of the national budget resources. The areas of political and administrative accountability remain a major challenge to most of the districts.

The 2013/14 Score-card report makes the following recommendations:

- Improve Human Capacity in Local Governments

- Impose a Moratorium on Creation of New Districts

- Reform the Local Government Act

- Set Up of a Local Government Challenge Fund and Provide Adequate and Discretionary Funding to Local Government

- Establish a Local Government Training Institute

- Establish and Operationalize a Local Government- Parliamentary Forum

- Establish Minimum Qualification for Councillors

- Strengthen District Public Accounts Committees

- Establish Conflict Resolution Mechanisms

- ACODE and ULGA Should Invest Substantive Resources in Civil Society Organizations

- Build the Capacity of Citizens to Effectively Demand Better Service Delivery

In conclusion, it is important to point out that there is visible progress in the performance of elected political leaders in general, though how this improved performance relates to the quality of public service delivery and accountability to citizens needs to be more fully explored.

Since decentralization was introduced in Uganda and much of the developing world over the past two decades, many countries have made the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy. This same period has witnessed the rebirth of CSOs and the achievement of new freedoms and civil liberties. With the euphoria of these transitions fading, people are beginning to ask sobering questions, especially about what difference democracy makes to development and whether democracy can help redress the severe economic inequalities, high levels of poverty and unemployment and the service delivery deficit that exist at the Local Level.

Since the introduction of LGCSCI assessment in Uganda in 2009, the assessment of Local Government Councils, Chairpersons, Speakers and individual Councillors has been continuous and steady significant progress has been registered in their performance. There has been progress in the performance of most District Councils in terms of conduct of Council business and the quality of debates, improvement in monitoring of service delivery by individual Councillors, record-keeping of Council proceedings and resolution of endemic conflicts that had always stifled Council business. There has also been a general acceptance of LGCSCI by Councillors. Most of the Councillors testify how they originally thought LGCSCI assessment would be used by their political opponents to defeat them, but they have over time come to appreciate its usefulness in making them effective and efficient in their work.

High investments in road infrastructure is essential to improving the quality of services and accessibility to markets; Roadworks on Agali - Aweii Road in Lira and Alebtong Districts.

1   INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Evidence suggests that successful decentralization improves the efficiency and responsiveness of the public sector while accommodating potentially explosive political forces whereby powers (especially fiscal powers) and functions are transferred to sub-national political entities, which in turn have real autonomy in specific instances.[1]

This fifth Local Government Councils' Score-card (LGCSCI) Report presents the findings and results of performance of elected Local Government leaders in 30 selected districts around the country during the Financial Year 2013/214. The report is produced under LGCSCI that has since 2009 been implemented by the Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment (ACODE) in partnership with Uganda Local Government Association (ULGA). LGCSCI is a 10-year initiative, which aims at strengthening citizens' demand for effective public service delivery and political accountability from their elected local leaders at the district level. The main goal of the initiative is *'to strengthen the weak political accountability mechanism between citizens and elected leaders that prevent citizens from receiving adequate public services, mainly by overcoming information related barriers and boosting Councillor professionalization and performance.[2]*

In order to achieve the above goal, LGCSCI seeks to:

- Support the capacity building for local councillors to understand their mandate as stipulated in the Local Government Act; and

- Support a robust outreach programme targeting citizens to educate them about what they should expect from their local leadership.

Since its implementation, LGCSCI has gone through several phases of expansion as a result of its success and ability to influence positive change both in the provision of service delivery and in the conduct of District Council business across the local governments. The first Local Government Score-card assessment was undertaken in 10 pilot districts during the Financial Year (FY) 2008/2009. The following year, the initiative was extended to 20 districts. In FY 2011/2012, LGCSCI was expanded

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[1] UN-HABITAT (2002) Local Democracy and Decentralization in East and Southern Africa: Experiences from Uganda, Kenya, Botswana, Tanzania and Ethiopia, p.3.

[2] See, ACODE-DGF Project memorandum 2012.

to cover 26 districts. With additional funding from USAID's Governance, Accountability, Participation and Performance (GAPP) Program, the coverage of districts in LGCSCI was further expanded by four more districts. Therefore, the LGCSCI assessment of this report captures the dynamics of local governance in 30 districts during FY 2013/2014.[3]

The introduction of the Local Government Councils' Score-card assessment in 2009 was largely welcomed as a complement to the Annual Assessment of Minimum Conditions and Performance Measures for Local Governments. This Annual Assessment used to be conducted by the Ministry of Local Government (MoLG) and it targeted the technical arm of the district leadership. At the conception of LGCSCI, it was felt that in order for the Annual Assessment of the technical arm to have an effect on the performance of Local Government, both the technical arm and the political arm needed to be subjected to periodic assessments. Unlike the Annual Assessment of the technical arm of Local Governments where the results are not publicised, LGCSCI assessment findings are published and disseminated locally, nationally and internationally to reach a wider audience. The reason for this is to strengthen citizens' capacity to demand efficient and effective service delivery and political accountability.

Over the past five years, districts benefiting from LGCSCI have experienced significant improvement in the performance of their mandates and responsiveness to political accountability. The recent independent evaluation of LGCSCI revealed that:

> *The relevance of LGCSCIs' focus on boosting of Councillor Performance is directly related to the chosen methodology and its tools. Our findings reveal that the project is highly relevant in boosting Councillor Performance related to their formal roles and responsibilities. Many Councillors had reservations or disagreements with the project during the initial year in which they were assessed; however, most Councillors met during the evaluation are now enthusiastic about the relevance of the score-card to their work.[4]*

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[3] For the selection criteria of assessed districts, see Chapter 3, "Methodology, Scope and Indicators."

[4] See, VNG International (2014) Evaluation of the ACODE Score-card for Local Government, Kampala, September.

A Critical Overview of Service Delivery in Local Governments

The decentralization system of government was viewed initially as highly prized for improving local governance, democratization and service delivery. After more than two decades of implementation, the results remain a "mixed bag" of reform, progress, stagnation, disappointment, and in some cases outright reversals. Against this state of affairs, ACODE and ULGA were prompted to initiate LGCSCI as a tool to strengthen local governments and help them deliver on their mandate within the framework of decentralization.

Most analysts regard decentralization, strong macroeconomic stability, and relative peace and security as among the primary reasons behind Uganda's quick recovery from the near state collapse in the mid-1980s. Other analysts observe that decentralization – the centrepiece of modernizing democratic discourse in the developing world – has proved problematic and challenging for several reasons: the roles of state agencies and elites, the international development community, and local politicians; and shifting decision-making involving the allocative and implementation functions of the central state affecting local governments and service delivery.[5] In the case of Uganda, the critical challenge to decentralization is that in taking that path, the country was venturing in the terrain where there were few and fragmented examples from which to learn.[6]

As such, the transition period has had its ups and downs. For example, both the decentralization law and policy have been interpreted differently by various groups. While some see decentralization as taking away the power of a central government, some in local governments seek the total independence of local governments. Most noteworthy is that the Local Government Act (CAP 243) Laws of Uganda has been lacking in several provisions which has prompted measures to amend it to accommodate practical realities of decentralization[7]. The 1995 Constitution of Uganda and the Local Government Act specify five levels of local government -

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[5] P. Bardhan and D. Mookherjee (2006). Decentralization and local governance in developing countries: a comparative perspective. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA; D. Olowu and J. Wunsch (2004). Local governance in Africa: the challenges of democratic decentralization. Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO.

[6] G. Meyers (2014). Decentralization in Uganda: Towards Democratic Local Governance or Political Expediency? In Challenges to democratic governance in developing countries (Public Administration, Governance and Globalization Series). G. M. Mudacumura and G. Morçöl (eds.), pp. 95-110. Springer.

[7] See, ACODE-ULGA (2014). Policy Memo on Local Government Reforms, submitted to the Minister of Local Government in October 2014.

district, county, sub-county, parish and village (See Figure 1). The delivery of both primary education and health care are decentralized in Uganda.[8]

Figure: 1 Local Government Structure in Uganda

Regarding education, the Government of Uganda considers education as a key priority for national development. In 1997 the Government launched the Universal Primary Education (UPE), which opened access to education opportunities to over 5 million children in the country. While UPE increased the opportunity of access to millions of children, the quality of education has remained poor. Various studies by UWEZO[9] have established that most of the children who complete Primary Seven are not able to read and write. Similarly, evidence shows that while a majority of the pupils who enrol for Primary One are girls, only 30 per cent of girls complete Primary Seven. The question then to ask is why 70 per cent of the girls who enrol end up dropping out of school and what it means for the country.

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[8] Ibid.

[9] UWEZO (2012): Are our Children Learning? Literacy and Numeracy across East Africa.

In health, while the primary health care infrastructure has expanded countrywide, staffing decisions are made at the district level, but district funding largely comes from the centre in the form of conditional grants with explicitly identified uses. Health centres remain understaffed and experience drug stock-outs with patients in most cases having to put up with unmotivated or demoralized and abusive health staff.

Challenges are faced in other sectors as well. In the roads sector, while government has increased the budget, most roads remain a nightmare to citizens, with soaring corruption levels being reported in the sector. For example, a recent corruption scandal in the roads sector relates to the construction of Katosi road in Mukono District. A Chinese company known as CICO was subcontracted by a phony company, Eutaw to tarmack the 74km Mukono - Katosi road. The project has stalled following a corruption scandal in which Uganda National Roads Authority (UNRA) was duped into paying UGX 24 billion in advance to a dubious firm which has since disappeared.[10]

This assessment report is organized into seven chapters including this introduction. The introductory chapter provides an overview of LGCSCI and of the decentralization context in which service delivery in Uganda occurs. While the report assesses evidence from 30 districts, we argue that this picture is representative of governance dynamics felt across the country. Chapter Two provides the analytical and conceptual framework that lie at the heart of the initiative, and describes decentralization in Uganda in greater detail. The chapter discusses the theory of change undergirding LGCSCI objectives of assessing the performance of local government leaders and providing the information about their performance to the electorate. As a strategic social accountability initiative, LGCSCI helps to build civic awareness and the capacity of citizens to demand better public services and political accountability from their leaders. In accordance with the initiative's theory of change, the increased demand for efficient service delivery and political accountability by citizens will be channelled upwards by the local governments to the central governments, which would then respond by implementing their mandates.

Chapter Three focuses on the methodology, scope and indicators. The methodology chapter describes the research design; participants in the research; research tools, data collection and management; quality control assurance and ethics; and the approach to analysis. Chapter Four focuses on the Score-card Performance and Assessment. It is the central

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[10] Frederick Musisi (2014).' We were conned on Katosi project- UNRA', Saturday Monitor, November 22, 2014.

chapter of the research report, presenting the performance results for all the 30 districts, and offering a comparative analysis of the performance of all councils, district chairpersons, district speakers and councillors across the districts. Chapter Five discusses trends in Local Government revenue and describes public service delivery in all 30 districts covered by LGCSCI. This is followed by a discussion of the associated challenges faced by citizens and districts alike. Chapter Six focuses on how to make local governments work for citizens, examining the internal and external factors affecting the performance of Local Government. Chapter Seven presents policy recommendations for improving the performance of local governments and of decentralization generally, and concludes with a discussion of LGCSCI's on-going impact on governance in Uganda.

Sufficient monitoring of roadworks by political leaders will ensure that roads are constructed with proper drainage: Flooded Alenga - Lira Road in Apac District.

2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: GOVERNANCE, VOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY

2.1 Genesis of Decentralization in Uganda

While the history of decentralization in Uganda can be traced back to the colonial period, it was not until the advent of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) Government in 1986 that it gained the prominence it enjoys today. In 1992, the Government of Uganda adopted the Decentralization Policy and enacted the Local Government Statute in 1993 and the subsequent Local Government Act of 1997. The 1995 Constitution articulated the current system of local government as a mechanism for decentralizing and devolving power and decision making to the citizens.[11]

Decentralization is expressed in the National Objectives and Directive Principles of the State Policy under the political objectives, and in particular under democratic principles of government. The Constitution is clear on the fact that the state shall be based on democratic principles, which empower active participation of all citizens at all levels in their own governance, and that all the people of Uganda shall have access to leadership positions at all levels. The Constitution also provides that 'the state shall be guided by the principle of decentralization and devolution of government functions and powers to the people at appropriate levels where they can best manage and direct their own affairs'. Chapter Eleven of the Constitution is dedicated to the decentralized local government which ensures government's commitment to decentralization.[12]

When the NRM came into power in 1986, government introduced the system of democratization through devolution of powers, which was already tested in the "bush war" days. It should be noted, however, that the adoption of the decentralization system was not only influenced by the internal factors but also by the external factors. In the 1980s, many

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[11] H, Ojambo, "Decentralization in Africa: A Critical Review of Uganda's Experience," Africa Development, Vol. XXX111, No. 4, 2012.

[12] UN-HABITAT, "Local Democracy and Decentralization in East and Southern Africa: Experiences from Uganda, Kenya, Botswana, Tanzania and Ethiopia," a publication of the Global Campaign on Urban Governance, 2002.

[13] S. Kahkonen & A. Lanyi, Decentralization and Governance: Does Decentralization Improve Public Service Delivery?, The World Bank PREM Notes, No. 55, June 2001.

developing countries, including Uganda, started to devolve central government functions to local jurisdictions. This shift was in response to political pressures for local autonomy and the need to deliver public services more efficiently.[13]

Decentralization was largely conceived as a vehicle that would improve governance and public service delivery by increasing 1) allocative efficiency through better matching of public services to local preferences, and 2) productive efficiency through increased accountability of local governments to citizens, fewer levels of bureaucracy, and better knowledge of local costs.

The rationale for decentralization is to promote efficient and accountable governance through increased involvement of the people in the way they are governed. This is achievable by empowering local governments to engage in localized planning and programme implementation, and creating citizens' control of government to enhance accountability through the democratic process. The adoption of the decentralization policy as a foundation for governance and public service delivery in Uganda beginning in 1987 promised a new deal for citizens as beneficiaries of the public service delivery system. It is generally believed that when people are involved in their own governance through decentralization, accountability on the part of the office bearers is enhanced, hence leading to more efficient utilization of public resources, which in turn promotes development. Furthermore, decentralization promises greater respect for human rights through the involvement of people in the design, planning and implementation of government programmes/policies.

Research over the past decade on the effectiveness of decentralization for improving service delivery has shown mixed results. On the positive side, Okidi and Guloba found that decentralization has in general terms fostered participatory planning and heightened a sense of local ownership and improved accountability.[14] In Uganda, improvement has been documented in the areas of healthcare, water, and increased enrolment of children in primary schools. In addition, local revenue collection has increased tenfold over the last 15 years. In spite of these achievements, there is widespread recognition that the delivery of public services is less than desirable at best or has malfunctioned at worst. Improvements in the key service delivery areas of health, education, agriculture and roads are not proportionate with the levels of public investment in these

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[14] J.A. Okidi & M. Guloba, 'Decentralisation and Development: Emerging Issues from Uganda's Experience', EPRC Occasional Paper, no. 31, Economic Policy Research Centre, Kampala, 2007.

areas. Rundown health centres and makeshift classrooms exist side-by-side with emerging state-of-the-art private health centres and schools. Inadequacies in staffing and drug supplies continue to plague health centres. Out of approximately 1.6 million children that enrol in Primary One, only about a third sit the Primary Leaving Examinations, with three quarters of these children largely unaccounted for because they disappear over the seven years of primary schooling.

Moreover, local governments are still constrained by inadequate financial resources, difficulties with attracting and retaining qualified staff, and ongoing corruption, nepotism and elite capture.[15] Structurally, acrimony and conflict often bedevil and compromise service delivery. For instance, the division of power between district chairpersons (the political head of the relevant jurisdiction) and resident district commissioners (appointed by the president to represent the government's interest and monitor the activities of districts) is ambigious and often creates conflict.[16]

Improving the service delivery outcomes of decentralization requires a two-pronged approach: ensuring that local government officials have what they need in order to do their jobs and building an active and engaged citizenry who hold them accountable. It requires a demand-side approach that is supplemented with building responsiveness on the supply side. With the local government score-card as its centrepiece, the Local Government Council Score-card Initiative increases the ability of citizens to hold their local government officials accountable for effective service delivery, and enhances the capacity of local government officials to respond to citizens' demands.

2.2   Theoretical and Conceptual Context

LGCSCI is a strategic social accountability initiative that enables citizens to demand excellence of their local governments and enables local governments to respond effectively and efficiently to those demands. Lee argues that *accountability* is a benchmark of good governance that requires transparency in the relationship between government officials

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[15]   B. Bashaasha, M.N. Mangheni and E. Nkoya, "Decentralization and Rural Service Delivery in Uganda," IFPRI Discussion Paper 01063, February 2011.

[16] O Azfar, J Livingston, & P. Meagher, "Decentralisation in Uganda" in P. Bardhanand& D, Mukherjee, eds., Decentralisation and Local Governance in Developing Countries: A Comparative Perspective. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2007.

