



UGANDA LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCILS SCORE CARD REPORT 2008/09

A Comparative Analysis of Findings and Recommendations for Action



Godber Tumushabe
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Acronyms

ACODE	Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment
BoQs	Bills of Quantities
CAO	Chief Administrative Officer
CBO	Community Based Organizations
CSO	Civil Society Organizations
DDP	District Development Plan
DDP	Deepening Democracy Program
DEC	District Executive Committee
FAL	Functional Adult Literacy
FGD	Focus Group Discussions
FY	Financial Year
HC	Health Centre
IGG	Inspector General of Government
KCC	Kampala City Council
LC	Local Council
LG	Local Government
LLG	Lower Local Government
LGSC	Local Governments Score Card
MoES	Ministry of Education and Sports
MoFPED	Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development
MoH	Ministry of Health
MoLG	Ministry of Local Government
MoU	Memorandum of Understandings
NAADS	National Agricultural Advisory Services
NPPAs	National Priority Program Areas
NGO	Non Governmental Organizations
PAC	Public Accounts Committee
PPDA	Public Procurement and Disposal Assets
PLE	Primary Leaving Examinations
PMA	Plan for Modernisation of Agriculture
PWD	People With Disability
RDC	Resident District Commissioner
TPC	Technical Planning Committee
UBOS	Uganda Bureau of Statistics
ULGA	Uganda Local Government Association
UNEB	Uganda National Examination Board
UNRA	Uganda National Roads Authority
UPE	Universal Primary Education

Acknowledgement

This Local Government Councils Score Card Synthesis Report for the FY2008/09 has been prepared based on the 10 district score card reports produced from the first assessment of the ACODE Local Government Councils Score Card Initiative. The score card assessments were conducted using a methodology developed by ACODE and guided by an Expert Task Group. The assessment that produced the district reports was undertaken by a team of dedicated researchers from local partner organizations.

The authors are indebted to the members of the Expert Task Group and the district research teams for their dedication and commitment to meet very tight deadlines. Without their efforts and the production of the district reports, this synthesis report would not have been possible. In addition, we acknowledge the support provided to the research teams by key local government officials including the clerks to council and the district planning officials who provided valuable information and validated information that was used in the district score card reports and this synthesis report. Admittedly, without the cooperation of the district councilors, chairperson and speakers, this exercise would not have been successful and we therefore extend our appreciation to all the district leaders that provided support in one way or the other.

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Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment

Executive Summary

The Local Government Score Card (LGCSC) is an independent assessment tool to assess the performance of local government councils in Uganda. It was initiated in 2009 under the Local Government Councils Score Card (LGCSC) Initiative of the Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment (ACODE). The Local Government Councils Score Card (LGCSC) is a set of parameters and associated indicators designed to do two interrelated things: first, it empirically assesses the extent to which local government council organs and councilors are performing their responsibilities as stipulated in the Local Act. Secondly, it examines whether there is a direct correlation between the good or bad score card performance of a local government council and the quality of service delivery in the district.

The parameters in the score card are based on the core statutory roles and responsibilities of the local government councils. The theory of change underlying the LGCSC is that by providing local government councils' performance related information to the public, citizens will be able to demand for better quality services through increased accountability from local political leaders hence triggering a vertical spiral of demand for accountability from the local to the national levels. The score card seeks to address the number one policy problem confronting policy makers and development practitioners in Uganda: why has the quality of public service delivery in Uganda not improved tremendously in spite of a sustained record of economic growth and major investments by government and development partners?

After almost two decades of the decentralization policy in Uganda, the results are mixed combining both success and widespread failures. The local government system was entrenched in the 1995 constitution and a series of reforms epitomized in the enactment of the Local Government Act in 1997. The series of policy and institutional reforms have yielded tangible results in creating a system of local governance where citizens elect their leaders from the local to the district leaders. The underlying rationale as articulated in the 1995 constitution is that effective governance is achieved when functions and powers are devolved to the people at appropriate levels. However, there have also been apparent widespread failures evidenced through the malfunctioning of the public service delivery infrastructure, persistent levels of rural poverty and absence of effective accountability between citizens and their leaders both at the local and national level. This malfunctioning is often blamed on the problem of "weakness of and corruption in" local governments. Consequently, the standard policy response to this problem is to implement a series of supply-side interventions including supply-side monitoring of service delivery by local governments.

It is argued that the diagnosis that blames the failure in the public service delivery system on the "weaknesses" of the local government is a wrong diagnosis of the policy problem. On the contrary, the problem of poor quality of public service delivery is a function of systemic policy failures that undermine accountability systems upon which

local governance is premised. The continuous affront in the powers of local governments, a distorted budget architecture that creates a substantial imbalance of power between the central government and local governments, and a rural development policy that has alienated citizens from government are the fundamental policy issues that account for the failure of local governments to become the frontline institutions for effective public service delivery. Consequently, it is argued that concentrating interventions on the supply-side financing and monitoring of performance of local governments is the wrong policy prescription. On the contrary, it is argued that what is needed are interventions that reconstruct and give confidence to local governments to plan and execute locally developed medium and long-term development programmes while building the accountability relationships between the citizens and leaders.

This Synthesis Report presents findings and analysis of the first LGCSC assessment conducted in 10 districts. The 10 districts which are spread evenly across the country were selected through criteria that sought to achieve a regional balance in the sample, balance old and new districts, included districts that were considered marginalized by geopolitical circumstances, or inclusion of districts that were perceived as models in terms of performance. Kampala District Council was particularly included in this lot by virtue of its metropolitan status. The score card is based on three interrelated building blocks: the council and its respective organs; the core responsibilities and functions of those organs; and the causal-effect relationship between score card performance and service delivery outcomes. The assessment covered the performance of local government councils in the 10 districts during the FY 2008/09. The following organs of the local government councils were assessed and scored: district councils; individual district councilors; the district chairpersons; and the district council speakers. All the organs are scored on performance of their core responsibilities with scores ranging from 0 up to 100 points.