[17] T. Lee, "The (Im)Possibility of Mobilizing Public Opinion?," in S. Odugbemi and T. Lee, eds., Accountability through Public Opinion: From Inertia to Public Action, World Bank Publication, 2011, pp.11-24.

and citizens, a sense of obligation among government officials to be responsive to citizens, and an empowered citizenry capable of punishing their government representatives if they fail to do so.[17] *Social accountability* refers to building accountability through citizen engagement in which "ordinary citizens and/or civil society organizations participate directly or indirectly in exacting accountability" from public sector officials,[18] often through the monitoring of public sector performance. *Social accountability initiatives* increase public sector performance by bolstering both citizen engagement and the public responsiveness of states.[19] *Strategic social accountability initiatives* have "a theory of change that takes into account the relationship between pro-change actions and eventual goals by specifying the multiple links in the causal chain".[20]

The Score-card Initiative is strategic. Whereas some social accountability initiatives focus primarily on a single link in the chain – e.g. citizens, civil society organizations, or local governments – the Score-card Initiative focuses on all of these links. Indeed, the central premise of LGCSCI theory of change is that monitoring the performance of local councils and providing information about their performance to the electorate will lead to citizens demanding accountability from their local elected officials. This increased demand, which CSOs and local governments will channel upwards to the national level, will ultimately result in a more engaged citizenry, a more responsive government, better performing local government officials, and more effective public service delivery. Figure 2 illustrates this theory of change.

The Local Government Councils' Score-card, and the rigorous data collection and dissemination methodology surrounding it (see Chapter 3), is the centrepiece of LGCSCI. The score-card is designed to fit into what some refer to as the "missing middle" of social accountability initiatives, turning uninformed citizens into informed citizens, unresponsive government into responsive government, and unaccountable government into accountable government.[21]

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[18] C. Malena, R. Forster & J. Singh, "Social Accountability: An Introduction to the Concept and Emerging Practice," Social Development Paper 76, World Bank, Washington DC, 2004, p.3.

[19] J. Fox, "Social Accountability: What Does the Evidence Really Say?," GPSA Working Paper No.1, Global Partnership for Social Accountability, September 2014.

[20] Fox, p.22.

[21] S. Odugbeme & T. Lee, "Taking Direct Accountability Seriously," in S. Odugbemi and T. Lee, eds., *Accountability through Public Opinion: From Inertia to Public Action*, World Bank Publication, 2011, pp.3-10.

Figure 2: Activating the Theory of Change

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                    ┌──────────────────────────────────┐
                    │  Central Government is responsive │
                    │    to local government demands    │
                    └──────────────────────────────────┘

┌──────────────────────────────────┐
│ Opportunities exist for productive│
│   CG-LGC engagement and that CG   │
│    is responsive to their demands │
└──────────────────────────────────┘

┌──────────────────────────┐      ┌──────────────────────────────────┐
│ Local Government is       │      │ Opportunities exist for productive│
│ responsive to citizens'   │◄────►│      CSO-LGC engagement           │
│ demands for service       │      └──────────────────────────────────┘
│ delivery                  │
└──────────────────────────┘      ┌──────────────────────────────────┐
                                  │      CSOs work on behalf of       │
┌──────────────────────────────┐  │   communities for better service  │
│ Opportunities exist for       │  │            delivery               │
│ productive citizen-LGC        │  └──────────────────────────────────┘
│ engagement                    │
└──────────────────────────────┘  ┌──────────────────────────────────┐
                                  │ Opportunities exist for productive│
                                  │     CSO-citizen engagement        │
                                  └──────────────────────────────────┘

┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Citizens use score-card results to demand accountability and        │
│ improved service delivery from Local Government Councils             │
└────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
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Its effectiveness as a tool for catalysing accountability and good governance depends, however, on the presence of both "voice" and "teeth".[22] Citizen *"voice"* is a key component of strategic social accountability initiative. Voice refers to the various ways in which citizens – either as individuals or in organized formations – can express their opinions and concerns, putting pressure on service providers, policy makers and elected leaders to demand better services or to advocate for them.[23] Reviews of social

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[22] Fox.

[23] S. Crawford, "Voice and Accountability in the Health Service of Bangladesh," How to Note, DFID, 2009

accountability initiatives have shown, however, that results from initiatives that rely solely on citizen voice are generally weak.[24] Citizen voices can be strengthened with the involvement of so-called interlocutors or intermediaries who facilitate two-way communication between governing bodies and citizens, and bridge cultural and power gaps.[25] Within the Score-card Initiative, both ACODE and local CSOs play this role as they interface with citizens and act as a conduit for citizen voice during the process of score-card data collection and the dissemination.

In addition to a strong citizen voice, effective social accountability initiatives must have "teeth", which Fox defines as governmental capacity to respond to voice.[26] This includes the capacity to respond positively to citizen voice through, for example, following up on recommendations that emerge from citizen engagement processes. It also includes governmental capacity to change practices and structures that inhibit transparency through, for example, investigating grievances and changing incentive structures to discourage wasteful, abusive or corrupt practices.[27] The LGCSCI methodology adds teeth to this social accountability initiative. Most significantly, the publication and dissemination of score-card results at the community, district and national levels makes visible individual councillors' performance on a broad range of good governance indicators. This not only provides citizens with very concrete information about their elected officials; it also provides a healthy dose of competition between councils to achieve top performance rankings.

Indeed, this national report synthesizing the score-card results of councillors, chairpersons, speakers and councils in all the 30 districts is a key "tooth" in LGCSCI strategic approach to achieving transparency, accountability and good governance in Uganda's local governments.

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[24] Lee, 2011; Fox, 2014; J, Gaventa& R. McGee, "The Impact of Transparency and Accountability Initiatives," *Development Policy Review* 31(S1):S3-S28, 2013.
[25] Fox, p.27.
[26] Fox, p.28
[27] Fox, p.28

Government has made significant investments and commitments in the ENR Sector, however, the forest cover continues to be depleted at a fast rate: Kasato Nankalangi Forest, Kigoma, Hoima District.

3 METHODOLOGY, SCOPE AND INDICATORS

3.1 Context and Rationale of LGCSCI

The Local Government Council Score-card Initiative (LGCSCI) is informed and premised in the theory of change where the main postulate is that as citizens are informed about the performance of their councils and councillors, their demand for effectiveness in public service delivery will be channelled upwards through the local government council system. As described in Chapter Two, LGCSCI is a strategic social accountability initiative driven by a demand-side theory of change.

Since 2009, LGCSCI has been implemented from a perspective of a demand-side model of monitoring and accountability, with three major groups of actors. The first group of actors is the citizens who are actively involved in monitoring and demanding better performance from mandated political and administrative institutions and leaders and through this process gaining the knowledge and skills required for civic engagement. The second group of actors is the Local Government institution which individually and collectively serves the role of a pressure point that is jolted into demanding accountability from the central government. The third category of actors is a competent civil society which, along with the media, operates in the space between citizens on the one hand and political and administrative leaders on the other hand.

In addition to serving a capacity building role for all three categories of actors, LGCSCI is an action research undertaking. Unlike many social accountability initiatives which rely primarily on citizen opinion to produce report cards, the score-card at the centre of LGCSCI is evidence-based. Using systematic quantitative and qualitative data-collection techniques and following conventional scientific norms and good practices, the assessment details actions taken by political leaders and analyses the implications of those actions for service delivery outcomes.

3.2 Selection Criteria of Assessed Districts

Figure 3 shows the districts participating in the LGCSCI assessment. The selection of districts to include in the assessment is based on five criteria. First, the selection takes into account the need to include districts from

Figure 3: Map of Uganda showing the distribution of participating districts by geographical location

all the regions of Uganda. The objective of this criterion is to encourage cross-regional learning and a better understanding of whether there are any variations in performance due to the geopolitical location of the district.

The second criterion is the length of time the district has been in existence. Since 1986, Government has continued to create new districts out of the already existing district units. Districts are therefore categorized as 'old' if they were in existence prior to 1986 and 'new' if they were created after 1986. The primary justification for creating districts is the need to "bring services closer to the people". Consequently, the score-

card seeks to examine whether there are considerable variations in performance between elected local leaders from old districts and those from the newly-created districts. Districts are also selected for inclusion in the Score-card because they had been perceived to be model districts according to the Annual Assessment. It is imperative to explore whether such a rating could be linked to the record of performance of the political leadership or a combination of other factors.

The fourth criterion is the perceived marginalization of districts on account of their geopolitical location. This criterion provides a basis for examining the performance of elected leaders in such districts *vis a vis* "non-marginalized" districts or whether the quality of service delivery is substantially different compared to the districts that are not considered marginalized. For purposes of this criterion, a district is considered marginalized if it is classified in the "hard-to-reach" categorization by the Ministry of Public Service or has suffered prolonged conflicts and instability. [28]

Finally, some of the districts were selected because of their perceived position of influence in a particular region. Given that the score-card cannot be conducted in all districts due to the costs involved, the inclusion of influential districts is intended to ensure the spillover effects of the assessment to other districts within the respective regions. A district is considered influential if it has a large population and has a municipality within its jurisdiction. Mbarara, Lira, Wakiso, Tororo, Moroto, Gulu, Soroti and Hoima fall under this category. It is important to emphasize that the five criteria are complementary rather than exclusive. Consequently, a district that meets multiple criteria is more likely to be selected for inclusion in the assessment.

3.3   Research Design in LGCSCI Methodology

The action research methodology underpinning LGCSCI combines capacity building with an assessment of political leaders' ability to fulfil their mandate as defined in the Local Government Act. [29] LGCSCI is not a name and shame undertaking but an intervention geared towards continuous training and equipping of political leaders to be effective in fulfilling their mandates. As such, the assessment tools and methods are designed in such a way that they lead researchers to carry out capacity building through the data collection process.

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[28] The following districts fall under this category: Moroto, Nakapiripirit, Amuru, Lira, Soroti and Luwero.
[29] See, **Local Government Act (CAP 243)**, Third Schedule

Each of the annual LGCSCI assessments is conducted over a period of four months stretching from June to September. The reference point for the assessment is the previous (just concluded) financial year. This report is for FY 2013/14.

3.3.1 Participants in the Research

While the primary focus of assessment within LGCSCI project are political leaders, data is also gathered from clerks to council, chief administrative officers (CAOs), district heads of department, sub-county chiefs, administrators of service delivery units and a cross-section of citizens. Political leaders that participate as respondents include the district chairpersons, speakers and district councillors. In addition, the district council as the highest decision-making body in the district is assessed as an entity through an interview with clerks to council. Citizens are engaged in the assessment process through focus group discussions, often designed as consultative meetings or dialogues.

3.3.2 Respondent Selection (Sampling)

Since the focus of LGCSCI is on the entire political leadership at the district level, all elected political leaders are primary sources of information. Technical leaders in the districts like CAOs, clerks to council, sub-county chiefs and heads of department provide corroborating evidence that is used to score elected leaders. However, purposive sampling is used to select administrators of service delivery units, key informants and FGD participants. During the year under review, a total of 806 FGDs were conducted in 403 sub-counties.

3.3.3 Score-cards and Local Government Structure

The score-cards are designed to assess the work of elected political leaders and representative organs to deliver on their electoral promises, improve public service delivery, ensure accountability and promote good governance. It is important to bear in mind that the Local Government Council comprises councillors elected to represent geographically defined areas. Each council also has members elected to represent the special interests of women, youth, and people with disabilities. [30] Separate Score-cards are produced for chairpersons, speakers, councillors, and the council as a whole.

The main building blocks in LGCSCI score-card are the principles and core responsibilities of local governments as set out in the Constitution[31]

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[30] **Local Governments Act (CAP 243) Laws of Uganda**, Section 10 (c),(d) and (e)
[31] Constitution, 1995 (As amended), Article 176

and the Local Governments Act.[32] These are classified into five categories: (1) financial management and oversight; (2) political functions and representation; (3) legislation and related functions; (4) development planning and constituency servicing and (5) monitoring service delivery. In the score-card, these are referred to as parameters. The parameters are broken down into a set of quantitative and qualitative indicators reflecting the statutory responsibilities and functions of the elected leader or institution being assessed.

3.3.4 Research Instruments for Data Collection

a) **Structured Interviewer Schedules:** Structured interview schedules for councillors, the chairperson, and the speaker comprise the starting point for the score-card process. The questions on the schedule correspond to the indicators on the respective score-card and have been developed in line with the legally-defined roles and responsibilities of political leaders. The structured interview provides an opportunity for the individual under assessment to provide information about his or her performance for each indicator on the score-card.

b) **FGD Guide:** Designed to engage citizens in a consultative meeting and dialogue process, the FGD guide is used at the sub-county level. The guide consists of a set of questions aligned to the national priority programme areas. Its utility is to enable citizens to discuss the quality of service delivery in their sub-county and to verify information provided by councillors. The guide also contains questions that gauge their level of civic awareness, and in the process builds their capacity for effective civic engagement.

c) **Key Informant Interview Guide:** This is a tool for use with the technical leaders at the district and sub-county level. It is designed to gain an overall picture of service delivery. The emphasis of these interviews is on determining quality, targets and level of achievement. Information from these interviews is also used to verify information provided by councillors about their performance on relevant indicators.

d) **Observation Checklist:** The observation checklist is mainly used at service delivery units to verify and record evidence of assertions made by Councillors, in written reports, and by technical leaders.

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[32] *Local Governments Act (CAP 243), Laws of Uganda* Section 30

e) Photography: Pictures are used to capture salient features associated with service delivery in the district.

3.3.5 Data Collection Processes

A number of qualitative and quantitative tools are used to collect data. Research teams of over 80 researchers from 30 districts interface with respondents, often in face-to-face encounters. The research team asks all the relevant questions and records the responses. Questions are asked and responses elicited in languages that suit the study participants in terms of comfort and confidence. The respondents are given liberty to refer to documents or refer the researcher to documents to corroborate what they are saying. The research team is at liberty to look for any other evidence to gauge the authenticity of responses elicited. The administration of LGCSCI score-card is a process. This process is pursued rigorously to ensure the involvement of citizens and the removal of potential bias from the assessment. Data collection is approached using the following methods:

a) **Document Review:** This process involves preliminary and on-going comprehensive review of both published and grey literature as well as official government reports. Key literature reviewed for LGCSCI annual assessments includes: service delivery and infrastructure reports, budgets, planning documents, minutes of district councils and their committees and many others.

b) **Structured Interviews:** These are carried out as part of administering the score-card parameters. Each of the accessible councillors is engaged in a face-to-face interview structured around the score-card. The process is a vital aspect of collecting verbal evidence that is verified later through written evidence of councillors' performance. Information elicited in the structured interviews is critical to the scoring of the score-card.

c) **Field Visits:** The information collected in structured interviews is verified through field visits to specific service delivery units and unstructured interviews with service users at respective units. Observation of service delivery units is supplemented with photography to verify assertions of councillors.

d) **Focus Group Discussions (FGDs):** Each of these consists of between 10 – 15 people. The composition of each FGD deliberately includes a gender-balanced cross-section of community leaders, ordinary citizens and youth. The purpose of FGDs is to enable citizens to verify information provided by their

respective councillors. The FGD participants are selected from community consultative meeting (dialogue) participants. LGCSCI researchers share the role of moderating and note-taking during these FGDs, which are conducted at sub-county level.

e) **Civic Awareness Meetings:** In line with the capacity building component of LGCSCI, civic awareness meetings with citizens are conducted in each sub-county. Prior to these meetings, enough mobilization is done to ensure satisfactory attendance. The dialogues typically follow the focus group discussions and are moderated by district-based LGCSCI researchers using guiding statements and questions developed from core thematic areas spelt out in the Local Governments Act. The meetings are platforms for civic education and empowerment about the role of the district council, councillors and the district chairman, as well as the duties of a citizen.

f) **Key Informant Interviews:** Key informant interviews are conducted with technical officers in the district, including CAOs, heads of department, clerks to council, sub-county chiefs and service delivery unit heads. The major focus of these interviews is on collecting succinct information on the status of service delivery and verifying the actions undertaken by the political actors during the financial year.

3.4 Data Management and Analysis

Determining the final scores for the score-cards involves careful analysis of both qualitative and quantitative data collected. The process begins with assembling the evidence from the document review, as the documents contain recorded evidence of council and councillor performance on most indicators. With this information in hand, the structured interviews are conducted with individual councillors, chairpersons and speakers. Information from the structured interviews is then augmented and verified through key informant interviews, focus group discussions, and field visits.

Each score-card is sub-divided into parameters. For each parameter, a series of indicators have been developed. Every indicator is assigned an absolute score that is awarded using a threshold approach. Cumulatively, the total score for the score-card is 100 points.

Data handling undergoes three major processes before it is used to produce the final scores and accompanying district and national level reports.

a) **Data cleaning:** Transcripts from the FGDs, notes from KIs and the preliminary marks on the indicators given by the researchers are reviewed by the technical team at ACODE to ensure accuracy and completeness.

b) **Data entry:** Qualitative data (FGD and KI interview transcripts, summaries from documents and field notes) are entered into Atlas-ti, while the quantitative data (scores from the score-card) are entered using Epi-data. Key statistics from ministries and budget information are entered and managed in Microsoft Excel Worksheets.

c) **Data analysis:** Qualitative data is coded and analyzed using the Atlas.ti qualitative data analysis software package. Key quotations and summaries of views from the various FGDs and KIs reflected in this report are a result of this process. Quantitative data, on the other hand, is imported into SPSS where correlations and descriptive summaries were generated. Excel is used to generate graphs and tables used in this report.

Since the inception of the score-card, a significant set of data on each of the districts participating in the assessment has been collected on governance and local service delivery. Given that data has been collected consistently since July 2011, it is now possible to identify trends in local government performance over time. This report augments analysis of the 2012-13 score-card data with a discussion of these trends.