The 10 district councils were assessed on the performance of 4 core responsibilities or functions: local legislation and legislative functions, accountability, planning and budgeting, and service delivery on National Priority Programme Areas (NPPAs). Luwero District Council scored the highest performance obtaining 86 points. The district generally scored well in three score card areas: accountability; planning and budgeting; and service delivery on National Priority Programme Areas (NPPAs).

Kamuli district council with 56 points got the lowest score performing well below average of all the 10 districts in the score card. The district council obtained generally low scores on all the parameters in the score card.

Individuals district councilors were assessed on five performance parameters: i) performance of legislative responsibilities; ii) evidence of contact with the electorate; iii) participation in communal and development activities in the respective constituency; iv) participation in lower local government councils by way of attendance at meetings or providing guidance and leadership; and v) engagement in service delivery on national priority programmes.

The general performance of councilors was generally fair with the majority obtaining points ranging from 40 to 69. There were apparent gender-based performance

differences with male councilors performing better than female councilors although female councilors from Kampala City Council and Ntungamo district were amongst the top performers. On average, female councilors scored better points than male councilors in Ntungamo district council and Kampala City Council. In all the remaining districts, male councilors scored more points than female councilors. The best performing female councilor was Councilor Florence Namayanja-Mukasa from Kampala City Council while the best performing male councilor was Councilor Erasmus Musisi from Luwero District Council.

The councilors for special interest groups of youth and people with disabilities (PWDs) generally scored low points across the ten districts compared to other councilors. The apparent explanation for the poor performance is that these councilors generally exhibited very limited knowledge of their roles and how they could mobilize their constituencies since those constituencies are not specifically defined. They are also the only councilors who have the entire district as their constituency but receive no logistical support to service this constituency.

The district chairpersons were assessed on five score card parameters covering: i) political leadership, ii) legislative roles, iii) contact with the electorate, iv) participation in communal and development activities and v) monitoring of service delivery on national priority programme areas. The average score for all the 10 district council chairpersons was 76 points. Generally, chairpersons performed well on all the score card parameters with the exception of the legislative roles and contact with the electorate where 4 of the chairpersons scored below the average points for all chairpersons on these score cards. Chairman John Wycliffe Karazarwe was the overall best chairperson scoring a total of 95 points out of 100.

District council speakers were assessed on all the parameters used to assess councilors although an additional parameter regarding presiding and preservation of order in the councils was added on their score card. The average performance of speakers was 62%. Out of the ten speakers, five (5) performed above their average mark while the other five (5) performed below average. Speaker Dennis Singahakywe was the best performing speaker with a score of 95 points out of a total score of 100 points. The only female speaker in the sample came second obtaining 79 points of a total score card of 100 points.

Generally, there are at least four key factors that affected the overall performance of the councils and their respective organs. These are:

- Lack of adequate knowledge about the roles of councils and councilors.
- Poor documentation and record keeping that makes traceability of councilors' performance difficult.
- Low levels of academic qualifications for some councilors; and
- The problem of non-resident councilors.

These factors cut across all the 10 districts in addition to district specific problems such as widespread corruption, conflict between the political and civil service leadership, and cliques.

The major conclusion from the assessment is that there was no apparent direct correlation between score card performance and service delivery on the one hand, and voice and accountability on the other. Analysis of the findings and examination of the causal-effect relationship shows the existence of major policy distortions that undermine service delivery and the accountability relationships between leaders and citizens. These distortions generally lie outside the mandate or capabilities of the local government councils. These are:

- Absence of integrated strategic development plans; an unfavorable national and local government budget architecture that concentrates power in central governments and makes local governments mere agents of the centre rather than governments as envisaged under the constitution.
- General absence of clear power relations structure and accountability relationships among the leaders at the local government level.
- A rural economic policy underpinned by welfarism, tax relief and “ administrative engineering” that is consistently engaging citizens from government; and
- The changing character of decentralization from devolution that was envisaged under the constitution to delegation- which is often the weakest form of decentralization.

It is these policy and operational distortions that have to be addressed if local governments are to effectively contribute to service delivery and build appropriate vertical and horizontal accountability relationships needed to ensure effectiveness in the delivery of public services.

This report therefore recommends two sets of proposals for action. The first set of proposals focus on improving the performance of local government councils within the current constrained policy and institutional environment. The second set of recommendations focuses on the actions that go to the root causes of the problem and hence proposes fundamental reforms in the current policy, budget and planning architecture at the national and local government level.

The following recommendations address the immediate problems affecting the score card performance of councils and their respective organs:

- Orientation and regular training of councilors on their roles as well as their accountability obligations to the citizens and voters.
- Training in documentation and record keeping.
- Setting minimum academic qualifications for councilors especially at the district level.

On the other hand, to address the apparent malfunctioning of the public service delivery system and the breakdown of accountability relationships between government, local governments and leaders, the following proposals are made:

- Changing the budget architecture to ensure appropriate investments in service delivery sectors, create a mechanism where local governments have direct control over their budgets by dividing the national budget between them and central government, and introduction of some form of direct taxes as means of recreating the accountability relationship between citizens and government.
- Provide technical support to local governments to enable them formulate medium and long-term development plans with performance targets on production,

investments, private sector development and the delivery of quality social services.

- Invest in building the demand-side infrastructure of civil society, citizens' groups and other civic agencies; and
- Establish leadership awards for local government councils and local council leaders for exemplary performance based on empirical performance assessments such as the Local Government Councils Score Card.

Finally, it is important to recognize that this is the first in the series of assessments to be conducted over the next 10 years. The sample of districts included in this round of assessment was considerably small given the financial and human resources required for undertaking the assessments. However, the number of districts to be included in the assessment will be progressively increased over the course of the initiative. This assessment has also raised important methodological issues that will be addressed during the course of revising and updating the score card methodology and indicators.