3.5   Quality Control Measures in LGCSCI Assessment

a)   **Periodic reviews:** The score-card undergoes periodic reviews by an expert task group comprised of academicians, officials from the Ministry of Local Government (MoLG), representatives from the parliamentary committee on local governments, district technical and political leaders and representatives of civil society. The rationale for periodic review is to ensure the tool is robust and legitimate.

b)   **Constitution of District Research Teams:** Each of the 30 participating districts has a three-person research team comprising a lead researcher and two research assistants. The research assistants are resident in the district and are responsible

for collecting information and data needed for the analysis and interpretation of the scores assigned for each indicator. They also participate in organizing FGDs, conducting interviews with councillors and validating the information provided by visiting service delivery units. The lead researcher directly supervises the fieldwork and produces the district report.

c)   **Training of District Research Teams:** The lead researchers and research assistants undergo intensive three-day training in basic research methods, research ethics, budget monitoring, data collection, organizing and managing community meetings and focus group discussions, and conflict management.

d)   **Use of a Researchers' Guide:** The researchers' guide was developed by the technical implementing team with input from the expert task group and district researchers. The guide explains the parameters and indicators in the questionnaires in detail, and provides explanatory notes to guide the researchers. The researchers' guide also has a glossary that defines the key words in the questionnaires. This guarantees some degree of homogeneity and reliability in understanding and interpreting the scores.

e)   **Report Writing Workshop:** A three-day report writing workshop is organized centrally for all lead researchers. The session is also used to peer-review the score-cards before the marks are submitted to ACODE for final verification.

f)   **Multi-layered verification process:** The processes of score-card generation begin with the district research team responsible for collecting information and data that provides evidence for scores assigned to each indicator. The second layer involves a team of lead researchers who directly supervise fieldwork and produce district reports. The third layer comprises LGCSCI leadership team who are responsible for the final validation of data with the purpose of removing or mitigating potential bias in the scoring. This is done by reviewing all information and data on which each score is based

g)   **Technical backstopping:** The project management team comprises ACODE researchers who work closely with lead researchers to provide support and guidance throughout the research process. The team is responsible for the final validation of the data and removing or mitigating potential bias in the scoring by reviewing and corroborating all information and data on which each score is based. LGCSCI leadership team provides a peer

review of the research process and ultimately authors the national synthesis report.

h)   **External review of Synthesis Report:** Before final publication, the report is externally reviewed and edited to ensure consistency and quality of content.

3.6   Ethical Issues

a) **Conflict of interest:** On rare occasions, some district researchers in the course of doing LGCSCI work express interest in joining elective politics to replace politicians they are assessing. Because this creates serious conflict of interest, such researchers are asked to step down from LGCSCI assessments. In other situations, LGCSCI researchers subscribe to political opinions different from the people they are tasked to assess which has potential to compromise the assessments. During training and support supervision, researchers are counselled to be objective, fair, balanced and non-partisan in ACODE and LGCSCI work or to step-down if they find this ethical behaviour to be irreconcilable with their political aspirations.

b) **Politicians who decline to be assessed:** Although all politicians are oriented and prepared for an upcoming assessment, a few may object and decline to participate in the one-to-one interviews. When such a situation arises, a politician is given the opportunity to change his or her mind during a four-month period. Researchers are advised to approach the offices of the district chairperson and speaker to ask them to convince the councillor to accept to be assessed. Having exhausted all possible options, politicians are assessed using secondary data (council minutes, committee reports and sub-county records). This year, only 19 of 732 councillors declined to be interviewed and were therefore subjected to this form of assessment. LGCSCI project stands by the position that assessment be applied to all elected officials because they have a social contract with the citizenry.

c) **Potential for compromised research:** While we have not registered any case of bribery of researchers by politicians who desire favourable assessments, the research team at ACODE anticipates the possibility and has put in place mechanisms to avert it. Supervisors deliberately make on-spot checks to verify scores awarded by district researchers, and an evidence verification exercise is undertaken centrally before a final mark is awarded.

d) **Confidentiality**: In conducting assessments of this type, confidential information frequently comes to the attention of researchers. Researchers are counselled and tasked to keep confidential any personal and private information they might have come across concerning study participants during data collection.

e) **Informed consent:** All districts participating in the assessment were approached and gave institutional consent, agreeing to the score-card assessment process. This consent was secured during the inception meetings with the distict leadership. On another level, all elected political leaders who accept to be assessed are requested to give oral consent. They are told about the purpose of the assessment, as well as risks and benefits associated with participating in the assessment.

f) **Voluntary participation.** All participants in the assessment did so willingly, without any coercion. In the case of political leaders who declined to be interviewed, they were informed that the assessment would be undertaken using secondary data.

3.7   Strengths and Limitations of the Assessment

The assessment of political leaders and institutions is fair and engages participants in a detailed way as much as possible. LGCSCI methodology is well developed. The researchers' guide contains detailed instructions for conducting interviews and definitions of key indicators, which greatly increases the reliability of the data gathered. Moreover, all researchers involved in the assessments have been trained in social research methods.

Although the data collection process is labour and time-consuming, the variety of research tools used enabled triangulation of data sources. This improved the validity and credibility of findings. The mixture of data collection methods ensures that complementary data is collected from individuals, official documents, and technical leaders to enable exploration of issues more in-depth and validate claims by study participants.

At the moment, the score-card only focuses on the district council and its organs. It is pertinent to note that the assessment does not cover municipalities and sub-counties because of the limited human and financial resources required to expand the assessments to cover these institutions.

Although the District Executive Committee is one of the important organs of the council, it is not included in the assessment because it is constituted through political appointment by the chairperson. Hence its performance is largely determined by the performance of the chairperson. Similarly, the score-card is silent on the role of other political oversight offices in the district such as District Public Accounts Committees (DPAC).

The assessment subjects all councillors to a uniform assessment, regardless of the size of the constituency served by the councillor. Councillors representing special interest groups (women, youth, and people with disabilities) have much larger constituencies, yet they are scored with the same instruments and criteria as those with fewer constituents. LGCSCI leadership team acknowledges this shortcoming of the methodology.

3.8 Report Dissemination

Report dissemination takes place at the national and district levels. At the national level, the synthesis report presents the major highlight of the 30 district report cards and provides a comparison of performance between the districts. This report is presented to national stakeholders, including MPs, officials from ministries, development partners, district leaders, civil society organizations, the media and the private sector. The dissemination of the district-level score-card reports is open to the general public with special invitation to the district political and technical leadership, sub-county leaders, local CBOs, local media and FGD participants.

Despite government investment in the water sector, a significant number of Ugandans do not have access to safe drinking water: Community water source in Toro Parish, Amuru Sub-County, Amuru District.

4 SCORE-CARD PERFORMANCE AND ANALYSIS

This chapter presents the general performance of the district councils, district chairpersons, speakers and councillors from the 30 districts that were assessed during the year under review. Four of the 30 districts – Arua, Nwoya, Masindi and Apac – were being assessed for the first time. The assessment focused on the following roles as stipulated in the Local Government Act: legislative function, contact with the electorate, participation at Lower Local Government (LLG) level, monitoring of the National Priority Programme Areas (NPPAs), political leadership and accountability to citizens.

4.1 Composition of District Councils

There are four broad categories of councillors: directly elected councillors, women councillors (affirmative action ticket), youth councillors and PWDs. While the directly elected and women councillors are voted through adult suffrage, the councillors representing the special interest groups of youth and people with disabilities are elected by secret ballot under electoral collages comprising leaders from grassroots groups. This section provides an overview of the composition of the district councils in the study, focusing on size of the councils, gender composition, political party affiliation, level of education, and number of terms served. After presenting the results of the score-cards, we will examine the degree to which councillor performance varies by each of these characteristics.

4.1.1 District Council Size

The size of the district councils varies considerably as it is largely based on the administrative units. Among the 30 districts assessed during the year under review, council size ranged from 15 councillors for Amuru to 49 councillors in Arua. Figure 4 shows the number of councillors for each district.

Figure 4: Size of District Councils

4.1.2 Gender Representation

District councillors and other local leaders in Uganda are elected through a combination of universal adult suffrage and special constituency elections. Women's participation in politics is guaranteed under the constitution[33] and the Local Government Act.[34] Through affirmative action, at least 30 per cent of the positions in council should be held by women. Consequently, gender representation is particularly guaranteed through the special constituency elections, which also include youth[35] and people with disability (PWDs).[36] These three groups are popularly referred to as special interest groups. During the year under review, a total of 731 councillors were assessed, 57 per cent (415) were male and 43 per cent (316) were female. Only two of the 30 chairpersons and three of the 30 speakers were women.

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[33] See *Constitution of the Republic of Uganda* (Article 32:1).
[34] See *Local Government Act* (CAP 243), Section 10.
[35] Every district council has 2 youth councillors: one male and one female.
[36] Every district council has 2 PWD councillors: one male and one female.

4.1.3 Political party affiliation

In terms of linkages, councillors matter to the national parties both as a barometer of support and as the foot soldiers for the general election campaign. During the year under review, councillor political party affiliation within the 30 districts mirrored the picture at the national level. The majority of councillors (532) subscribed to the ruling NRM party followed by the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC), Independent councillors, Uganda Peoples' Congress (UPC), Democratic Party (DP) and Uganda Federal Alliance. Figure 5 presents a summary of political party affiliation of councillors from all 30 districts.

Figure 5: Political Party Affiliation of Councillors in the 30 Districts

4.1.4 Councillors' Level of Education

Education is widely understood to be central to the development of human capital, and an engine for economic growth. Higher levels of education are also strongly associated with social capital, and have a universally positive effect on all forms of civic engagement. Indeed, the social gains of an educated public are an important justification for the huge expenditures on education by district councils. The contributions an educated electorate brings to civil society and citizens in general cannot be over-emphasized. During the year under review, 4 per cent of the councillors had only completed primary, while 36 per cent had completed Ordinary Level or Certificate. Thirty-eight per cent had completed Advanced Level or Diploma, and 21 per cent had completed either a Bachelors (20 per cent) or Masters (one per cent) degree. Only

one per cent of the councillors did not disclose their level of education. Figure 6 summarizes councillors' levels of education from the 30 districts.

Figure 6: Councillors' Level of Education

4.1.5 Number of Terms Served by Councillors

Previous score-card reports suggest that serving multiple terms enhance general councillor performance, with investments in general legislative knowledge gained through learning by doing. In some cases though, too many terms can be responsible for relaxed accountability. During the assessment period, the majority (524) of councillors were serving their first term as shown in Figure 7, there is a small number of councillors serving their fourth (20) and fifth (5) terms respectively.

Figure 7: Number of terms served by councillors

4.2   Performance of District Councils

The policy of decentralization in Uganda is operationalized through the district as a unit. A district council is a corporate body that can sue or be sued. It is also the highest authority within a district with executive, legislative, planning and administrative powers. In terms of political leadership, district councils comprise directly elected councillors and councillors representing special interest groups, including women, people with disabilities, and the youth. The district council is a game changer for social accountability because it is the platform where councillors can raise issues affecting their electorates and ensure that resources are allocated for the most pressing service delivery needs.

The local government council is the focus of the assessment. The score-card indicators are derived from the functions of the local government councils as stipulated under the Local Governments Act. The indicators seek to establish the extent to which a council uses its political, legislative, administrative, and planning powers to address the issues that affect the electorate within its jurisdiction. During the assessment period, the district councils were assessed on four parameters: legislative role, accountability to citizens, planning and budgeting, and monitoring service delivery on National Priority Programme Areas (NPPAs). Table 1 presents a summary of the performance of all 30 districts councils.

Table 1: Performance of District Councils 2013/14

District	Performance				Legislative Role											Accountability to Citizens						Planning and Budgeting				Monitoring NPPAs							
	2011/12	2012/13	2013/14	% change	Rules of Procedure	Membership to ULGA	Committees of Council	Motions Passed	Ordinances	Conflict Resolution	Public Hearings	Legislative Resources	Petitions	Capacity Building	Sub Total	Fiscal Accountability	Political Accountability	Administrative Accountability	Involvement of CSO	Principles of Accountability	Sub total	Plans, Vision and Mission	District Budget	Local Revenue	Sub total	Education	Health	Water and Sanitation	Roads	Agriculture	FAL	ENR	SubTotal
Max Points	100	100	100		2	2	3	3	3	1	2	4	2	3	25	4	8	8	2	3	25	5	4	11	20	5	5	4	4	4	4	4	30
Gulu	82	75	84	12	2	2	3	1	0	1	0	4	2	3	18	3	7	8	2	2	22	5	4	9	18	5	5	4	4	4	0	4	26
Wakiso	71	76	83	9	2	2	3	2	0	1	0	2	2	3	17	4	8	8	2	0	22	5	4	9	18	4	5	3	4	3	3	4	26
Jinja	44	66	82	24	2	2	3	2	1	1	2	3	2	3	21	4	6	4	2	2	18	5	4	9	18	5	5	2	4	4	3	2	25
Mpigi	67	72	82	14	2	1	3	2	2	1	2	4	2	0	19	4	6	8	2	0	20	5	4	9	18	5	5	3	4	4	0	4	25
Kabarole	75	63	81	29	2	1	2	2	0	1	0	3	2	2	15	4	7	8	2	2	23	5	4	9	18	5	5	3	3	3	3	3	25
Rukungiri	69	70	80	14	2	0	3	1	1	1	2	4	2	3	19	4	4	8	0	3	21	5	4	9	18	3	3	3	3	3	3	4	22
Mbarara	53	62	75	21	2	1	3	2	2	1	0	2	2	3	18	3	5	6	0	0	14	5	4	9	18	4	4	3	4	3	3	4	25
Luwero	70	60	71	18	2	0	3	2	0	1	0	1	1	3	13	4	6	7	2	0	19	5	4	7	16	4	5	3	4	2	2	3	23
Amuria	76	70	69	-1	2	2	2	2	1	0	0	2	1	3	15	4	3	7	2	0	16	5	4	2	11	5	5	4	4	3	3	3	27
Kamuli	40	67	69	3	2	1	3	2	0	1	2	2	0	2	15	4	6	5	2	0	17	5	4	2	11	5	5	3	4	3	3	4	26
Mukono	78	67	69	3	2	0	2	2	0	1	0	4	2	2	15	4	4	4	2	3	17	5	4	6	15	3	5	3	3	3	0	4	22
Tororo	40	55	69	25	2	1	3	1	1	1	0	4	1	1	15	3	6	4	2	1	16	5	4	5	14	5	4	3	3	3	3	3	24
Kanungu	67	57	69	21	2	1	3	1	1	1	2	3	2	2	18	4	5	2	2	0	13	5	4	9	18	4	5	1	2	4	0	4	20
Nwoya			68		2	2	3	0	0	1	2	2	2	3	17	3	7	3	2	1	16	5	4	9	18	3	3	3	3	3	0	2	17
Bududa	60	61	64	5	2	0	2	0	0	1	0	2	2	3	12	3	3	2	2	2	12	4	4	2	10	5	5	4	4	4	4	4	30

District	Max Points	Performance 2011/12	Performance 2012/13	Performance 2013/14	% change	Rules of Procedure	Membership to ULGA	Committee of Council	Motions Passed	Ordinances	Conflict Resolution	Public Hearings	Legislative Resources	Petitions	Capacity Building	Legislative Sub Total	Fiscal Accountability	Political Accountability	Administrative Accountability	Involvement of CSO	Principles of Accountability	Accountability Sub total	Plans, Vision and Mission	District Budget	Local Revenue	Planning Sub total	Education	Health	Water and Sanitation	Roads	Agriculture	FAL	ENR	Monitoring SubTotal
Max Points	100	100	100	100		2	2	3	3	3	1	2	4	2	3	25	4	8	8	2	3	25	5	4	11	20	5	5	4	4	4	4	4	30
Mbale		55	68	64	-6	2	0	3	0	0	1	0	4	1	3	14	3	4	5	2	3	17	5	4	2	11	5	5	3	3	3	3	0	22
Lira		49	62	63	2	2	2	3	3	0	1	1	3	1	3	19	2	8	6	2	1	19	5	4	7	16	0	3	0	0	4	0	2	9
Amuru		30	40	61	53	2	2	2	2	0	1	0	2	0	3	14	3	6	3	2	0	14	5	4	9	18	3	3	2	2	1	1	3	15
Nakapiripirit		56	61	61	0	2	2	1	2	2	1	0	1	2	3	16	3	5	6	2	3	19	4	3	4	11	3	2	3	2	1	0	4	15
Masindi				60		2	1	3	2	0	1	2	3	2	1	17	4	5	5	2	1	17	4	4	6	14	1	2	2	3	2	1	1	12
Moyo		55	63	59	-6	2	1	2	3	0	1	2	1	2	1	15	3	5	5	2	0	15	5	4	0	9	5	5	3	3	3	1	0	20
Moroto		55	56	56	0	2	1	1	1	0	1	0	2	1	2	11	2	4	3	2	2	13	4	4	7	15	4	4	3	3	2	1	0	17
Ntungamo		64	69	56	-19	2	1	3	0	0	1	0	4	0	0	11	3	3	2	2	1	11	5	4	7	16	5	5	4	3	0	0	1	18
Agago			51	51	0	2	0	3	1	0	0	0	2	2	2	12	3	6	4	2	0	15	5	4	2	11	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	13
Nebbi		51	69	51	-26	2	1	2	1	1	1	0	2	1	2	13	3	3	5	2	0	13	5	4	2	11	5	3	0	3	2	0	1	14
Apac				50		2	0	2	3	0	1	2	2	2	2	16	3	4	5	2	0	14	5	4	7	16	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	4
Hoima		48	67	49	-27	2	0	2	2	0	0	0	2	1	3	12	4	5	2	2	0	13	5	4	2	11	3	3	2	2	2	0	1	13
Arua				46		2	2	3	2	0	1	0	1	0	3	14	4	4	5	2	1	16	5	4	2	11	1	1	1	0	2	0	0	5
Soroti		68	60	43	-28	2	1	0	1	0	1	0	3	1	0	9	3	4	3	0	0	10	5	4	2	11	2	5	2	2	2	0	0	13
Buliisa		57	60	33	-45	2	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	2	7	3	3	6	2	0	14	4	4	2	10	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2
Average		59	63	64	4	2	1	2	2	0	1	1	3	1	2	15	3	5	5	2	1	16	5	4	6	14	3	4	2	3	3	1	2	19

4.2.1 Overall Performance

Overall, Gulu Distict Council emerged the best performer with a score of 84 out of 100 possible points. This performance represents improvement at two levels. First, the district progressed from the second position to the first. Second, the score represents a percentage change of 12 points when compared the previous year's performance. It is also important to note that Gulu has a record of excellent performance, as it was also rated the best performing district council during the second and third assessments. Only one point behind Gulu is Wakiso District (83 points), which is closely followed by Jinja (82 points), Mpigi (82 points), Kabarole (81 points) and Rukungiri District (80 points). In addition to all scoring above 80, all five of these districts recorded improvement from the previous year. Indeed, 12 of the top 13 districts' scores improved as compared to FY 2012/13. Amuru District council registered the highest percentage change of 53 per cent, moving from the worst performer last year to the middle of the rankings this year. The average score for all councils was 64.