1. Introduction

In 1992, Uganda adopted the decentralization policy that sought to establish a system of governance underpinned by strong local governments. Subsequent constitutional and legal reforms¹ established districts and the sub-counties as key pillars of local governments through which effective service delivery and local governance is to be attained. Although the decentralization policy has been pursued as a key government public policy over the last two decades, there is widespread consensus that the performance of local governments is less than desirable. The revenue base of local governments has diminished and they are now heavily dependent on central government disbursements mainly through conditional grants. The quality of services is less than desirable as key decentralized services such as health care, water and sanitation, primary education, roads and agricultural advisory services remain generally depressing and dismal. Previous interventions to address the problem have not led to serious improvements in the quality of services. These have mainly been supply-side interventions where it is assumed that monitoring of lower local governments by the centre² will result into improvements in the quality of public service delivery. This supply-side approach is devoid of triggering demand for accountability by the service recipients in a particular local government to the extent that accountability is made to the centre rather than the citizens.

In 2009, ACODE developed the LGCSC Initiative to address the problem of poor quality of service delivery and poor governance and accountability from a demand-side perspective. The LGCSC Initiative seeks to build citizens' demand for better governance and improvements in the delivery of public services by providing critical information on the performance of local government councils and their respective organs. The underlying theory of change of the Initiative is that by providing data and information on the performance of local government councils to the public, citizens will be able to demand for increased accountability from local political leaders hence triggering a vertical chain reaction that builds into demand for accountability from the local to the national level. Factors that are identified during the assessment as negatively impacting on the performance of councils and councilors are addressed through capacity building and outreach activities with partner institutions such as the Uganda Local Government Association (ULGA) and other capacity building agents.

This synthesis report, therefore, presents the findings from the first score card assessment conducted in 10 districts covering the financial year 2008/09. The assessment was conducted in the districts of Amuria, Amuru, Hoima, Kampala, Kamuli, Luwero, Mbale, Moroto, Nebbi and Ntungamo.

1 Constitution of Uganda 1995 Section 11, Articles 176-189, Local Government Act 1997, Local Government Amendment Act 2005, Local Government Amendment Act 2006

2 Ministry of Local Government Annual National Assessment of performance measures and minimum conditions, and monitoring initiatives from line ministries of Health, Education, Works, Water and Sanitation

The report is presented in 8 sections. Section 2 after this introduction provides the rationale for the LGCSC Initiative while section 3 presents the summary of the methodology and score card that was used in the assessment exercise. This was based on the background paper to the Initiative.³ Section 4 provides basic socio-economic characteristics of the districts that were covered during the first score card assessment. These socio-economic characteristics are presented as reflecting on the overall quality of service delivery in the relevant districts. In section 5, we present the basic findings and analysis from the assessment. The key conclusion from the assessment is that there is no direct correlation between the score card performance and the quality of public service delivery in the 10 districts assessed. Consequently, in section 6, we explore the major factors underlying the poor quality of service delivery. It is these factors that the outreach phase of the score card should seek to address by building the civic competence of citizens to demand for responsiveness on the part of the local government councils and the government. In section 7, we offer specific recommendations for action while section 8 is the general conclusion.

3 Tumushabe, G., et al (2010) Monitoring and Assessing the Performance of LG Councils in Uganda: Background, Methodology and Scorecard. ACODE Policy Research Series No. 31 2010 Kampala

2. Background and Rationale for the Local Government Councils Score Card Initiative

Since the introduction of the decentralization policy at the beginning of the 1990s, the Government of Uganda and its development partners have invested significant financial, human and other resources to improve the quality of public service delivery and governance at the local level⁴. Over the years, Government implemented a series of institutional, fiscal and other reforms to build local governments as key agencies through which public services can be effectively delivered. The articulation of key decentralization principles in the 1995 constitution⁵ and the enactment of major local government legislation⁶ in 1997 to operationalize those constitutional principles could be said to have been the epitome the local government reform agenda.

However, almost two decades later, there is general consensus that the decentralization policy and its operational institutional framework – the local government system- has not worked as was originally envisaged. For example, while local governments were envisaged to have their own revenue base, they no longer have meaningful financial resources of their own but rather depend on the central government for financing. The

Box 1: The tenets of Uganda's decentralization system as enshrined in Article 178 of the Constitution

- The state shall be guided by the principle of decentralization and devolution of governmental functions and powers to the people at appropriate levels where they can best manage and direct their own affairs.
- The system shall be such as to ensure that functions, powers and responsibilities are devolved and transferred to local government units in a coordinated manner.
- Decentralization shall be a principle applying to all levels of local government and in particular, from higher to lower local government units to ensure people's participation and democratic control in decision making.
- The system shall be such as to ensure the full realization of democratic governance at all local government levels.
- There shall be established for each local government unit a sound financial base with reliable sources of revenue.
- Appropriate measures shall be taken to enable local government units to plan, initiate and execute policies in respect of all matters affecting the people within their jurisdiction.
- Persons in the service of local government shall be employed by the local governments.
- The local governments shall oversee the performance of persons employed by government to provide services in their areas and monitor the provision of government services or the implementation of projects in their areas.


⁴ For example a total of 7.693 trillion has been channelled through Local governments in the past 10 Financial Years (2000/2001-2009/2010)

⁵ Constitution of Uganda 1995, Articles 176-189

⁶ Local Government Act 1997


fiscal decentralization strategy which was formulated at the beginning of the 1990s has since been abandoned in favor of a complex system of conditional grants that covers almost all sectors particularly roads, education, health, water and agriculture. Figure 1 and Figure 2 respectively show the trends in conditional grants to districts for selected sectors and trends in conditional grants to districts by sector in real per capita terms, for the period 2004-2009.

Figure 1: Trends in Conditional Grants to Districts by Sector “Inflation Adjusted Allocation”



Source: Author's calculations based on figures from Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development 2010

Figure 2: Trends in Conditional Grants to Districts by Sector “Real per capita Terms”



Source: Author's calculations based on figures from Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development 2010

This departure from the original fiscal decentralisation is just but a facet of the trends by the central government to scale back on the decentralized powers. This is in contrast to the original intent of the decentralization policy and the local government system

to progressively devolve more powers and responsibilities to local governments. Table 1 below shows selected local government powers and functions that have been recentralized over the years.