One of the four new districts (Nwoya) scored slightly above average (64), but Masindi, Apac and Arua had scores below average. A total of eight districts suffered setbacks in terms of performance, with negative percentage changes. Hoima, Soroti and Buliisa registered the greatest decline.

4.2.2 Legislative Role

Legislation is one of the central functions of district councils in Uganda. It is through the legislative function that a council can actually exercise its powers by passing either resolutions or ordinances. While in council, the councillor's job is to work with other council members to set the overall direction of the district through their role as policy makers. The policies that council sets are the guidelines for the district administration to follow. Ideally, councillors should spend more time while on council deciding on new policies setting up programmes or reviewing the current ones to make sure they are working to improve the quality of service delivery.

The legislative function is assessed by examining the operationalization of the rules of procedure, functionality of committees of council, and passing lawful motions on various policies. The functionality of the business committee is equally important in understanding the legislative function, as this determines the agenda for discussion. The process of discussing bills and passing ordinances is also critically analyzed. During the assessment period, district councils registered improved

performance with regard to their legislative role. The model rules of procedure for district councils had been adopted and operationalized by all 30 councils. The functionality of the executive committee, standing committees and business committees was also impressive, with 21 out 30 districts meeting the minimum threshold stipulated in the score-card.

By contrast, district councils registered a decline in performance with regard to passing of ordinances. Twenty-one of 30 councils did not pass a single ordinance, a notable decline from the previous financial year when this was the case for only 10 of 26 districts.

4.2.3 Accountability to Citizens

Given their planning and administrative powers, local government councils are required by law to remain politically, administratively and fiscally accountable to citizens. In practice, council debates, decisions and resolutions should not be the sole reserve of the council members but should be communicated to the citizens through various forms. Accountability also involves open and inclusive participation of citizens during council meetings.

Regrettably, the areas of political and administrative accountability remain a major challenge to most of the districts. This is clearly demonstrated through their performance where districts scored only 5 out of the possible 8 points. Only two districts (Wakiso and Lira) scooped full marks for political accountability, and only 5 districts earned full marks for administrative accountability.

4.2.4 Planning and Budgeting

The functionality of the technical arm of any district is highly dependent on the planning and budgeting function of the district council. Under this parameter, the score-card indicators focus on availability and approval of plans, vision and mission statements, and levels of local revenue collection. Local revenue is important for ensuring local government discretion with regard to setting local priorities. It is this same revenue the guarantees council's sittings and meetings. The more local revenue a district collects the more capacity and flexibility it has to respond to service delivery issues raised by the voters.

Findings from our data show commendable progress under this parameter. During FY 2012/13, only one district council (Amuru) earned full marks for local revenue generation. This year, by contrast, 10 districts earned full marks, including all of the top 7 districts. This represents a significant increase in the capacity of local governments to engage

successfully in generating their own revenue. Moreover, the success of fund-development strategies of these ten districts can serve as models for other districts which continue to struggle to generate local revenue.

4.2.5 Monitoring NPPAs

The Ugandan Constitution stipulates that local governments oversee the performance of government employees who provide services, and monitor the provision of government services and the implementation of projects in their districts. [37] The primary responsibility for discharging this mandate falls on the local government council as the planning authority of the district. The Local Government Act also obligates local governments to accord National Priority Programme Areas (NPPAs) preferential budget outlays.[38] These programme areas are reflected in the National Development Plan (NDP) under different categories. Score-card results over the last five years show a steady improvement in the general monitoring role of local government councils, though there remains work to be done in this performance area.

With the exception of Bududa District, monitoring of FAL still stands out as a major challenge for districts across the board. Of the 30 districts, 13 did not earn any mark in this area. Compared with FY 2012/13, the average score for monitoring FAL programmes dropped from 2 to 1. The average score for monitoring schools (education) dropped from 4 to 3 (out of a possible 5 points), as fewer districts earned full marks and more received marks ranging from 0 to 1. Monitoring of agricultural services also registered a decline in performance. The average score for monitoring of agricultural services increased from 2 to 3. That notwithstanding, a total of six districts[39] earned full marks in this area, compared to only two last year. The situation with monitoring health remained static over the last two years. The average remained at 4 (out of a possible 5 points). A notable achievement, however, is that this year half of the districts (15 out of 30) earned full marks in health service monitoring. The average score for monitoring of roads remained the same as last year: 3 out of 4 possible points. Only 9 out of 30 districts earned full marks for road services monitoring.

In sum, the overall performance of district councils on the FY 2013-14 score-card improved slightly over the previous years, and would undoubtedly have shown greater improvement were four new districts not added.

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[37] Constitution of the Republic of Uganda (As amended), Article 176(2) (g)
[38] Local Government Act (CAP 243), Section 77 (1), (2) and (3)
[39] Gulu, Jinja, Mpigi, Kanungu, Bududa, and Lira districts.

Understandably, the performance of the new score-card districts tended to be below average. Notable overall improvements were in passing and operationalizing rules of procedure, fiscal accountability, and working with CSOs.   Monitoring of NPPAs continues to be a challenge, and councils definitely need to improve their performance in terms of passing ordinances.

4.3   Performance of District Chairpersons

The district chairperson is the political head of a district with executive powers and authority to monitor the general administration of the district. Among their key functions, chairpersons preside over meetings of the executive committee, are responsible for ensuring the implementation of council decisions, and oversee performance of civil servants in the district. As a political head of a district, the chairperson is expected not only to attend council sittings but also designate one day during the year to make a report on the state of affairs of the district. The function of presiding over the executive committee implies that the chairperson oversees the committee functionality insofar as motions and bills are concerned. Monitoring service delivery of key NPPAs is another critical role of the district chairperson. Accordingly, the chairperson's score-card focuses on five parameters: political leadership, legislative performance, the degree of contact with the electorate, participation in communal and development activities, and monitoring of service delivery on NPPAs.

Table 2: Performance of District Chairpersons

Name	Gender	District	Party	Terms	2011/12	2012/13	2013/14	% Change	DEC	Monitoring Admin	State of Affairs	Oversight Civil Servants	Commissions/Boards	Central Gov't	Sub Total	Council	Motions Executive	Bills by Executive	Sub Total	Meetings Electorate	Issues by Electorate	Sub Total	Projects Initiated	Communal Projects	NGOs	Sub Total	Agriculture	Health	Schools	Roads	Water Sources	FAL	Environment	Sub Total
Maximum Score					100	100	100		3	5	2	4	2	4	20	2	6	7	15	5	5	10	3	2	5	10	7	7	7	7	7	5	5	45
Martin O. Mapenduzi	M	Gulu	FDC	1	91	88	89	1	3	5	2	4	2	4	20	2	2	0	4	5	5	10	3	2	5	10	7	7	7	7	7	5	5	45
Proscovia S. Musumba	F	Kamuli	FDC	1		88	87	-1	3	3	2	3	2	3	16	2	4	3	9	5	5	10	3	2	3	8	6	7	7	7	7	5	5	44
Richard Rwabuhinga	M	Kabarole	IND	1	80	89	87	-2	3	4	2	4	2	4	19	2	6	0	8	5	5	10	3	1	5	9	7	7	7	7	5	3	5	41
Alex Oremo Alot	M	Lira	UPC	1	40	76	85	11	3	3	2	2	2	3	15	2	4	3	9	5	5	10	3	2	3	8	7	7	5	7	7	5	5	43
John Mary Luwakanya	M	Mpigi	NRM	1	80	80	83	4	3	5	2	4	2	4	20	2	6	3	11	5	5	10	0	1	5	6	7	7	7	7	3	0	5	36
George M. Egunyu	M	Soroti	NRM	2	82	78	82	5	3	5	2	4	2	3	19	2	6	3	11	5	5	10	1	1	3	5	7	7	7	7	7	0	2	37
Duesdedit tumusiime	M	Mbarara	NRM	1	70	75	81	7	3	5	1	4	2	4	19	2	4	3	9	5	5	10	3	2	1	6	5	6	5	7	6	5	3	37
Benard E. Mujaasi	M	Mbale	NRM	3	70	74	81	9	2	5	2	3	2	3	17	2	2	1	5	5	5	10	3	1	5	9	7	7	7	7	7	0	5	40
Francis L Mukoome	M	Mukono	NRM	2	80	80	80	0	2	5	2	2	2	4	17	2	4	2	8	3	5	8	3	2	3	8	6	6	7	7	7	4	3	39
Fredrick Gume Ngobi	M	Jinja	NRM	2	66	87	78	-12	3	5	2	3	2	3	18	2	6	3	11	5	5	10	3	2	3	8	5	2	5	6	7	3	4	31
Emmanuel Osuna	M	Tororo	NRM	2	78	82	78	-5	3	5	2	2	2	2	16	2	4	3	9	5	5	10	3	2	5	10	6	6	6	6	3	3	3	33
Matialwanga Bwanika	M	Wakiso	DP	1	70	82	78	-5	3	5	2	4	2	4	20	2	6	0	8	5	5	10	3	2	0	5	7	5	5	7	5	3	3	35

Name	Gender	District	Party	Terms	Trends in Performance 2011/12	2012/13	2013/14	% Change	Political Leadership DEC	Monitoring Admin	State of Affairs	Oversight Civil Servants	Commissions/Boards	Central Gov't	Sub Total	Legislative Role Council	Motions Executive	Bills by Executive	Sub Total	Contact With Electorate Meetings Electorate	Issues by Electorate	Sub Total	Projects Initiated	Communal Projects	NGOS	Sub Total	Monitoring NPPAs Agriculture	Health	Schools	Roads	Water Sources	FAL	Environment	Sub Total
Maximum Score					100	100	100	100	3	5	2	4	2	4	20	2	6	7	15	5	5	10	3	2	5	10	7	7	7	7	7	5	5	45
Charles K. Byabakama	M	Rukungiri	NRM	1	44	80	78	-3	3	4	2	3	2	4	18	2	4	0	6	5	5	10	3	2	3	8	7	7	6	7	2	3	4	36
Al Hajji Abdulnaduli	M	Luwero	NRM	3	63	69	78	12	3	5	2	4	2	4	20	2	6	0	8	4	5	9	3	2	0	5	5	7	7	7	5	0	5	36
George B.Tinkamanyire	M	Hoima	NRM	3	65	76	76	0	1	6	2	4	2	3	18	2	6	0	8	5	5	10	0	1	5	6	3	7	7	7	7	0	3	34
Denis Singahache	M	Ntungamo	NRM	1	69	74	76	3	3	4	2	4	2	4	19	2	2	0	4	5	5	10	3	2	5	10	5	7	5	7	5	0	4	33
John Francis Oluma	M	Amuria	NRM	1	74	78	73	-7	3	3	2	4	2	4	18	0	4	0	4	5	5	10	3	1	2	6	3	7	7	7	5	5	1	35
John Lorot	M	Nakapiripirit	NRM	2	69	75	75	0	2	5	2	4	2	4	19	2	4	0	6	4	3	7	3	2	3	8	2	6	6	7	6	3	5	35
Patrick Okello Oryema	M	Nwoya	FDC	2			70		3	4	1	2	2	4	16	2	4	0	6	5	5	10	3	2	5	10	5	5	5	5	5	0	3	28
Vukoni Jimmy Okudu	M	Moyo	IND	1	52	62	68	9	3	5	2	3	2	3	18	2	4	3	9	5	5	10	3	2	3	8	5	5	5	3	5	0	0	23
Aol Mark Musooka	M	Moroto	NRM	1	76	78	62	-26	3	4	1	1	1	3	13	0	0	3	3	5	3	8	3	1	3	7	3	7	3	7	3	3	5	31
Anthony Omacha Tube	M	Amuru	NRM	2	54	78	61	-28	3	4	1	4	2	4	18	0	0	0	0	4	5	9	3	1	5	9	0	1	6	7	6	2	3	25
Josephine Kasya	F	Kanungu	NRM	3	53	74	62	-19	3	5	2	1	2	3	16	2	4	0	6	3	5	8	3	1	5	9	4	7	0	7	0	0	5	23
John Baptist Nambeshe	M	Bududa	NRM	1	62	71	56	-27	1	4	1	2	2	3	13	0	2	0	2	5	5	10	3	2	5	10	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	21
Peter Odok Woceng	M	Agago	NRM	1		47	57	18	2	4	2	3	2	4	17	1	5	0	6	5	5	10	1	0	3	4	2	6	2	6	2	0	2	20

Identifiers					Trends in Performance				Political Leadership							Legislative Role				Contact With Electorate			Projects				Monitoring NPPAs							
Name	Gender	District	Party	Terms	2011/12	2012/13	2013/14	% Change	DEC	Monitoring Admin	State of Affairs	Oversight Civil Servants	Commissions/Boards	Central Gov't	Sub Total	Council	Motions Executive	Bills by Executive	Sub Total	Meetings Electorate	Issues by Electorate	Sub Total	Projects Initiated	Communal Projects	NGOs	Sub Total	Agriculture	Health	Schools	Roads	Water Sources	FAL	Environment	Sub Total
Maximum Score					100	100	100	100	3	5	2	4	2	4	20	2	6	7	15	5	5	10	3	2	5	10	7	7	7	7	7	5	5	45
Wilson Isingoma	M	Masindi	NRM	1			56		3	5	1	3	1	4	17	2	6	0	8	5	5	10	1	1	5	7	3	2	2	2	2	0	3	14
Fred Lukumu	M	Buliisa	NRM	2	56	70	55	-27	2	4	1	3	2	4	16	2	4	0	6	5	5	10	3	2	5	10	2	2	2	2	2	0	3	13
Robert Okumu	M	Nebbi	NRM	1	65	74	53	-40	2	5	0	3	2	3	15	2	4	3	9	4	2	6	1	2	5	8	0	6	0	7	2	0	0	15
Sam Wadri Nyakua	M	Arua	NRM	1			49		3	5	1	2	2	4	17	2	4	0	6	4	5	9	3	1	3	7	0	5	5	0	0	0	0	10
Bob Okae	M	Apac	UPC	1			42		1	4	1	2	1	2	11	2	2	0	4	3	2	5	3	1	1	5	0	7	2	2	2	2	2	17
Average				2	67	76	71	-5	3	5	2	3	2	4	17	2	4	1	7	5	5	9	3	2	4	8	4	6	5	6	4	2	3	30

4.3.1 Overall Performance

While the scores of chairpersons as a whole represent a decline from FY 2012/13, there are several bright spots. Most notably, in almost half of the performance areas on the score-card (10 of 23), the average scores for chairpersons approximated the maximum scores possible.

Overall, Chairman Martin Mapenduzi from Gulu emerged the best performer with 89 out of 100 possible points. This score is consistent with Gulu's district council performance as presented in the previous section. This score represents change at two levels: an increase of one point and an improvement from the second to the first position. Chairperson Proscovia Salaam Musumba from Kamuli District and Chairperson Richard Rwabuhinga from Kabarole District followed closely and tied for second position with a score of 87. Notably, these were the top three performers last year as well, though their positions have shifted.

While it is not possible to draw any significant conclusions about gender and performance given that only two of the 30 chairpersons are women,[40] it is important to note that the scores of both women chairpersons declined. A close look at the performance of the four new districts of Nwoya, Masindi, Arua and Apac paint a similar picture to that of councils. With the exception of Chairperson Patrick Okello Oryema from Nwoya District who scored 70 out of 100 possible points, the other three scored less than 60 points.

The chairpersons whose performances were most improved were Chairman Peter Odok W'oceng from Agago, who improved from 47 to 57 points (18 per cent), and Al Hajji Adbul Nadduli from Luwero District, whose score improved from 69 to 78 points (12 per cent). In contrast, the scores of Chairpersons Robert Okumu from Nebbi and Anthony Omach Atube from Amuru declined by 40 per cent and 28 per cent respectively.

4.3.2 Political Leadership

District chairpersons have registered consistent improvement within in political leadership. Generally a strong parameter for chairpersons, there is clearly room for improvement in the indicators connected to oversight of civil servants. Chairpersons in 13 of the 30 districts received full marks in this area, but nine Chairpersons received only half or less of the marks possible.

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[40] Chairperson Salaam Musumba from Kamuli District and Chairperson Josephine Kasya from Kanungu District.