Table1: Changing Nature of decentralized functions

OFFICE / SECTOR	DECENTRALISED POSITION	RECENTRALIZED POSITION	REMARKS
The office of the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO)	There shall be a Chief Administrative Officer who shall be appointed by the District Service Commission [the Local Government Act (1997) part II s. 64 (1)]	There shall be a Chief Administrative Officer who shall be appointed by the Public Service Commission[the Local Government Amendment Act 2005 s.63 (1)]	The Central Government argues that it had to recentralize the CAO so as to create some form of uniformity in the Districts as they claim that Local Governments had previously appointed questionable CAOs along with accusations of corruption in the Local Government system. This change goes against the already transferred power possessed by Local Governments in handling this particular office. It undermines the power of Councils over administration staff.
Appointment of the district contracts committee	The District Tender Board shall consist of seven members including the Chairperson all of whom shall be appointed by the District Council on the recommendation of the District Committee [the Local Government Act (1997) part IIs.92(1)	The District Contract Committee shall comprise a Chairperson, a member representing the Town Council, and three other members all of whom shall be nominated by the Chief Administrative Officer from the public officers of the District Council and approved by the Secretary to Treasury [Local Government Act (Amendment)2006 part II 91 s. (2)]	The position of the CAO has already been recentralized meaning that the CAO is under the regulation of the central Government. So when one of the most crucial departments/ powers of the local government is removed, it goes against one of the cardinal objectives of Decentralization of the District Local Government being principle employer of the persons in its service.

OFFICE / SECTOR	DECENTRALISED POSITION	RECENTRALIZED POSITION	REMARKS
The procurement process	In the performance of its functions, a district tender board shall- Act only upon request by the Local Council seeking the procurement of goods, services or works [the Local Government Act 1997 92 s.7(b)]	The introduction of the PPDA act of 2003 makes the procurement process longer (the Council - CAO - Procurement Unit- Contracts Committee)	This process promotes bureaucracy and therefore delays in service delivery. Also since none of the functions of the District Contracts Committee gives room for checks and balances on the activities of the Committee at the Local Government level, it undermines the oversight role of the District council.
Payment of chairpersons, speakers and councilors	The Chairpersons of Local Governments, the Vice Chairpersons and Secretaries of District Council shall be paid such emoluments and allowances as the council shall determine subject to The Local Governments Financial and Accounting Regulation [the Local Government Act (1997) 1 st schedule (1)	Government undertook to pay the wages of the LC Five Chairman, the Speaker to Council and the LC III Chairpersons. [2005/2006 budget speech]	One can argue that this is a good move by the Central Government to try and come in to lessen the financial strain on the district council and also check the imbalances in wages and allowances in the different district of Uganda. However, this continues to promote dependency on the central government.
Graduated Tax	One of the major sources of Revenue for the local government in the decentralization policy was the mandate to levy an annual tax known as Graduated Tax [The Local Government Act 1997 revenue regulations part II s.2(1)	In Financial Year 2005/06 budget speech, Graduated Tax was effectively removed severely impacting negatively on local revenue collection by local governments.	To the common man this is a great relief and a plus for the Central Government but we cannot overlook its impact on Local Government revenue and the fact that its removal has increased Local Government reliance on the Central Government. This is one of the evidences that show that the central government of Uganda has not allowed the maturity of the decentralization policy since it continues to interfere in the day today running of the Local Government and thereby increasing dependency.

OFFICE / SECTOR	DECENTRALISED POSITION	RECENTRALIZED POSITION	REMARKS
Payment of LC 1 Chairpersons	Previously , LC 1 Chairpersons have not been paid	The government will pay an honorarium to all Local Council (LC1) Chairpersons monthly in recognition of their contribution in improving delivery of government programs in different parts of the country.[the Budget of Uganda 2010/2011]	Previously the LC1 Chairpersons have not been paid and like all other Government interventions its commendable but one wonders if it would have not been better for government to effect this change under the umbrella of the Local Government policy.
Fisheries Licensing	In addition to graduated tax, rates and grants from Government, local Government revenue shall consist of –fishing licenses [the Local Government Act 1997 fifth schedule part IV s. 13 (L)	On 9th September 2009 the Minister of State for Fisheries Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry And Fisheries gave a directive that starting that very month of September 2009 the Department of Fisheries Resources would undertake the licensing exercise. This effectively removed any power of the District Local Governments to issue fisheries licenses	The fisheries sector had several challenges including failure by local governments to manage over fishing However, it would have been more credible for the central government to solve these problems alongside the Local Governments and not completely cut out one of its revenue sources.

OFFICE / SECTOR	DECENTRALISED POSITION	RECENTRALIZED POSITION	REMARKS
Teacher's Salaries	The 1997 Local Government Act second schedule part 2(1) decentralized education services which include payment of teachers' salaries passing through the District Council	In 2008 payment of teachers' salaries was taken over by the central Government. Part III section 8(b) of The Education Act 2008 awards the payment of teachers' salaries and allowances as a responsibility of the Central Government towards Government aided institutions	Given the constant delays in payment of teachers by the districts, there is a case by central Government to take over payment of teachers' salaries. One down side of this is that the district still remains the organ that inspects and requires accountability from these teachers since its closer to them than the Central Government. This move creates a bureaucratic process in case there is a need to make changes to the pay roll if the district deems it necessary through inspection to penalize a teacher who is failing to abide by the regulations of the Education Act for example.

The apparent reversal in the nature of decentralization is clearly inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution which declared that "The state shall be guided by the principle of decentralization and devolution of governmental functions and powers to the people at appropriate levels where they can best manage and direct their own affairs." In this regard, the framers of the constitution sought to create a system that ensured that functions, powers and responsibilities are devolved and transferred to local government units in a coordinated manner. On the contrary, the general tendency has been to look at local governments as weak and therefore failing the public service delivery system. While attempting to increase the resource envelop available to local governments through a distorted budget architecture built around conditional grants, Government and development partners have also tried to fix the problem of local government performance and the quality of public service delivery by focusing on monitoring the fiscal and administrative performance of local governments. These efforts have largely not paid adequate attention to the political, legislative and planning responsibilities and powers vested in the local government councils.