4.3.3 Legislative Role

The legislative role of the district chairperson is executed through the District Executive Committee (DEC). The committee is responsible for initiating and formulating policy for approval of the council. Consistent with recent score-card reports, presenting bills and motions is a challenge for the majority of chairpersons. Only eight out of 30 chairpersons earned full marks for motions presented by the executive. Of greater concern, however, is that no one received all seven marks in the area of presenting bills. In fact, no chairperson received a score higher than 3 (out of 7) in this area, with the majority (18 out of 30) actually receiving a score of 0.

4.3.4 Contact with Electorate

One of the functions of the district chairperson is effective representation of his or her electorate. District chairpersons should remain in close contact with the people and are expected to be residents in their districts in order to serve their electorate more effectively. Only when they are in regular contact with their constituents can service delivery deficiencies and other concerns be communicated directly to them by voters. Overall, chairpersons are doing very well in this performance area. All but four received full marks for handling issues raised by the electorate, and the vast majority (22 out of 30) earned full marks for meeting with the electorate.

4.3.5 Initiating Projects in Electoral Area

District chairpersons are performing generally well within the parameter of initiating and contributing to projects. Overall, 24 out of the 30 chairpersons initiated two or more projects in their electoral area, earning full marks for that performance area. However, the scores were a bit more uneven in the areas of contributions to communal projects and working with NGOs, though all but one chairperson had contributed to a communal project by providing material contributions and written advice. In terms of working with NGOs, virtually all had at least signed an MOU with an NGO and 14 out of 30 earned full marks, which required signing two or more MOUs and actually implementing at least one of them.

4.3.6 Monitoring NPPAs

District chairpersons are required by law to monitor and coordinate the implementation of government programmes. This monitoring extends beyond the confines of the district to include monitoring activities of the municipal and town councils and of other lower local governments and administrative units in the district. [41]

On average, chairpersons earned the highest marks (6 out of 7) for monitoring of roads and health facilities, while the monitoring of FAL lags far behind (only 2 out of 6 on average). Scores for the monitoring of schools, agriculture and water sectors declined on average from the previous assessment. Chairperson Martin Mapenduzi from Gulu stands out after earning the maximum score for all seven service delivery areas, a situation that surely contributes to his first-place performance.

In sum, district chairpersons are to be commended on their overall performance. Even though the average overall score declined from last year, as with the council performance, this is at least in part due to the addition of chairpersons being scored for the first time. That well over half of the chairpersons (18 out of 30) scored at least 75 per cent of the points possible is a notable achievement. Chairpersons would do well, however, to boost their capacity to monitor NPPAs and present bills to council.

4.4 Performance of district speakers

District speakers[42] have a dual role. As elected councillors, district speakers have the responsibility of representing their constituencies. In addition, they are vested with very specific responsibilities regarding the management of council business, including presiding over meetings of the council. While in council, the effectiveness of the district speaker has a direct bearing on the functioning and outputs of the council. Consequently, besides being assessed on the parameters that apply to councillors, the score-card also assesses speakers on their responsibility of presiding over and preserving order in the council. Table 3 presents a summary of the speakers' performance from 30 districts.

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[41] See *Constitution of the Republic of Uganda 1995 (As amended)*, Article 197. See also, *Local Government Act (CAP 243)* 1997, Section 79

[42] The definition of district speakers includes their deputies. See *Local Government Act (CAP 243)* Section 11 (1)

Table 3   Performance of District Speakers

Name	District	Political	Constituency	Gender	Terms	2011/12	2012/13	2013/14	% change	Chairing Council	Rules of Procedure	Business Committee	Records Book	Record of Motions	special Skills	Sub Total	Meetings Electorate	Coordinating Center	Sub Total	Participation in LLG	Health	Education	Agriculture	Water	Roads	FAL	Environment	Sub Total
Maximum Sores						100	100	100		3	9	3	2	3	5	25	11	9	20	10	7	7	7	7	7	5	5	45
James Kezaala Kunobwa	Mukono	NRM	Nagojje	M	2	73	79	89	13	3	7	3	2	3	5	23	11	9	20	10	7	5	3	7	7	3	4	36
Douglas Peter Okello	Gulu	NRM	Lalogi	M	1	89	84	88	5	3	9	3	2	3	5	25	9	6	15	9	7	7	7	7	3	3	5	39
Martin O. Odyek	Lira	UPC	Railway Division	M	1	26	75	88	17	2	7	3	2	3	2	19	8	6	14	10	7	7	7	7	7	5	5	45
Muhammed Mafabi	Mbale	Ind	Bubyangu	M	2	75	77	79	3	2	9	3	2	0	0	16	9	9	18	10	5	5	7	5	5	3	5	35
Juliet Jjemba	Mpigi	NRM	Muduuma, Kiringente	F	2	40	78	78	0	3	9	2	0	3	0	17	11	9	20	10	1	7	7	7	5	0	4	31
Daudi Mukiibi	Wakiso	NRM	Kakizi	M	3	75	73	77	5	2	9	3	2	0	2	18	11	7	18	10	5	5	5	6	5	1	4	31
Micheal Matsyetse	Bududa	Male	Bumasheti	M	2	35	63	76	21	3	9	2	2	0	0	16	11	9	20	10	5	5	5	5	5	1	4	30
Willaim K Tibamanya	Mbarara	NRM	Rugando	M	1	58	64	73	14	3	6	3	2	3	2	19	9	9	18	10	3	5	5	1	5	3	4	26
Charles Beshesya	Kanungu	NRM	Kirimya	M	1	61	68	72	6	3	6	3	2	3	0	17	11	9	20	10	7	5	5	5	3	0	0	25
Clovis Mugabo	Kabarole	NRM	Mugusu	M	1	54	66	72	9	3	6	3	2	3	2	19	5	9	14	4	7	7	7	3	3	3	5	35
Proscovia Namansa	Luwero	NRM	Wobulenzi	F	3	64	73	71	-3	3	9	3	2	3	0	20	11	9	20	10	1	1	1	6	7	0	5	21

| Identifiers | | | | | | Trends in Performance | | | | Legislative Function | | | | | | | Contact with Electorate | | | LLG | Monitoring NPPAs | | | | | | | |
Name	District	Political	Constituency	Gender	Terms	2011/12	2012/13	2013/14	% change	Chairing Council	Rules of Procedure	Business Committee	Records Book	Record of Motions	special Skills	Sub Total	Meetings Electorate	Coordinating Center	Sub Total	Participation in LLG	Health	Education	Agriculture	Water	Roads	FAL	Environment	Sub Total
Henry Ndyabahika	Rukungiri	NRM	Buhunga	M	2	64	75	68	-9	3	9	3	2	3	2	22	9	9	18	4	3	3	3	3	5	3	4	24
Charles E.Engoru	Amuria	NRM	Asamuk	M	2	41	68	67	-1	3	4	3	2	3	0	15	11	9	20	0	5	6	5	4	5	3	4	32
Christopher Odonkara	Amuru	NRM	Pabbo	M	1	51	69	66	-4	2	9	3	0	3	0	17	7	9	16	4	7	7	5	1	7	0	2	29
Innocent F Komakech.	Nwoya	FDC	Anaka	M	1			65		2	9	3	2	3	0	19	9	9	18	4	2	7	7	3	3	0	2	24
Martin Chaiga	Moyo	NRM	Moyo	M	2	44	63	65	3	3	9	2	2	3	0	19	11	0	11	10	5	5	5	5	5	0	0	25
Nathan Isingoma Kitwe	Hoima	NRM	Busisi	M	1	33	64	65	2	3	9	3	2	3	2	22	7	9	16	6	3	3	0	6	5	0	4	21
James Paul Michi	Tororo	NRM	Eastern Division	M	1	32	69	64	-7	3	9	3	2	0	2	19	9	7	16	0	5	5	2	5	5	3	4	29
Samuel Bamwole	Kamuli	NRM	Nawanyago	M	3		87	61	-30	3	3	3	2	3	5	19	9	9	18	8	3	3	1	1	3	3	2	16
Caesar Lometo Laimery	Moroto	NRM	Youth	M	1	49	54	60	11	3	3	3	0	3	0	12	0	9	9	10	3	3	3	5	7	3	5	29
Richard Mayengo	Jinja	NRM	Mafubira	M	3	68	73	60	-18	3	9	3	2	3	5	25	7	6	13	4	1	3	3	3	3	3	2	18
Andrew Odongo	Soroti	FDC	Western Division	M	1	61	60	58	-3	3	6	3	2	3	2	19	7	9	16	0	5	5	0	7	5	1	0	23
Dan Nabimanya	Ntungamo	NRM	Rukoni West	M	1	66	75	55	-27	3	4	3	2	3	0	15	7	9	16	4	5	1	0	5	5	0	4	20

Name	District	Political	Constituency	Gender	Terms	Trends in Performance				Legislative Function							Contact with Electorate			LLG	Monitoring NPPAs							
						2011/12	2012/13	2013/14	% change	Chairing Council	Rules of Procedure	Business Committee	Records Book	Record of Motions	special Skills	Sub Total	Meetings Electorate	Coordinating Center	Sub Total	Participation in LLG	Health	Education	Agriculture	Water	Roads	FAL	Environment	Sub Total
John Bostify Oweka	Agago	NRM	Omot	M	1		23	55	139	2	6	3	0	3	3	17	5	9	14	2	3	3	3	3	5	3	2	22
Ida Fuambe	Nebbi	NRM	Nyaravur, Atego	F	3	68	73	53	-27	3	9	3	0	3	0	18	2	9	11	10	3	1	1	3	5	0	1	14
Jotham Loyor	Nakapiripirit	NRM	Kakomogole	M	3	62	44	49	11	3	4	0	0	3	2	12	6	9	15	4	5	5	5	1	1	0	1	18
Felix Ambrosis Yine	Apac	UPC	Apac	M	2			48		3	9	2	2	3	0	19	9	2	11	0	3	1	1	1	7	3	2	18
Genesis Dria Acema	Arua	NRM	Okollo	M	3			40		3	9	3	2	3	0	20	2	9	11	4	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	5
Ronald B. Kyomuhendo	Masindi	NRM	Kigulya Division	M	2			39		2	9	3	0	0	2	16	4	9	13	0	0	0	0	5	1	0	4	10
Didan Amama R.	Buliisa	Ind	Ngwedo	M	1	31	65	32	-51	3	4	3	0	0	2	12	4	2	6	4	1	1	1	1	1	1	4	10
Average					2	55	68	64	3	3	7	3	1	2	2	18	8	8	16	6	4	4	4	4	4	2	3	25

4.4.1 Overall Performance

The performance of speakers is generally very similar to that of FY 2012/13. While there was a decline of 4 points in the overall average score, the average scores for the various performance areas remained mostly the same. Speaker James Kezaala Kunobwa from Mukono District emerged the best performer with 89 out of 100 possible points. Apart from the fact that the speaker registered a percentage change of 13 per cent, his rating improved from third to first. Speakers Douglas Peter Okello from Gulu District and Speaker Martin Ocen Odyek from Lira District followed closely, tying with 88 points. Speaker Martin Odyek's performance is especially commendable given that he earned only 26 points during the FY 2011/12 assessment. His score jumped to 75 points in the FY 2012/13 assessment, and then improved by another 17 per cent in FY 2013/14.

In terms of gender, the numbers have not changed much. Out of 30 district speakers, only three are female.[43] While the performance of two of the women speakers declined, Juliet Jjemba's score (Mpigi) remained the same at 78 points. A close look at the four new districts of Nwoya, Apac, Arua and Masindi presents a similar picture to those discussed under council and chairperson performance. While Nwoya continues to fair well among the top 15, with 65 points, the three districts of Apac (48 points), Arua (40 points) and Masindi (39 points) are trailing in the bottom five.

4.4.2 Legislative Role

District speakers are the major drivers of the legislative function of the district councils. The legislative function is executed through chairing of lawful meetings, enforcement of rules of procedure, convening of the business committee, and keeping a proper record of the motions and bills presented in council. While the law does not conspicuously point out the need for district speakers to delegate to their deputies, the delegation function is implied through the very existence of the deputy speaker's office, making delegation a best practice. During the year under review, seven district speakers[44] did not delegate council responsibility to their deputies. The practice of delegation by the remaining 24 is a positive shift from high numbers of speakers who did not consider delegation during the first four years of the initiative.

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[43] All the 3 district speakers were part of the previous assessment which covered 26 districts.
[44] District speakers from Lira, Mbale, Wakiso, Amuru, Nwoya, Agago and Arua

While the speakers' general performance in enforcement of the rules of procedure has improved, the number of speakers lagging behind is cause for concern. Last year, only two speakers received marks of 4 or below (out of 9 possible points) in the rules of procedure performance area. This year, unfortunately, the number of speakers scoring less than half of the marks possible increased from four to six. The provision of special skills (i.e. writing papers to guide council and committee procedures) continues to be an area of challenge for many district speakers. Only four speakers[45] earned the full five marks in this performance area. The average score across all of the districts for this area was just 2. In general, speakers are performing well in the areas connected to record keeping, as is evident in the large numbers of speakers earning full marks in keeping the records book and keeping records of council motions.

4.4.3 Contact with the Electorate

Because district speakers are first of all councillors before they can be elected as speaker, it is important to remain in contact with their electorate. This is done through mobilizing and organizing community meetings and keeping records of the service delivery issues raised for follow up. Score-card scores show substantial unevenness among speakers in this performance area. Twenty-three of the 30 speakers earned full marks (9 points) for having a functioning coordinating centre in their constituency. However, all but nine speakers (21 of 30) could still improve their performance in the area of meeting and communicating with their electorate.

4.4.4 Participation in Lower Local Governments (LLGs)

As district councillors, district speakers represent a defined electoral area, which can be a sub-county or a municipality. Participation in the designated lower local government (LLG) is therefore a requirement by law. On the score-card, district speakers are assessed on their attendance at sub-county council sittings. While almost half (13 out of 30) of the speakers received full marks for participating in lower local governance, 15 of the speakers received less than half of the 11 marks possible. The speakers of Amuria, Tororo and Apac scored 0 under this parameter because they did not meet the threshold of at least four sub-county meetings.

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[45] District speakers from Mukono, Gulu, Kamuli, and Jinja

4.4.5 Monitoring NPPAs

The function of monitoring NPPAs by district speakers stems from their role as district councillors. Besides being elected, district speakers earn a monthly salary which obligates them to ensure that taxpayers and citizens get value for their money. All district councillors, including the speaker, are assessed on the extent to which they dedicate time to ensure effective delivery of public services to their electorates. Overall, there is a good deal of improvement to be made in monitoring service delivery. On average, speakers scored only 4 out of 7 marks for monitoring of health, education, agriculture, water and roads, 2 out of 5 for monitoring FAL, and 3 out of 5 for monitoring the environment.   Speaker Martin Odyek of Gulu stands out for his excellent performance under this parameter. He is the only speaker who scored full points (45 out of 45) in all seven NPPAs.

4.5   Performance of District Councillors

The role of elected councillors, as part of the governing body of a council, is spelled out in the third schedule of the Local Government Act. In discharging their duties, district councillors are bound by law to have due regard to both the national and district interests and the interests of the people in their electoral area. This makes councillors among the most important politicians in the country, especially in the political landscape of decentralization. Before representing views, opinions and proposals to council, district councillors are expected to maintain close contact with their electoral area, as a means of consulting the people on issues to be discussed. The law demands a district councillor designate at least a day during a given period for meeting the people in the electoral area. As peoples' representatives, councillors are expected to take part in communal and development activities in their sub counties and in their districts as a whole.

Accordingly, the councillor score-card is designed to assess councillors' enactment of their responsibilities in four parameters: legislative role, contact with the electorate, participation in lower local governments and monitoring NPPAs.

4.5.1 Overall Performance

During the assessment period, the best performing male councillor was Norman Ssemwanga Kaboggoza (NRM) from Wakiso District. Councillor Kaboggoza scored 91 out of 100 possible points. Apart from this outstanding performance, Hon. Kaboggoza has exhibited steady

performance right from 2011/12. His score of 91 also shows a percentage improvement of 3 per cent over the previous year's performance. The best female councillor was Stella Kyorampa (NRM) from Kabarole District, representing Hakibale and Busoro constituencies, with 86 out of 100 possible points. Councillor Francis Kazini (NRM), a youth representative from Hoima District, is recognized for his improvement. With an increase of 140 per cent over the previous year, Councillor Kazini registered the greatest improvement in scores among his male counterparts. Among the women councillors, Josephine Atim (NRM) from Atiak Sub-county in Amuru District registered the greatest percentage improvement (104 per cent). The tables below analyse the overall councillor performance by education, political party, gender, term served as alluded to in the first part of this chapter.

4.5.2 Political Party Affiliation and Councillor Performance

The data in Table 4 show that despite the small numbers in council, opposition party councillors with the exception of UPC, performed the legislative function better on average than their counterparts in the NRM. Within the contact with the electorate parameter, the average score for DP councillors was much higher than others at 17 out of 20. FDC and UPC councillors lagged behind in this parameter, with average scores of less than 10. An analysis of councillor participation in LLGs paints a similar picture with councillors from the DP and UFA outperforming their counterparts from the NRM and other political parties. Monitoring of NPPAs presents a quite different picture, however, with Independent councillors performing the highest, but followed closely by councillors affiliated with the NRM and DP. It should be noted, however, that the average scores for all of the groups was very low, with none of them averaging even 20 out of 45.