It is this apparent failure of the local government system evidenced through the malfunctioning of the public service delivery infrastructure, persistent levels of rural poverty and absence of effective accountability between citizens and their leaders that this Local Government Councils Score Card seeks to address. It is argued that the diagnosis that blames the failure in the public service delivery system on the "weaknesses" of the local government is a wrong diagnosis of the policy problem.

On the contrary, the problem of poor quality of public service delivery is a function of systemic policy failures that undermine accountability systems upon which local governance is premised. The continuous affront on the powers of local governments, a distorted budget architecture that creates a substantial imbalance of power between the central government and local governments, and a rural development policy that has alienated citizens from government are the fundamental policy issues that account for the failure of local governments to become the frontline institutions for effective public service delivery. Rather than concentrating interventions on the supply-side financing and monitoring of performance of local governments, what is needed are interventions that reconstruct and give confidence to local governments while building the accountability relationships between the citizens and leaders.


3. Local Government Councils Performance Score Card and Methodology

The tool for conducting the annual assessment of local government councils is what is referred to as the Local Government Councils Score Card (LGCSC). The LGCSC contains the score card – a set of qualitative and quantitative measurements - as well as the methodological steps for conducting the assessment or score card administration. The Score Card was developed through an intensive intellectual and empirical process at the inception of the Local Government Councils Score Card Initiative in 2009. The development of the score card went through a three phase process. First, a detailed background paper was prepared. The paper provides the conceptual and analytical framework, examines the limitations of the current local government performance monitoring initiatives, identifies the essential building blocks for developing a demand-side monitoring score card, and proposes the score card and methodology. Secondly, the background paper was subjected to an intensive peer review process through a Task Group of experts and practitioners on governance and local governments. Finally, the initial score card was subjected to limited field testing in at least five districts. This section of the report therefore presents the score card used during the assessment and the methodology for its administration.

3.1 The Score Card

The Local Government Councils Score Card (LGCSC) is a set of parameters and associated indicators designed to monitor the extent to which local government council organs and councilors are performing their responsibilities. The parameters in the score card are based on the core responsibilities of the local government councils. The theory of change underlying the LGCSC is that by providing local government councils' performance related information to the public, citizens will be able to demand for increased accountability from local political leaders hence triggering a vertical spiral of demand for accountability from the local to the national level.


The score card is built around three interrelated blocks. The first block is the organs of the local government councils. The Local Government Act establishes the district local government and the sub-county local governments as corporate legal entities as indicated in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Local Governments and Administrative Units under the decentralization structure

Besides these corporate structures, there are also local administrative structures through which effective local administration and public service delivery are to be attained. However, the score card is designed to apply only to the district council and the sub-county council because of the powers and responsibilities vested in them. Ideally, if these two structures are functioning properly, the corresponding administrative structures should also be able to function properly as well. The current assessment and hence this report, however, focuses on the district local councils. It is intended that subsequent assessments will go further to focus on selected sub-county councils in the form of case studies in order to enrich the assessment process.

For purposes of the assessment, district councils are disaggregated into the respective organs of council as provided for in the Local Government Act. As shown in Figure 4, this assessment focuses on the five organs of the district council: i) Council; ii) Executive Committee; iii) Chairperson; iv) Speaker and deputy speaker; and v) Individual councilors. Separate score cards (Annex 2) are used for each of these organs.

Figure 4: Key Aspects of the Local Government Councils Performance



Source: Tumushabe, G., et al (2010).

The second building block is the responsibilities of the local government councils. The local government councils are vested with various responsibilities under the Local Government Act but also by the nature of their powers and position. These responsibilities are grouped into 5 categories: financial management and oversight; political functions and representation; legislation and related legislative functions; development planning; constituency servicing and monitoring service delivery. Performance indicators are therefore developed based on each of these responsibilities. Each indicator or score is given a weight so that the total scores add up to 100. The scores are generally based on the importance that the research team placed on the particular responsibility or function. The weighting was tested and validated through a series of focus group meetings organized during the core card development process.

The third building block focuses on the causal-effect relationship between the score card performance and Voice and accountability. In our theory of change, good performance of councils measured by their execution of the council responsibilities should result into effective public service delivery and a robust system of accountability relationships

between citizens and their elected leaders from the local level to the national level. This element is perhaps the weakest in the methodology. For example, as the results from the assessment started coming in, the assessment team was particularly shocked that Kampala City Council which is known to have a notorious public service delivery record performed very well with an overall score of 88 percent.⁷ At the time of the design of the methodology, the issue of causal-effect relationship was not given adequate attention and there are no clear indicators to measure this relationship. The bulk of the analysis on this issue is based both on the literature and the focus group discussions between the assessment teams and the citizens in the districts that were assessed.

3.2 Local Government Councils Score Card Administration: Methodology

The Local Government Councils Score Card administration refers to the methodology of undertaking the assessment exercise. The score card administration is divided into 4 phases: the preparation phase; the fieldwork phase; data management and analysis phase; and outreach and advocacy phase.⁸

During the preparation phase, a number of activities including securing buy-in from key stakeholders, customizing the score card, selecting the local government councils to be assessed, identification of district research teams and organizing methodology workshops were undertaken. For purposes of this first assessment, a Task Group comprising representatives of local governments, academia, civil society and donors was constituted to help provide feedback in the methodology development process.⁹ The research teams were selected from district based civil society organizations as part of the strategy to build local capacity to sustain the score card administration process¹⁰.

The score card was mainly administered through individual interviews with the respondents, focus group discussions and a very rigorous information validation process conducted through feedback sessions and review of relevant background documents. On average, at least 4 focus group discussions were conducted in each of the 10 districts. The focus group discussions were organized for either councilors or citizens' groups. Participants in the citizens' groups were identified on the basis of the fact that they were either beneficiaries or in a position to have observed the work of the councilors. Official local government documents such as district development plans, annual budget and performance assessments were key sources of background information and validation data.

The outreach phase is also considered one of the important aspects of the methodology. The assessment exercise is supposed to identify key factors that negatively impact on the performance of local government councils that need to be addressed to ensure effective performance and accountability. However, the uniqueness of the LGCSC is that empowerment activities for both councilors and citizens are also an integral part

⁷ See Muyomba, L., et al (2010). Kampala District Local Government Council Score Card

⁸ See Tumushabe, G. et al (2010) Monitoring and Assessing the Performance of LG Councils in Uganda: Background, Methodology and Scorecard.

⁹ Annex 3 A List of Task group members

¹⁰ Annex 3 B District Based Researchers

of the methodology. For example, the focus group discussions were an essential tool for educating councilors and citizens on the statutory responsibilities of councils and councilors. Other outreach activities building on the publication of this report includes official launching, dissemination workshops and outreach through media.

3.3 Selection of Local Governments for Assessment

The LGCSC is a long-term initiative whose goal is to contribute to the consolidation of democracy and efficiency in public service delivery in Uganda. This goal is to be achieved through two broad interrelated interventions. First, the Initiative will provide empirical information on the performance of local government councils to citizens and build their capacity to demand for accountability and effectiveness in the delivery of public services. Secondly, the Initiative will identify factors that inhibit the effective performance of local government councils and build partnerships that will implement targeted actions to remove those constraints. Initially, the initiative will be implemented over the next 10 years starting with FY2008/09. Because of the total number of districts which were estimated at 114 by the beginning of the FY 2010/11, criteria have been developed to guide the progressive inclusion of districts in the Initiative. In selecting the first 10 districts covered in this report, the following criteria was used: national coverage; the need to balance old and newly established districts; local governments perceived to be good performers viza avis those that are considered poor performers; and marginalization as a result of historical or geographical factors.¹¹ Table 2 below shows the districts covered during this first assessment.

Table 2: Selection Criteria for the Assessed Local Governments

Parameter	Districts Chosen
Regional balance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Eastern Region: Mbale and Kamuli • Western Region: Ntungamo and Hoima • Central Region: Kampala and Luwero • Northern Region: Nebbi and Amuru • North Eastern Region: Amuria and Moroto
Duration of Existence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In existence by 1986: Moroto, Kampala, Mbale, Kamuli, Nebbi, Hoima, Luwero • In existence post 1986: Ntungamo, Amuria, Amuru
Perceived Model Districts¹³	Luwero Ntungamo Kampala
Marginalized by geopolitical reasons	Moroto: Hard to reach area, and in civil conflict –cattle rustling Amuru: Civil Conflict- LRA conflict Amuria: Civil Conflict-LRA Conflict, cattle rustling and prone to weather vagaries Luwero: Civil Conflict- NRA liberation Struggle (1981-1986)

¹¹ Godber et al 2010, Monitoring and Measuring the Performance of Local Government Councils in Uganda: Background, Methodology and Indicators.

4. Selected Socio-Economic Characteristics of the Assessed Districts

Local government councils are vested with planning, budgeting and service delivery monitoring responsibilities. Consequently, if the councils are performing very well, then the quality of the public services should be good or generally above average. According to the score card methodology, the empirical way of understanding the quality of public services is to look at the key socio-economic indicators of the respective local governments. This section of the reports presents a compressed comparative analysis of these indicators. The detailed analysis can also be found in the individual district reports which are published separately from this synthesis report. This part of the report provides a comparative analysis of some of the key socio-economic characteristics that relate to the quality of service delivery at the local level.

4.1 General Characteristics

In many ways, perhaps with the exception of Kampala District, all local governments in Uganda share some similar characteristics. On average, the assessed rural districts have a population of 41,000 with varying resources both from the centre and locally generated. Kampala being an urban centre is unique in terms of population despite being the smallest in size. Nebbi has the highest number of councillors (35) while Amuru has 17. Table 3 indicates general characteristics of the assessed districts.

Table 3: Population, budget and political representation


	Population Size ¹⁴	Size of District Km ²	Budget Outturns ¹⁵ FY 2008/9	Councillors	Per capita Representation	Per capita Budget Allocation
Amuria	315,500	2,695.60	8,493,048,000	21	14,810	26,919
Amuru	215,500	2,337.00	10,074,260,035	17	5,290	46,748
Hoima	476,000	5,755.00	14,935,835,488	27	17,293	31,378
Kampala	1,533,600	176.30	77,822,928,890	31	49,400	50,745
Kamuli	690,300	3,443.60	15,816,626,804	33	20,879	22,913
Luwero	405,900	2,577.50	18,624,001,184	27	14,967	45,883
Mbale	403,100	534.4	20,103,505,793	27	15,055	49,872
Moroto	282,700	8,516.00	9,943,180,543 ¹⁶	21	13,142	35,172
Nebbi	526,200	3,288.00	21,014,247,012	35	14,621	39,936
Ntungamo	447,400	2,184.50	17,860,918,770	28	16,618	39,922

Source: Author calculations based on various official records from UBOS and Specified District Local Governments

4.2 Primary Education

In the education sector, mainly as a result of the introduction of universal primary education (UPE), primary school enrollment has fairly been impressive as indicated in Figure 5 with high annual enrollment figures especially for girls.


Figure 5: Enrollment in UPE Schools



Source: NPA 2010 Baseline data for the National Development Plan 2009

The education sector is however faced with a number of challenges for both software related inputs like teachers and hardware inputs such as physical infrastructure especially classrooms. These challenges translate into low completion rates, high pupil teacher ratios and poor performance. A scrutiny of the trends for PLE performance indicates very few pupils across the districts passing in Grade 1. During the FY under assessment, with the exception of Kampala which has a dominance of private schools, all the districts recorded dismal performance of less than 5% pass in Grade 1 as shown in Figure 6 below.

Figure 6: District PLE Performance in 2008




Source: Author's calculations based on the results of Uganda National Examinations Board 2010

4.3 Health

Generally, all the districts assessed have almost similar health infrastructure. The health infrastructure system is dominated by Health Centre IIs with Kamuli District Local Government having the highest concentration of such facilities as indicated in Figure 7.