Table 4:   Political Party Affiliation and Councillor Performance

	Parameter	Legislative Role	Contact with electorate	Participation in LLG	Monitoring Service Delivery
	Maximum Scores	**25**	**20**	**10**	**45**
Political Party	DP	16.5	17.0	8.5	18.1
	FDC	14.7	9.5	5.0	14.3
	Independent	13.7	13.7	5.7	19.3
	NRM	13.6	12.5	5.7	18.3
	UFA	15.0	12.5	8.0	15.5
	UPC	12.4	9.9	4.7	17.2
	Total Average	**13.7**	**12.3**	**5.7**	**17.9**

4.5.3 Level of Education and Councillor Performance

Data from this assessment shows that the level of education has an impact on councillor performance in many different ways. Table 5 reveals that the more educated a councillor is, the better the performance in terms of the legislative role. Indeed, only councillors with Master's and Bachelor's degrees, as well as councillors with advanced certificates and diplomas scored above the average. However, the finding was different when it comes to councillors' contact with the electorate, participation in LLGs, and monitoring of NPPAs. Councillors with lower education levels were seen to perform better under these three parameters.

Table 5: Level of Education and Councillor Performance

Parameter		Legislative Role	Contact with electorate	Participation in LLG	Monitoring Service Delivery
Maximum Scores		**25**	**20**	**10**	**45**
Education level	Primary	12.7	13.8	5.3	19.7
	O level	12.1	13.1	5.4	18.1
	A Level/ Certificate/Diploma	14.2	12.3	5.9	18.6
	Bachelor's/Master's Degree	15.1	11.1	5.6	16.1
	Undisclosed	12.8	5.0	4.4	12.4
	Total Average	**13.7**	**12.3**	**5.7**	**17.9**

4.5.4 Gender and Councillor Performance

Overall, male councillors performed slightly better than female councillors in three of the four parameters of the score-card: legislative, participation in LLGs, and monitoring service delivery. Men and women performed equally in the area of contact with the electorate. It is important to note, however, that female councillors have more responsibilities than their male counterparts, with two and sometimes three sub-counties to cover. With this in mind, the analysis in Table 6 presents an impressive picture of female councillor performance whose deviation from the average score did not exceed 1.6 points in any of the four parameters.

Table 6: Gender and Councillor Performance

	Parameter	Legislative Role	Contact with electorate	Participation in LLG	Monitoring Service Delivery
Maximum Scores		25	20	10	45
Gender	Male	14.9	12.3	5.9	18.9
	Female	12.1	12.3	5.4	16.7
	Total Average	**13.7**	**12.3**	**5.7**	**17.9**

4.5.5 Terms served and Councillor performance

The data in Table 7 shows an interesting relationship between number of terms served and councillor performance. As would be expected, first-term councillors score lower than the others across four parameters. Scores increase for the third, and especially fourth term, councillors in every parameter. Notable, however, is the decline in scores across the board for councillors in their fifth term.

Table 7: Terms served and Councillor performance

Parameter		Legislative Role	Contact with electorate	Participation in LLG	Monitoring Service Delivery
Terms Served	1	13.33	12.25	5.57	17.52
	2	14.35	11.72	5.45	18.26
	3	14.73	13.04	6.75	20.42
	4	16.68	16.11	7.26	20.68
	5	14.40	11.40	4.40	19.00
Total Average		**13.7**	**12.3**	**5.7**	**17.9**

Lots of gains have been registered in health infrastructure developments: A maternity ward at Abala HC III, Agweng Sub-County, Lira District

5 LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCING AND TRENDS IN PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY

The primary objective of this chapter is to provide evidence for recommendations to improve the performance of local governments. Based on the evidence that connects patterns of revenue to level of local government autonomy and, hence, service delivery, improvements are recommended in the following areas:

- underfunding of local governments,

- limited discretion by local governments over expenditure,

- limited capacity for assessing, projecting and collecting taxes, and

- unfavourable tax allocation system.

This chapter will first present a straight-forward picture of local government financing, highlighting the pattern of dependence on central government transfers, as well as the limitations of local revenue generation. This interplay has important impacts on the functioning of local government, and on its ability to allocate resources for targeted service delivery. A key section is devoted to the performance of districts on selected service delivery indicators.

5.1 Local Government Financing

The composition of financing sources depicts a local government's level of autonomy and impacts functions critical for service delivery, such as convening of council and committee meetings and monitoring of service delivery. Specifically, over-dependence on central government transfers, accompanied by strict conditionalities, limits the discretion of local governments to determine priorities, and constrains their leverage for planning and implementation. In short, it greatly curtails their power and influence. Further, the level of financing of council operations by the central government is largely inadequate, and it is unrealistic to expect that locally generated revenue will make up the shortfall.

Current local government financing levels translate to an average of UGX 163,691 per capita per year in LGCSCI districts using preliminary census

figures from 2014. Figure 8 presents the average per capita financing of the districts for three financial years (2011/12 to 2013/4). Moyo (UGX 107,806), Gulu (UGX 82,609) and Nwoya (UGX 80,884) registered the highest financing per capita while Wakiso (UGX 20,209) and Hoima (UGX 21,793) registered the least annual financing per capita.

Figure 8: Average Local Government Financing Per Capita for LGCSCI Districts (2011/12 to 2013/14)

Source: Author's compilation using preliminary census figures 2014 (UBOS) and Annual District Performance Reports 2011/12 to 2013/14

5.1.1   Composition of Local Government Financing

In terms of composition, financing of local governments continues to be dominated by grants from the central governments which account for over 90 per cent of financing to local governments. Other sources of financing for local governments include donor (5 per cent) and locally generated revenue (3 per cent). Figure 9 depicts the pattern of financing of LGCSCI districts for three financial years 2011/12 to 2013/14.

Figure 9: Composition of Financing of Local Governments for FY 2011/12 to 2013/14

*Source: Annual District Performance Reports 2011/12 to 2013/14*

Districts of Amuru, Gulu and Nwoya have the highest proportion of non-central government financing for FY2011/12 to 2013/14 with an average of 60 per cent, 75 per cent and 78 per cent respectively. The same districts are largely funded by donors who account for 39 per cent, 23 per cent and 20 per cent in the same order. Wakiso, Jinja and Gulu districts registered the largest local revenue collections and contribution to annual expenditure at an average of UGX 4.8bn (10.5%), 1.8bn (4.7%) and 1.5bn (4.2%) respectively. On the other hand, in Agago and Soroti locally generated revenue contributed less than one per cent of their annual expenditure. Apac, Soroti and Masindi registered the least average annual local revenue collections in nominal terms at UGX 105.8 million, 112.2 million and 143.0 million, respectively.

5.1.2 Locally Generated Funds

Local revenues are categorized under five major categories including Local Service Tax (LST), Local Hotel Tax (LHT), property related charges, user charges and Business licenses. Several other sources of revenue are lumped together as 'other charges'. Information from the Local Government Finance Commission (LGFC) on local revenues for LGCSCI districts for 2011/12 shows that the major local revenue sources combined accounted for less than 50 per cent of local revenue collected in 11 districts. Property-related charges, LST and User charges accounted for

a substantial share of local revenue to districts, while business licenses accounted for the least as shown in Figure 10.

Figure 10: Contribution of Different Sources to District Local Revenue FY 2011/12

Source: LGFC Data Base 2013

Figure 10 shows a variation in diversity of local revenue sources for districts. This variation reflects the structure of the local economy and the level of urbanization. In districts with a small number of formal economic activities, collection of revenue from the major local revenue sources is very difficult. Also, districts are largely rural with very few hotels, real estate and formal business. Districts have decried the revenue source allocation system in which few and hard-to-administer taxes have been assigned to them while Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) takes the charge of the more viable tax revenue sources in the country.

5.1.3   Local Revenue Performance

Figure 11 compares local revenue projections to actual collection. On the whole, local revenue performance for FY 2011/12 was abysmal across LGCSCI districts. A total of six districts collected over 30 per cent more than the projected revenue while ten districts registered a shortfall of more than 30 per cent. The poor performance depicts a weakness in assessing, forecasting and collecting tax revenues. There is also a problem of documenting and reporting on local revenue by districts. Available information is not consistent and before introduction of the Output Budgeting Tool (OBT) by MoFPED would be delayed by years.

Figure 11: Local Revenue Performance of Districts for 2011/12

Source: LGFC Data Base 2013

5.1.4 Central Government Transfers and Allocations

Over half of the districts covered by LGCSCI receive special funds under the Peace Recovery and Development Programme (PRDP). Central government transfers translate into an average of UG 147,902 per capita for FY 2011/12 to 2013/14 using preliminary population census figures for 2014. Surprisingly, Agago Distrct has the highest annual central government transfers per capita over the three years under consideration at UGX 162,961, followed by Gulu and Kanungu districts at UGX 150,270 and UGX 140,102 respectively. Masindi, Wakiso and Hoima districts recorded the least average central government transfers over the three years at UGX 15,618, UGX 17,192 and UGX 18,732 respectively, as shown in Figure 12.

Figure 12: Average Central Government Transfers to LGCSCI Districts Per Capita (2011/12 to 2013/14) and Change in Amount Transferred (2011/12 to 2012/13)

Source: Author's compilation using preliminary census figures 2014 (UBOS) and Annual District Performance Reports 2011/12 to 2013/14

Figure 12 also shows the change in central government transfers to LGCSCI districts. Between FY 2011/12 and 2012/13 these transfers reduced on average by 3 per cent. Gulu, Buliisa and Moroto suffered the largest reductions in Central Government transfers with 32 per cent, 28 per cent and 27 per cent cuts respectively over the two years. The reduction of transfers to districts has been an on-going concern for local governments who fear that the meagre transfers are even declining further and with it the capacity to deliver on service delivery. On the other side, however, several districts registered increases in Central Government transfers accruing to them over the two years, most notably Wakiso (35 per cent), Luweero (24 per cent) and Kamuli (23 per cent).

5.1.5 Allocation of Central Government Transfers

Central government transfers to LGCSCI districts are dominated by the Education Sector which accounts for about 28 per cent of the total transfers. This is followed by Agriculture (22 per cent) and Public Sector Management (21 per cent). Other allocations include Health (15 per cent), Water and Environment (7 per cent), Works and Transport (4 per cent) and Social Development (one per cent). Figure 13 shows the average allocation of central government transfers to LGCSCI districts for FY 2011/12 and FY 2012/13.

Figure 13: Average Allocation of Central Government Transfers 2011/12 to 2012/13

Source: MoFPED Releases to Local Governments (FY 2011/12 to 2012/13)

5.2 Performance of Districts on Service Delivery

One of the key theses of LGCSCI project framework is that performance of political leaders has an impact on the quality of services. Therefore, the status of service delivery is analysed as an indication of local government performance and tests one of the central propositions of LGCSCI. Three areas of service delivery have been selected for these purposes: primary education, primary health care health, and water/sanitation. These three areas are considered important as development aspects for the country and are categorized under the social services sector in Uganda's National Development Plan (NDP 2010/11 to 2014/15) framework. The information used here is compiled by the respective line ministries and compares performance of the districts for FY 2011/12 and FY 2012/13 except for primary education where performances for FY 2012/13 and FY 2013/14. The data tell a story of gains, reversals, and the persistence of poor performance.

5.2.1 Primary Education

The Education and Sports Sector Annual Performance Report ranks districts in a league table. The assessment takes into account three

indicators including: Net Intake Rate, which is the level of access to primary education by pupils aged six years per district; Completion Rate which measures the level of primary completion per district; and, Primary Leaving Examinations (PLE) performance index which measures performance per district. The performance of districts covered by LGCSCI on the ESSAPR for FY 2012/13 is presented in Figure 14. Districts of Luweero, Mbarara and Mpigi ranked highest, while Amuru, Nakapiripirit and Amuria were among the worst performers.[46] The performance of lowly-ranked districts is weighed down by low intake levels which stand at 27.9 per cent and 29.6 per cent for Nakapiripirit and Amuru respectively.

Figure 14: Performance of LGCSCI Districts on Primary Education Assessment FY 2013/14

Source: ESSAPR 2012/13to 2013/14

In terms of change in performance, districts of Nebbi, Soroti and Tororo registered the greatest improvement from 2013/14, climbing 22, 18 and 16 places respectively. Jinja District suffered the biggest decline, falling 29 places.

5.2.2 Primary Health Care

The health sector too prepares the Health Sector Annual Performance Report (HSAPR) in which performance on the implementation of the Health Sector Strategic Plan (HSSP) is reported.

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[46] Note that the scale of the ranking has been inverted for presentation and emphasis otherwise the ranking in the ESSAPR is such that the higher the score is the worse the performance.

The assessment of performance involves the composite ranking of districts on 11 health sector indicators. The performance of districts on the assessment by the MoH is presented in Figure 15. Gulu, Kabarole and Nwoya districts ranked highest while Moyo, Moroto and Amuru were among the worst performers.

Notable climbers include Mukono, Hoima and Rukungiri, jumping 70, 68 and 48 places respectively. Amuru, Masindi and Mbale suffered the largest decline, falling by 57, 34 and 32 places respectively.

Figure 15: Performance of LGCSCI Districts on Primary Health Care Assessment FY 2012/13

Source: HSAPR 2011/12to 2012/13

5.2.3 Water and Sanitation

The ranking of districts used here is from the Water and Environment Sector Annual Performance Report (WESAPR) 2013. Districts are scored on eight indicators for water and sanitation from which an aggregate score is derived. The performance of LGCSCI districts is presented in Figure 16. Mbarara, Rukungiri and Wakiso scored highest while Nakapiripirit, Moroto and Arua scored the least on water and sanitation. Apac, Buliisa and Soroti districts registered the greatest improvement in score at 25, 25 and 23 places respectively. Kamuli, Hoima and Luweero registered the biggest reduction in scores on water and sanitation.

Figure 16: Performance of LGCSCI Districts on Water and Sanitation Assessment FY 2012/13

Source: WESAPR 2011/12to 2012/13

5.3   Citizens' Perceptions of Service Delivery

An analysis of data from the focus group discussions with citizens complements the above discussion on the status of service delivery in LGCSCI districts. It provides an understanding of the ongoing challenges with service delivery as experienced on the ground from the viewpoint of citizens. This section summarizes citizens' perceptions of the state of service delivery in the three sectors discussed above (education, health, and water/sanitation), as well as in the roads and agriculture sectors.

5.3.1   Perceptions about Education

Focus group data point to ongoing issues with the quality of education. Citizens raised significant concerns about the low rates of student success, and consistently attributed to those low success rates to inadequate educational infrastructure and teacher absenteeism.   In the area of infrastructure, focus group participants reported problems like not enough classrooms, buildings of poor quality, and lack of instructional materials, all of which negatively impact students' ability to learn. In addition, issues with teachers arriving very late or not showing up at all came up in almost all of the focus group discussions. One woman at a focus group in Bududda District captured the sentiments of many when

she gave this explanation for moving her children to a private school: "The teachers do not teach because they have no teaching materials because government sends capitation grants late. The head teachers are never at school to supervise teaching and so teachers come as late as 11 am and leave at 1pm after registering in the attendance book. Why should I take my children to such a mess?" All ten participants in a Nebbi District focus group concurred on the challenges of lack of infrastructure, stating that there was no staff resident in the school. They went on to say that many teachers commuted from Nebbi town, which accounted for the late-coming and early-leaving of staff from schools and contributes to poor performance of students. Community members across the districts suggested that building or improving teacher accommodations could greatly help with the absenteeism issue.

Buliisa stood out as a positive exception to this pattern, as citizens recognized the recent improvements in educational infrastucture. Over the last three years, there has been remarkable improvement in school infrastructure development, especially in construction of new classroom blocks, provision of desks, installation of water harvesting facilities, and building pit latrines and staff houses. These improvements were as a result of collaboration between SFG and PRDP (NUSAF II) and development partners such as World Vision, Build Africa and Soft Power. The beneficiary schools in FY 2013/14 include Walukuba, Nyamukuta, Bugoigo, Kisiabi, Kisansya, Wanseko, Ndandamire, Kirama, and Kijangi primary schools.

5.3.2 Perceptions of Health Care Services

Staff issues, drug stock outs and the state of health centres dominated citizens' discussions of health service delivery. Staff issues mentioned include reporting to work late, health centres with too few staff, nurses at health centres who are rude, and the lack of staff accommodation. Poor conditions in health centres was also identified as a big problem, with community members describing centres with poor hygiene, lack of water supply, and few and dirty toilet facilities. In an FGD in Buliisa District, one of the health care workers gave a particularly poignant description of the issues at a centre he is affiliated with:

"I have reported the issue of this big crack on the wall which is dangerous and even the existing pit latrine is filled up but the district has on many occasions not listened to my plea as they say there is no money to address this problem. We share the same latrine at our residence with patients and this puts the lives of the health workers and the patients at risk. In fact there can be cholera

outbreak any time because of poor sanitation in the health centre as this is a cholera prone area."

Drug stock-outs continue to be a major issue that citizens in all districts are facing. In focus group after focus group, citizens talked about how the unavailability of drugs forced them to go without medicines unless they had the resources to buy them at private clinics where prices could be very high.

5.3.3 Perceptions of Access to Safe Water

Access to safe drinking water was a contentious issue among citizens across the districts. The lack of adequate and safe water sources, poor distribution of safe water sources, non-functioning water sources, irregular water supply for piped water, and poor water quality were the most significant and widespread water challenges that citizens identified in FGDs.

Citizens from Kabarole, for example, stated:

"The only sources of water we use are Nyatamwanguba, Munira and Nyabuswa rivers which are all tributary rivers originating from the mountain. The same water sources are being used by cows and other animals which contaminate them."