Figure 7: Health Facilities in the assessed District



Source: Author's calculation based on UBOS, NPA Baseline data for the National Development Plan 2009

However, despite the presence of these health facilities, the quality of health care vis vis the demand leaves many a citizen at crossroads. With the exception of Kampala that has a number of private health providers; most of the citizens in each of the assessed districts depend on government health services. This high demand results into overcrowding as indicated in Figure 8 (Rubare HCIV in Ntungamo) or initiating community self help initiatives in Figure 9 (Amuria District)



Figure 8:
Clients wait to register in the OPD at Rubare HC IV in Rushenya County

**Figure 9:**

A patient on drip in a community Health Centre in Aten village-Amuria

Despite the apparent high demand, the health facilities are faced with a challenge of human resources with low staffing levels. The bulk of the health facilities are manned by nurses while specialized health workers are very few in the districts.

4.4 Roads and works

The status of the roads just like other decentralized public services was found to be wanting. Two centers of responsibility exist for management of the roads at the district level. While the Uganda National Roads Authority has the responsibility over national trunk roads both bitumen surfaced and murrum, district local councils have control over specified roads. There however exists a stark contrast between these two types of roads with district roads generally lacking in quality. In Kampala for example the roads under KCC are in a state of disrepair and the number one nightmare for the city residents whether motorists, cyclists or pedestrians. During the dry season, the city residents have to contend with unbearable dusty conditions while during the rainy season, the City turns into a high concentration of mud and mini-lakes. Figures 10,11 and 12 indicate the state of roads in Amuria, Luwero and Kampala respectively.

**Figure 10: Amuria****Figure 11: Luwero**




Figure 12: *Kampala*

The major reason advanced to explain this state of affairs by the Local Governments mainly boards on the resources available to the districts to effectively cover the maintenance of these roads.

4.5 Local Government Budget and Revenue


The Constitution of Uganda provides that “there shall be established for each local government unit a sound financial base with reliable sources of revenue. However, an analysis of the current local government revenue structure clearly shows that this principle has been honored more in breach. Like most of the districts across the country, all the districts assessed are financed through central government transfers mainly in the form of conditional grants. Table 4 shows central government transfers and local revenue as a percentage of the total revenue for the respective local governments.

Table 4: Revenue Sources for the FY 2008/09


	Local Revenue	Gov’t Releases	Donor ¹⁸	Total Revenue
Amuria	133,648,000	6,986,450,000	1,372,950,000	8,493,048,000
Amuru	99,349,800	9,203,910,035	771,000,200	10,074,260,035
Hoima	271,219,428	13,922,860,985	745,090,075	14,935,835,488
Kampala	29,665,002,000	48,157,926,890		77,822,928,890
Kamuli	142,808,062	15,371,255,581	302,563,161	15,816,626,804
Luwero	268,917,000	17,813,606,000	541,478,184	18,624,001,1846
Mbale	631,927,000	19,428,482,093	43,096,700	20,103,505,793
Moroto	223,900,000	8,160,985,000	1,558,295,543	9,943,180,5437
Nebbi	169,072,143	19,023,838,776	1,821,336,093	21,014,247,012
Ntungamo	165,662,990	17,499,184,000	196,071,780	17,860,918,770

Source: Various Budget Framework Papers 2009/2010 from the District Local Governments

With the exception of Kampala, all local governments have a very low local revenue base (Figure 13) especially when compared with the local government transfers and as a percentage of total local government budget (Figure 14).

Figure 13 Local Revenue as Percentage of Total District Revenue

Source: Author's calculations based on various Budget Framework Papers 2009/2010 from the given District Local Governments

Figure 14: Comparison between Central Government transfers and Local Revenue

Source: Author's calculations based on various Budget Framework Papers 2009/2010 from the given District Local Governments

5. Score Card Findings and Analysis

This section of the Report presents a comparative analysis of the score card findings from the 10 local governments. Separate reports for all the 10 local government councils containing more detailed findings including individual councilors' performance are published in separate district report. The comparison is based on the different organs of the council. For example, the report compares the general performance of all the 10 local government councils while the chairpersons, speakers and individual councilors or also analyzed and compared separately.

5.1 Performance of District Local Government Councils

District Local Government Councils are the ultimate policy, planning and political authority in the district. Local government councils are established under Section 9 of the Local Government Act which provides, *inter alia*, that "a council shall be the highest political authority within the area of jurisdiction of a local government and shall have legislative and executive powers to be exercised in accordance with the Constitution and [the Local Government] Act." Substantively, the functions and powers of Local Government Councils are provided for under Part IV of the Local Government Act. These range from the power to exercise all political and executive powers and functions to the provision of decentralized services, protection of the constitution and promotion of good governance, and ensuring the implementation and compliance with government policy. The district council is also established as the district planning authority and charged with the responsibility of preparing a comprehensive and integrated development plan. The district council is also vested with powers to make laws in the form of district ordinances and byelaws provided that such laws are not inconsistent with the constitution. In addition, the councils are vested with powers to employ the district public service staff, and generally supervise the delivery of public service in the district. It is these powers and functions upon which the councils are assessed.

Consequently, the 10 district councils were assessed on the performance of 4 core responsibilities or functions: legislative, accountability, planning and budgeting, and service delivery on National Priority Programme Areas (NPPAs). Luwero District Council scored the highest performance obtaining 86 points out of 100 as indicated in Table 5.

Table 5: Performance of District Councils

District	Legislative Role (out of 20)	Accountability Role (out of 20)	Planning & Budgeting (out of 12)	Service Delivery on NPPAs (out of 48)	Total Score (out of 100)
Luwero	14	18	11	43	86
Nebbi	15	16	11	42	84
Kampala	16	16	12	40	84
Amuru	13	16	11	39	79
Moroto	10	16	12	40	78
Amuria	13	14	12	36	75
Hoima	10	14	11	34	69
Ntungamo	17	8	11	32	68
Mbale	9	10	12	36	67
Kamuli	12	10	8	26	56
Average Score	12.9	13.8	11.1	36.8	74.6

Generally, all the districts scored well on the score of service delivery on national priority programme areas in spite of the generally poor quality of services in the districts. Two basic factors explain this level of performance. First, the score card puts emphasis on the monitoring aspects of service delivery by the council rather than the actual delivery of the services which is supposed to be executed through the district technical structures. Secondly, there is a financial incentive for monitoring as councilors are paid allowances for undertaking such monitoring visits.