Nebbi District residents voiced similar concerns, stating that

"There is no clean water here and the distance to access clean water is over 2 km. The landscape is not favourable for drilling boreholes, thus we resort to using unsafe water from the streams."

Residents in Nwoya District also talked about the challenges of distance, describing how

"we have to trek about 3km to be able to get water from the stream in Lapono, and sometimes when it rains, the water becomes dirty so we have a serious challenge with water shortage."

On a positive note, there were a few communities that had access to safe drinking water and did not have complaints about access or quality of water. For instance, in one focus group in Mbale, all citizens agreed that they did not have any water related challenges given that their gravity flow schemes and protected springs were fully functional. In Apac, the district leadership has endeavoured to increase access to safe water across the country. In FY 2013/14, the district drilled 37 boreholes, dug 18 shallow wells, constructed 21 protected springs, and rehabilitated 30

boreholes in an attempt to increase access to safe water in the district. Even with this effort, however, the functionality rate of all the water sources stands at 72.6 per cent, below the national standard of 80 per cent.

5.3.4 Perceptions of Road Quality

Citizens across the districts complained about the poor quality of roads, often attributing this to political leaders' intervention. The problematic and even dangerous road issues raised included roads that were washed away by rains, roads that were too narrow, and pot-holes, all of which made roads prone to accidents. Political leaders were often depicted as contributing to the problem because of the perception that politicians not only do not do enough to ensure that roads were repaired and maintained, they also blocked private sector initiatives to repair roads. In an Agago District focus group, for example, one female member emphasized that the roads were terrible and the bridge connecting Nakatsi Sub-county and Nabweya had been washed away. In Jinja, one participant gave the example of a businessman who was trying to improve roads but whose efforts were continuously obstructed by delays in securing permits from the district.

5.3.5 Perceptions of Agricultural Services

The agricultural sector employs over 90 per cent of the population, directly or indirectly, in most project districts. Agriculture serves as the mainstay of food security as most products are consumed locally and agriculture is practiced on subsistence level. Agricultural extension services and the delivery of farming tools and inputs for crops and animals hold the key to increasing productivity and to Uganda's future development in general. Focus group discussions reflected this urgency and willingness on the part of farmers to work with extension services and to participate in government programmes, such as NAADS. The weather was always a major concern, but a well-coordinated programme – consisting of the timely availability of improved seeds, new implements and tools, advisory services and training, and opening post-harvest markets – could mitigate the fluctuations and vulnerability often associated with farming and animal husbandry.

In the FGDs, a frequent topic was the NAADS programme, and citizens' voices were varied. Some praised the objectives of the government in supporting small-scale farmers by providing inputs and extension services. In Nebbi District, for example, a group of women pointed out that NAADS and NGO trainings had given them insights on modern agricultural practices, and their yields had increased. An older woman

received fertilizer and was pleased to say NAADS had helped. However, many other voices expressed dissatisfaction with NAADS implementation. Complaints about the selection process, party favouritism, absence of choice of enterprise, delays in the provision of seeds, tools and other inputs, and understaffed advisory services dominated discussions.

One comment from an Agago District farmer reflected a larger sentiment:

"I am a beneficiary of NAADS but the seedlings and seed were delivered late and were of poor quality... Farmers were not allowed to choose the type of seeds and seedlings to be supplied."

Other people were concerned about advisory services and many citizens argued that the programme should be expanded to allow more participation from all farming households rather than a few individuals. Extension services should not segregate farming communities by giving preference to one group. The impact of broadly disseminated information and a more inclusive approach were essential ingredients successful support of the sector. In one interview from Palaro Sub-county in Gulu District, a 27-year-old exclaimed:

"Last year, we did not receive a good yield from what we planted - the sun was too much for the crops. The district officials are to blame because they have never bothered to advise farmers on the weather pattern and how farmers should plant their crops. If we don't have that information, we will always fall victim to failed crops."

Finally, during a Nebbi focus group, many participants who are dependent upon animal husbandry expressed the need for veterinary services and vaccination programmes. In sum, citizens throughout the districts saw a need for improved services in each of these five sectors and Issues with staffing and infrastructure recur in all areas. Many of the issues raised by citizens are also reflected in the challenges districts face to improving service delivery.

5.4   Challenges to Service Delivery Identified by District Leaders

With the goal of identifying the major challenges to effective service delivery faced by the districts, this section summarizes information from the 2014-15 district work plans for 29 of the 30 LGCSCI districts. Drawing on the sections on 'Challenges in Implementation' and 'The three biggest challenges faced by the department in improving local government services,' Table 8 summarizes the major challenges affecting

local governments and their ability to deliver services. The information in the table captures the urgent issues that districts have to grapple with. Staffing problems were highlighted by all the districts without exception.

Table 8: Challenges Identified by Districts

Challenge	Districts (n=29)	Issues Identified
Staffing and Human Resources	29 (100%)	Understaffing, especially in key sector (health, education) and at Parish level, retention and turnover, lack of skills and qualifications, difficult to attract personnel, lack of motivation, insufficient space, inadequate supplies and equipment.
Budget and Funding	22 (76%)	Budget and revenue architecture, dependency on central government transfers, insufficient funds, budget cuts, delays, non-released funds, lack of discretionary spending/flexibility, meeting payroll, difficulty generating local revenue, collecting taxes, uneven donor commitment.
Roads and Access to Markets	15 (52%)	Inadequate transportation network, road improvement and maintenance, lack of operational road equipment, weather, limits on access to urban centres and markets for products.
Procurement	10 (35%)	High costs, timeliness/delays in resources and implementation, poor quality of local contractors, operational repairs, lack of supervision and monitoring, poor documentation and data collection/storage.
Agriculture and Land	10 (35%)	Access to and adoption of new technology, crop disease, low productivity, training and advisory services/extension, microcredit, inadequate post-harvest processing and marketing, limitations of NAADS, land titling, poor quality of land, weather.
Monitoring & Supervision	10 (35%)	Insufficient levels of monitoring and supervision, lack of transportation and vehicles for staff, engagement across district.
Environment and Weather	8 (28%)	Natural disasters and weather, disregard for environmental and natural resource compliance, population growth, park animals.
Sector Resources	6 (21%)	Lack of recourses in health education and sanitation, citizen sensitization to improve attitudes and behaviour.
Special Services & Problems	4 (14%)	Needed attention to youth, alcohol abuse, HIV/AIDS, resettled communities in post-conflict zones, donor commitment/funding.

Source: Multiple Local Government Annual Workplan 2014-2015, Ministry of Finance

Systematic issues with funding and the budget architecture (i.e., dependency on the central government and inability to generate local revenues) are highlighted by 75 per cent of the districts. These issues impact the ability of districts to govern effectively and with the flexibility needed given variations in local context. For example, the timeliness of fund release is a chronic problem that impacts the ability of local politicians and technical staff to do their jobs. This represents a major obstacle to realizing decentralization, including local autonomy in governance and control of targeted service delivery.

At least one third of the districts identified other categories of challenges, related to roads and transportation, agricultural development and land, access to markets, and the ability to supervise and monitor procurement and service delivery projects. The latter is rooted in a low priority to fund mechanisms for monitoring and auditing; and made worse by inadequate transportation to monitor events in the field. In the end, data collection and reporting suffers – both necessary tools for districts and councillors to be accountable to citizens. In sum, the range of data presented in this chapter points to the challenges of service delivery experienced by both local governments and the citizens they serve.

The roads infrastructure remains a big challenge to agricultural productivity and access to markets in the majority of Local Governments: A Section of Corner Kilak-Patong Road, Agago District.

6 MAKING DECENTRALIZATION WORK: FACTORS AFFECTING PERFORMANCE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

The policy thrusts of the local government reforms are to promote active citizen participation in the national development process, to integrate and invigorate the local planning process and to optimize resource utilization at the local government level. The ultimate goal of the reforms is the provision of an appropriate institutional framework which ensures public participation in the governmental process and facilitates greater public service delivery system.[47]

This chapter examines the factors, both internal and external to local governments, that influenced the ability of democratic decentralization to work at local government level. The introduction of the decentralization policy in 1993, and its subsequent institutionalization in the 1995 Uganda Constitution and the Local Government Act of 1997, sought to bring decision-making, resources and effective service delivery closer to the citizens. As a radical departure from centralized regimes of governance of the past, Uganda's form of decentralization entailed the devolution of powers (fiscal, political and administrative) and grassroots participation.[48] Decentralization was also an essential aspect of the nation building strategy as it not only brought resources and power in terms of decision making to the local people, but also increased their political participation and citizen empowerment.

Bringing decision-making, resources and effective service delivery closer to the citizens requires understanding the dynamics that hinder or promote the performance of local governments. Based on findings from this assessment, it has become apparent that the ability of local governments to deliver public services to the citizens is influenced by internal and external factors that are often intertwined. Internal factors are those dynamics/issues that reside within local governments and which can be addressed locally. External factors emanate from outside the local governments and local leaders have less leverage to address them.

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[47] Lubanga, F.X.K. (1996). The Process of Decentralization, in, Villadsen, S & Lubanga (eds.) Democratic Decentralization in Uganda: A New Approach to Local Governance, Kampala: Fountain Publishers.
[48] Villadsen, S. (2000).Decentralization of Governance, in Villdsen, S. & Lubanga, F. (eds.) Democratic Decentralization in Uganda: A New Approach to Local Governance, Kampala, Fountain Publishers.

The section below discusses ways that central and local governments, have responded to challenges, while also highlighting the internal and external factors that continue to influence the performance of local governments.

6.1 Positive Responses to Key Challenges Facing Local Governments

6.1.1 Legal and Policy Reforms

One of the challenges that has been frequently cited for negatively affecting effective and efficient delivery of services and political accountability is the existing legal and policy framework[49] especially the Local Government Act. Some of the provisions of the Act do not provide sufficient elaboration on the functions and powers of the different authorities (municipality vs district, chairperson vs speaker, chairperson vs RDC) which leads to unnecessary conflicts that constrain service delivery. Government has responded to some of these legal and administrative challenges by amending the Local Government Act.

6.1.2 Retention of Unspent Funds

Districts have always faced the challenge of spending all the allocated funds within a financial year, an issue that makes them return substantial resources to the centre. This has been largely attributed to lack of absorptive capacity on the part of the local governments on the one hand and late releases by the Ministry of Finance. Government, through the Ministry of Finance has intervened by giving a three-month reprieve to local governments during which all unspent money should be utilized. While this does not fundamentally solve the problem, it is a commendable step towards addressing a major obstacle to effective service delivery.

6.1.3 Budget Transparency and Timely Release of Funds

The Ministry of Finance has initiated a number of reforms geared towards addressing budget transparency and accountability to improve service delivery at the local government level. Critical among these reforms is the cleaning up and decentralizing the payroll[50] to deal with corruption and inefficient utilization of public resources.

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[49] Tumushabe, G., et. al., (2013).Uganda Local Government Councils Score-card 2012/13: The big service delivery divide. ACODE Policy Research Series, No. 60, 2013. Kampala.
[50] http://www.newvision.co.ug/news/651379-govt-decentralises-payroll.html

The other key reform relates to increased transparency and availability of information regarding release of funds to local governments. To this end, the Ministry of Finance and its key civil society partners, including ACODE, IPA and ODI, organizes periodic media briefings to explain the reforms undertaken and their effectiveness. Moreoever, the Ministry of Finance and its partners have developed an easy-to-use budget website (www.budget.go.ug) with relevant information on releases to local governments and level of utilization of the resources by individual local governments.

6.1.4   A Halt to the Creation of New Districts

The creation of new districts has largely been identified as one of the constraints in attaining the objectives of democratic decentralization since it increases the cost of public administration and makes districts unviable.[51] However, the announcement by President Museveni in March 2013[52] that government is going to impose a moratorium on the creation of districts has created a sense of relief that finally the clamour for creation of new and problematic districts would come to an end.

6.1.5   Increased Support and Partnerships with Civil Society

For the last five years during which ACODE and ULGA have implemented LGCSCI, the confidence building and support by the Ministry of Local Government has made the work of civil society policy engagement successful. While LGCSCI was initially perceived as a name-and-shame project, because of the capacity building nature of the project and the civic engagement, the Ministry of Local Government has over time become a key ally to ACODE and ULGA in the implementation. For example, the Ministry of Local Government is represented on the LGCSCI task group responsible for intellectual backstopping and quality control.

6.1.6   Acceptance of LGCSCI by Participating Districts and Demand for Expansion

At the time ACODE and ULGA initiated LGCSCI, there was a generally negative attitude towards civil society work in most local governments. This situation was even worse for those CSOs that worked in the governance and accountability sectors. This largely accounts for the initial resistance by the district leadership towards the score-card.

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[51] http://www.newvision.co.ug/news/640722-district-bosses-hail-no-more-districts-move.html

[52] See David Tash Lumu & Deo Walusimbi, Museveni-tired-of-new-districts, *Observer,* Monday, 11 March 2013 http://observer.ug/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=24134:museveni-tired-of-new-districts

Over time, the attitude has changed to that of support and partnership to the extent that ACODE and ULGA are currently overwhelmed by requests to expand the assessment beyond the 30 focus districts. [53]

6.1.7 Ongoing negotiations for increased funding

Underfunding of key decentralized services has often been identified as a key impediment to service delivery. Several research undertakings on the functioning of local governments, including the four score-card reports by ACODE have all confirmed this point. As a response, government through the Local Government Finance Commission annually conducts sector negotiations with the line ministries to review performance and funding commitments. These negotiations present an opportunity for local governments, through ULGA, to push for a proposed change in the budget architecture.

6.2 Internal Factors Impacting the Effectiveness of Local Governments/Leaders to Execute Mandates and Meet the Electorate's Expectations

6.2.1 Lack of Human Resource Capacity

Inadequate human resource capacity which is manifested in several ways, is a reality faced by all 30 districts. First is the challenge of understaffing. Most of the local governments' key departments, especially health and education, are understaffed which makes it difficult to perform efficiently and effectively due to work overload of the few workers available.[54] During one of the FGDs in Mbarara District, Biharwe Sub-county, participants reported that their health centre had been closed for a whole week because the nurse was off-duty on well-deserved leave.

Another human resource limitation is a shortage of qualified and experienced staff to deliver public services, coupled with a lack of training opportunities to develop professional and technical expertise. Other problems related to human resource capacity include low pay and delays in salary payment, lack of relevant job-specific equipment and other job-related materials to use in the execution of staff duties. The aggregate effect of all this is demoralization and disillusionment with work.

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[53] see, VNG International (2014), Evaluation of the ACODE Score-card for Local Governments, Kampala: September

[54] Bashasha, B. et al, (2011). Decentralization and Rural Service Delivery in Uganda, IFPRI Discussion Paper 01063.

The good news is that the Government is making efforts to increase capacity of staff in local governments through training of administration and support staffs. For instance, it is now rare to find districts without a qualified medical doctor. A professional, well qualified staff adequately equipped with the necessary tools is very critical for local governments to realize their potential in providing efficient public services to communities.

6.2.2 Elite Capture and Marginalization

A critical element in the decentralization process is the transfer of political and administrative authority to the local leaders. In most cases, the powers transferred to local leaders have been subjected to abuse by local elites. For example, while decentralization was expected to reduce bureaucratic corruption at the centre, it has ended up decentralizing corruption at the local government level. Corruption is widespread in the process of awarding lucrative service contracts to friends, family, relatives, clansmen and those who provide kickbacks. Most councillors and many other key informants and FGD participants in this assessment complained about the unfairness in awarding tenders to friends and sometimes to local leaders in other districts with expectations of paying back in the 'same currency'. Most of the local governments assessed had weak DPACs that are incapable of providing oversight on public expenditure, opening up spaces for transgression and corruption. As a result, corruption at the level of local government is both negatively affecting the quality of service delivery and justifying the case for recentralization.

The extent of elite capture and corruption in Uganda is best illustrated by the study conducted by Reinikka and Svensson (2004) in education. It was established that local officials and politicians captured the bulk of the school grants. Unless this local elite capture is controlled, it will further foster the widespread marginalization of the poor, women, disabled, youth and other minority groups that are less favoured politically. Widespread marginalization of the poor, special interest groups and the minority makes decentralization unattractive, and undermines the ability of local governments to reach all citizens in a way that promotes civic engagement.

6.2.3 Low Levels of Civic Awareness/Consciousness

Central to the effective functioning of democratic governance and local democracy is the level of civic consciousness of citizens. Citizens that are aware of their rights, duties and obligations are able to demand good governance, better public services and political accountability from their leaders. Unfortunately, the majority of the citizens at the local government

level do not know their civic rights due to low levels of education and many years of political brutality and repression under successive regimes. Most people do not expect much from their government, and as such they welcome any public service with gratitude even if it is substandard, as was often the case with the quality of inputs such as seeds and seedlings provided under the now defunct National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS). The abolition of the Graduated Tax in 2005 eroded peoples' civic consciousness towards service delivery and about their duties, rights and obligations. The GT had always reminded people about their citizenship and their entitlement.

The findings from this assessment suggest that the majority of the citizens at the local government level have low levels of civic consciousness about their rights, duties and obligations and have low expectations from the government in terms of the quality of service delivery. During the FGDs, participants expressed a loss of confidence in their councillors' ability to influence the quality of service delivery. For example, a question that was commonly asked was: 'Do political leaders have capacity to influence service delivery? The majority of the responses were in the negative; and the reasons for negativity hinged around corruption, failure to hold local meetings, and a lack of money. A disengaged citizenry that is not aware of their rights, duties and obligations undermines the foundation of good democracy. Democratic consolidation and socio-economic transformation is possible when citizens are able to articulate their demands from the political leadership at all levels of government, compelling leaders to respond by supplying public services and political accountability as per their mandates.

6.2.4 Political Conflicts and Low Levels of a Democratic Culture

In a 2005 national referendum, Ugandans voted to change from a movement political system to a multiparty system. However, most local governments still operate in the mode of a movement system. The genesis of this is the fact that most local government councils are dominated by the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) party, which is an offshoot of the movement political system that was in power in Uganda from 1986 to 2005. While a transition in the political system is on-going, the practical operation of most local government councils still functions in the tradition of the movement. This tendency appears to be responsible for the lack of formalized political competition and vigorous debate that characterise most democracies. Political competition underpins democracies since it ensures that political leaders and political parties compete to serve citizens better.

Moreover, a lack of formalized political competition within local governments undermines their effectiveness in service delivery.[55]

In addition, most local governments are experiencing rampant political conflicts, largely between district speakers and district chairpersons.[56] Speakers often work hard to undermine the performance of chairpersons so that they can defeat them at the next elections. For example, it is a common practice for speakers to deny chairpersons a chance to address council sessions. Similarly, it is also common for chairpersons to undermine speakers by denying them resources to convene the council in order to reduce the speakers' effectiveness, and reduce the chance they have of running for the chairperson's office at the next elections. Unfortunately, this competition continues unregulated, and has undermined local government ability to deliver on their mandate, including delivery of services to communities. Democratic values of tolerance and moderation, healthy debates, mutual respect, and respect of other people's political freedoms have not yet taken root among most local governments in Uganda, impact poor performance and the delivery of public services.

6.3 External Factors that Affect Effectiveness of Local Governments/Leaders from Implementing their Mandates to the Electorate

As earlier delineated, there are both internal and external factors that constrain the effective provision of service and political accountability are both internal and external. This section examines the external factors and their role in influencing the performance of local governments. External factors relate to those factors outside the control of local governments that affect their performance in the execution of their mandates.

6.3.1 Poor Financing and Dependence on the Central Government

All activities that local governments are expected to perform require adequate financing. In all 30 districts where LGCSCI is being implemented and indeed across the entire country, local governments complain of lack of adequate financial resources to implement government programmes. Local governments have a big mandate of delivering public services to the citizens at the grassroots. Delivery on this mandate is costly and requires adequate funding.

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[55] See, Tumushabe, W. G. et. all, (2013). Uganda Local Councils Score-card 2012/13: A Big Service Delivery Divide.

[56] In Ntungamo the fight became so severe that the Hon Minister Adolf Mwesigwe had to chair council at one of the sessions to resolve such impasse

The problem is compounded by the low levels of local revenue generation, which limits the financial autonomy of local governments and hampers their ability to plan and implement their priority programmes. Most of the local governments' local revenue used to be generated from Graduated Tax (GT), which was abolished in 2005.[57] In general, the GT contributed about UGX 60-80 billion per year. The abolition of GT left almost all local governments dependent on grants from the central government.

Currently, local governments get their funding from four main sources: (1) locally generated revenue from market dues, trading licences, rent and rates; (2) central government grants; (3) donor and project funds for specified activities; and (4) fundraising. Of these, it should be noted that local governments depend heavily on subventions from the central government; on average, districts get 98 per cent of their funding from the central government. This overdependence on the central government has greatly undermined localized planning and programming in local governments since most of the funds are conditional grants. Incidentally, in the framework of decentralization local governments were supposed to be the main planning units for communities. Conditional grants limit local government ability to fund priority areas that may be very relevant. While these might be funded by the generation of local revenue, the score-card results for chairpersons and councils show low levels of performance in the area of presenting and passing ordinances that might facilitate the raising of such funds.

Another impact of financial dependence is that the practice erodes confidence of local leaders. Decentralization has given them 'power without authority' since they have very limited financial autonomy. Both in interviews and in district documents, district leaders identified this funding dynamic as a key challenge, and many confessed that local governments are poor and powerless due to a lack of financial autonomy. Decentralization was supposed to create empowered local governments capable of exerting or demanding upward accountability from the central government. Yet, with local governments essentially weak and under-resourced in the current power configuration, they function merely as administrative mechanisms – extensions of Central Government – for serving citizens. The powerlessness of local governments defeats the whole ethos of decentralization.

Service delivery is further constrained by delays in the transmission of funds to local governments and service delivery units. While the Ministry of Finance has tried to address this problem by ensuring that releases are made by the tenth day of the first month in a quarter, the delays

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[57] Ibid.

persist. Budget monitoring by ACODE and its partners for the third and fourth quarters for FY 2013/14 in 26 of LGCSCI districts found a delay of 21 days in the transmission of funds to sub-counties and service delivery units on average. The delays have been largely blamed on the slow funds transfer system which starts with instructions by the Accountant General to Bank of Uganda to release funds to specific local government bank accounts from where it is passed on to service delivery units and lower local governments. Delays in remittance of funds and budget cuts set up local governments to fail in their implementation of projects and programmes.

In Nakapiripirit and Bulisa districts, most leaders and participants of FGDs cited late release of funds by the centre as a major constraint to effective delivery of services.[58] Delays in receiving funds results in late initiation of procurement processes leading to low absorption of funds, late payment of salaries for staff especially teachers and health workers, and a general undermining of morale and the inability of councillors to monitor service delivery. The danger with councillors failing to monitor service delivery is their loss of control of the oversight role required to promote transparency and the timely delivery of services.

6.3.2 The Legal Regime and Low Qualifications of Councillors

The legal regime governing local governments, especially the Local Government Act has been problematic to implement. As the LGA currently undergoes a process of reform, criticisms are being raised on a number of legal impediments in the law that make it difficult to run efficient and effective local governments. For example, the law is silent on the qualifications of elected councillors, yet it is specific on the qualification of district chairpersons. The consequence of inconsistency is clear. A lack of a requirement for a certain education level can result in councils being dominated by councillors with very low qualifications. Yet councillors are expected to supervise the technical staff, most of whom are university graduates with Bachelor's and Master's degrees.

The difference in education levels is always a source of tension between the technical arm and the political arm of local governments, which constrains service delivery and political accountability. Additionally, since most government policies, programmes and reports are in English, it becomes difficult for some councillors with only a primary school education level to comprehend and debate authoritatively on development issues in council.

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[58] Interviews with leaders of Napiripirit and Bulisa districts that were conducted in June, 2014.

6.3.3 Marginalization of Women and other Interest Groups

While the Constitution of Uganda and the Decentralization Policy provided for political participation of formerly marginalized groups including women, persons with disability and the youth, they still face an uphill task in the performance of their duties. For example, councillors who are women, youth, or persons with disability have larger constituencies to service than regular male councillors, yet they are expected to execute their duties with the same allowance as their counterparts. Consequently, most of these special interest groups are less able to best serve their constituencies.

6.3.4 Central Government Reluctance to Fully Decentralize

Decentralization has been highly praised as a near-success story, making Uganda a benchmark for many countries. However, it still faces serious challenges. Critical among the challenges is reluctance by some government officials to let go of the locus of power. Such officials see decentralization as taking away their power from the centre. It is against this background that the deepening of decentralization through allowing more resources and functions at the local government level is at risk. Indeed, we have witnessed attempts to recentralize some functions and administrative positions. The reluctance to shift political control can also be witnessed in the budget architecture between the centre and local governments. It is imperative for government to demonstrate its commitment to decentralization by allocating adequate financing to local governments and changing the budget architecture to allow more local autonomy.

This chapter examined the key factors affecting the performance of Local Governments. A central theme is how interconnected internal and external factors affect the ability of local governments to make democratic decentralization work in the interests of citizens. The analysis presented in this chapter sets the stage for presenting the policy recommendations and conclusions in Chapter Seven.

P.L.E PERFORMANCE

YEAR	DIV 1	DIV 2	DIV 3	DIV 4	DIV X	DIV U	Total
2000	72	09	00	00	00	00	81
2001	32	61	05	03	00	01	102
2002	50	35	00	00	00	00	85
2003	83	41	01	00	04	00	129
2004	29	81	02	06	01	02	121
2005	63	59	08	02	07	00	139
2006	95	48	01	00	01	00	145
2007	129	37	00	00	02	00	168
2008	33	186	27	05	04	00	255
2009	44	69	02	00	01	00	116
2010	26	155	32	09	02	04	228
2011							10
2012	31	98	00	00	03	00	132
2013	64	48	00	00	00	00	112

Regardless of the many challenges associated with UPE, there are outstanding cases of good performance. These are attributed to the commitment of the district leadership, school management and parents:Kibiito Primary School, Kibiito Sub-County, Kabarole District.

7 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

The analysis in Chapter Two made the case that fulfilling decentralization's promise of effective and efficient service delivery requires a local government to have the capacity to respond to citizen demands, and an active and engaged citizenry with the capacity to hold them accountable. The initiative is designed to enhance capacity on both fronts. By monitoring the performance of local councils and providing information about their performance to the electorate, citizens will be better able to demand accountability from their local elected officials. This increased demand will ultimately result in a more engaged citizenry, a more responsive government, better performing local government officials, and more effective public service delivery.

As Chapter Six makes clear, however, there are a number of constraints, both internal and external, that limit the capacity of local governments to respond to citizen demands. If local governments do not have the vehicles and person-power needed to monitor the progress of road projects, health services and water quality initiatives, they cannot do the job of holding contractors and service-providers accountable. If the budget architecture designed by central government leaves virtually no room for local government discretion, how are they to respond to the demands of citizens that stem from particular local contexts? Internally, if local speakers and chairpersons are unable to bring forward ordinances, the policy environment for effective service delivery will not be established. These are the kinds of constraints that leave local governments without the "teeth" they need to respond to the "voice" of their constituents. Moreover, if citizens do not have the civic capacity to engage effectively with their elected officials to demand improvements in public services, their voice will either not be heard or will, perhaps, be ignored.

In this concluding chapter, a variety of recommendations are provided that would enable local governments to do the jobs they are mandated to do and enable citizens to be more engaged participants in the democratic process that underpins effective service delivery. The recommendations, all of which stem from the literature and data presented in this report, range from national to local and include both policy and practice.

7.1   Recommendations for Central Government

7.1.1   Improve Human Capacity in Local Governments

Low staffing levels and lack of training opportunities for staff in local governments has been blamed for the nominal performance in the delivery of services. In addition to understaffing due to the central government ban on recruitment, most local governments fail to attract highly qualified staff such as doctors and engineers due to poor pay and poor working conditions. To this end, the central government should plan to fill vacant posts in all local governments and create enabling conditions to attract essential staff to hard-to-reach districts.

7.1.2   Impose a Moratorium on Creation of New Districts

Evidence has shown that the creation new administrative units like districts and municipalities increases the cost of public administration and does not necessarily translate into improved service delivery. While the creation of new administrative units may in the short run translate into political dividends, it does not result in improved service delivery in the long run. Instead, it results in frustration and low political support for the government. To this end, government should concentrate on building the capacity of the current local governments to effectively deliver services and enhance political accountability.

7.1.3   Reform the Local Government Act

The existing legal framework, particularly the Local Government Act, is largely seen as an impediment to effective and efficient performance of local governments. Local governments urgently need an enabling law to implement their mandate. The bill should strongly consider the rights of women and other special interests groups in local governments. Secondly, the law should provide for the elections of local council leaders at LC 1 & LC 2 levels to bring government close to people and increase security of persons and property as well as law and order.

7.1.4   Establish a Local Government Challenge Fund and Provide Adequate and Discretionary Funding to Local Government

One of the factors affecting the performance of local governments is poor financing and overdependence on the central government. Central government often dictates the conditions and priority areas for local government spending, leaving local government councils very little room to manoeuvre. This greatly limits the ability of local governments to plan and invest and contradicts the mandate that local government engage in planning and set priority areas for their districts. To this end, the central

government should provide adequate and discretionary funding to local governments in order for them to invest in their priority areas of interest. Government could set up a Local Government Challenge Fund from which local governments would draw funds to fund their innovative programmes and projects that are unique to individual districts. This should be evaluated each year and the best district rewarded for their performance. Competition among local governments is likely to improve service delivery and political accountability to the citizens.

7.1.5 Establish a Local Government Training Institute

One of the factors affecting performance of local governments is that most Councillors do not fully understand their roles and functions as established in the Local Government Act. While the Ministry of Local Government conducts induction training for the councillors at the beginning of an election year, findings from this assessment indicate that the induction is not sufficient to equip them with requisite knowledge. To this end, it is recommended that government should establish a Local Government Training Institute, perhaps drawing on high-performing councils, chairpersons and speakers, to equip councillors and other staff with the knowledge and skills of running efficient and effective local governments.

7.1.6 Establish and Operationalize a Local Government-Parliamentary Forum

The demand-side model of democracy as espoused by the theory of change of LGCSCI is based on the belief that strong and empowered local governments are capable of exerting vertical demand for accountability to the central government (Parliament, Ministry of Local Government, Ministry of Finance and other line ministries). The centre will then be compelled to respond to the demands of citizens that have been channelled all the way up from the grass-root communities. At the central government level, parliament is well positioned, given its mandate, to ensure that the interests of citizens channelled from the communities through civil society and local leaders are listened and responded to. To this end, the establishment and operationalization of the Local Government-Parliamentary Forum to address the pressing challenges that prevent local governments from fulfilling their mandates should be fast-tracked.

7.1.7 Establish Minimum Qualification for Councillors

As discussed in Chapter Four of this report, there is a relationship between the level of education and ability to effectively execute the legislative role in council. Councillors with higher levels of education, particularly 'A' Level and above, performed better than their counterparts with lower education levels. We therefore recommend a minimum qualification of at least 'O' Level for councillors.

7.2 Recommendations for Local Governments

7.2.1 Strengthen District Public Accounts Committees

Information obtained during the assessment indicates that corruption continues to negatively affect the delivery of efficient public services to citizens. The District Public Accounts Committees (DPACs) that were established to provide oversight over public expenditure at local government level are very weak in performing their mandates. To this end, there is a need to strengthen the DPACs in order for them to reduce corruption and save the badly needed resources in local governments.

7.2.2 Establish Conflict Resolution Mechanisms

In many districts, conflicts within local government impede councils' capacity to deliver effective services and political accountability to citizens. Conflicts have been prevalent between the district speakers and district chairpersons, between the district chairpersons and Chief Administrative Officers and even between new and old districts over boundaries and sharing of resources. It is recommended that the Ministry of Local Government establish a conflict resolution team of professionals who can step in to resolve conflicts that stifle the performance of districts.

7.2.3 Invest Substantive Resources in Civil Society Organizations

A vibrant local civil society is very critical for democracy and its consolidation. Also, a strong and competent civil society is crucial for effective, efficient, and accountable local governments. To this end, ACODE and ULGA should invest substantial resources in strengthening local civil society's ability to play a watch-dog role at the local government level and deliver issue-based civic education to the communities. Such investment would entail providing strategic leadership training and hard and soft resources to civil society organizations.

7.2.4 Build the Capacity of Citizens to Effectively Demand Better Service Delivery

Effective governance depends on an active and engaged citizenry. Together with civil society organizations, citizens need to be more empowered to use the score-card results to demand more effective service delivery.

7.3 Conclusion

Since decentralization was introduced in Uganda and much of the developing world over the past two decades, many countries have made the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy. This same period has witnessed the rebirth of CSOs and the achievement of new freedoms and civil liberties. With the euphoria of these transitions fading, people are beginning to ask sobering questions, especially about what difference democracy makes to development and whether democracy can help redress the severe economic inequalities, high levels of poverty and unemployment, and service delivery deficits that exist in most local governments.

Since the introduction of LGCSCI assessment in Uganda in 2009, the assessment of local government councils, chairpersons, speakers and individual councillors, continuous and significant progress has been registered in their performance. There has been progress in the performance of most district councils in terms of conducting council business and engaging in quality debates. Monitoring of service delivery by individual councillors, record-keeping of council proceedings and resolution of endemic conflicts have also improved. There has also been a general acceptance of the assesment by councillors. Most of the councillors testify how they originally thought LGCSCI assessment would be used by their political opponents to defeat them, but they have over time come to appreciate its usefulness in making them effective and efficient in their work. The speaker of Lira District gave a testimony about how he had even convinced the district chairman to kick ACODE out of Lira when he was scored the poorest performer in FY 2011/2012. Today, the same speaker is not only one of the best performers but is a chief proponent of LGCSCI.

After a rigorous external evaluation of LGCSCI in September and October 2014 by VNG International, the consultants concluded that there are wide a range of examples where the score-card has a

direct and positive impact on services. The acceptance of LGCSCI among stakeholders at the local and national level can be viewed as a significant success. Dissemination of performance related information to citizens when combined with LGCSCI capacity building has 'awoken' the consciousness of a small but significant samples of citizens on their own rights and responsibilities, placing Councillors on 'high alert' as this small group of citizens exert increasing pressure on LGC to deliver on commitments and services.

While LGCSCI does not possess all the answers for the effective performance of local governments in Uganda, the five years of investment in the 30 districts have positively resulted in noticeable improvement in their performance as established by the external evaluation. The scores recorded in the four new districts of Arua, Masindi, Nwoya and Apac remind us of where many started out. Many more districts are currently requesting to be included in the annual assessment under LGCSCI. While this is not currently possible due to resource and capacity limitations, ACODE will work with partners to devise a means of scaling up the assessment process that the initiative has created.

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