All the districts assessed were found to have functional PACs as evidenced through the meeting records of the committees. There was evidence of display of public funds received on public notice boards while internal assessments were being conducted. Luwero district is the only one where council had conducted public hearings. The district council had also entered into MoUs with NGOs. Generally, the partnership between local government councils and CSOs appeared widespread although the practices varied from district to district. However, it is important to observe that the establishment of PACs and internal assessments are statutory or administrative requirements and hence a potential reason why these scores are positive across all the assessed districts. Indeed, there was generally no evidence of the PAC reports being debated by the councils. On the contrary, all the districts in the sample that had been audited by the Auditor General had very poor accountability record and numerous queries regarding illegitimate expenditure and misuse of public funds²⁴.

The lowest score on the accountability role by the councils was from Ntungamo District Council which scored only 8 points out of 20. The low score for Ntungamo District Council on issues of accountability is accounted for by three factors. First, although Ntungamo district has a public notice board where public funds are to be displayed, there was no evidence that the information for the FY2008/09 was displayed. The non-display of the information was confirmed through the validation exercise. Secondly, there was no record of any public hearings conducted during the year under review.

²⁴ Annual Report of the Auditor General for the year Ended 30th June 2009 Volume 3 Local Authorities

Thirdly, the assessment team found no evidence of involvement of CSOs in the budget process nor is the development plan generally disseminated.²⁵

The assessment found generally good performance with regard to the planning and budget functions of the councils across the 10 districts. Like in many other cases, it was found out that district councils are likely to perform well in cases where there are statutory requirements to put in place certain documents or procedures compared to other cases where such requirements do not exist. For example, in the case of planning and budgeting, a District Development Plan (DDP) and an approved budget are requirements for any allocation and disbursement of funds. Some of these documents are also required as minimum performance requirements for the annual assessment of local government performance. Secondly, it is also apparent that councils performed well in cases where the actual performance was dependent on the work of technical departments. Indeed, both the DDP and the annual budgets are produced by the technical departments of the local government.

One of the major deficiencies with the score card is that it focuses largely on the outputs like the existence of the documents and not on the quality. Indeed, a review of the Mbale DDP revealed that the DDP stated that Mbale had 18 districts instead of 11 which is the actual number. Surprisingly, the number of 18 was also captured by the UBOS for the National Development Plan (NDP).²⁶ The review of the minutes of council also didn't show evidence of a more robust debate on the development priorities and targets set out in the DDPs and the budget.

One of the primary roles of local government councils is to enact local legislation to address local problems. The score card assesses the performance of the district councils on their legislative responsibilities. They are scored on six performance benchmarks: adoption of standard rules of procedure; enactment of ordinances; passing of motions of specific local policy issues; availability of legislative resources; evidence of citizens' petitions debated by council or focused council tours; and convening of council meetings on time. In general, all the councils registered fairly good scores on attendance of council meetings. This pattern of performance across the 10 districts is generally attributed to the payment of sitting allowances which is one of the major motivations for council membership and attendance of council meetings. This finding is also consistent with other scores that involve payment of allowances such as monitoring visits where participation was found to be generally good.

With the exception of Kampala, there was no enactment of any major pieces of legislation during the period under review or in the 2 years preceding this period. Only Kampala was found to have enacted more than 4 ordinances dealing with, among others, food and hygiene, student hostels and licensing of trade persons. Similarly, the assessment generally found no record of any major motions for resolutions on national or local policy issues. In the assessment, motions on selected policy matters are considered as evidence of handling of issues that affect the citizens or voters. Again, Kampala was an

²⁵ Add note/clerk to Council & District NGO Forum

²⁶ See table 1 General Characteristics: Baseline data on profile, current service delivery levels and gaps for local governments in Uganda

exception in this regard given that during the period under review, KCC received and debated a number of motions.

5.2 Performance of Individual Councilors

The district councilors were assessed on 5 key areas related to their statutory and other functions (as noted in Annex 2 D). These are: i) performance of their legislative responsibilities; ii) evidence of contact with the electorate; iii) participation in communal and development activities in their respective electoral areas; iv) participation in lower local government council by way of attendance at meeting or providing guidance and leadership; and v) engagement in service delivery on national priority programmes.

Figures 15 and 16 show the general performance of the councilors disaggregated by gender across the 10 Districts

Box 2: DISTRICT COUNCILLOR

FUNCTIONS

- Maintain close contact with the electoral area, and consult the people on issues to be discussed in the council where necessary (Specified in the third schedule part 2 s.8(1)(a))
- Present views, opinions, and proposals to the council (Specified in the third schedule part 2 s.8(1)(b))
- Attend sessions of the local council and meetings of committees or sub committees of which he/ she is a member (Specified in the third schedule part 2 s.8(1)(c))
- Appoint at least a day in a given period for meeting the people in his/her electoral area. (Specified in the third schedule part 2 s.8(1)(e))
- Report to the electorate the general decisions of the Council and the actions it has taken to solve problems raised by the residents in the electoral area (Specified in the third schedule part 2 s.8(1)(e))
- Bring to bear on any discussion in the council the benefit of his or her skill, profession, experience or Specialized knowledge (Specified in the third schedule part 2 s.8(1)(f))
- Take part in communal and development activities in his or her electoral area ,and district as a whole. (Specified in the third schedule part 2 s.8 (1)(g))

POWERS

- Power to introduce a bill for an ordinance in the council (Specified in the third schedule part 4 s.15 (1))
- Power to introduce a bye-law in his or her council (Specified in the third schedule part 4 s.22 (1))

Figure 15 : Total scores of councilors disaggregated by gender





Figure 16: Average Scores of councilors disaggregated by gender and district



While each of these parameters is discussed in the specific district reports, all the districts councilors performed their legislative role well while the least performed indicator was attendance of Lower Local Government Councils. An average councilor in each of the 10 districts scored 15 out of 20 for legislative role while the score stands at 3 out of 10 on participation in lower local council.

5.2.1 Legislative Role


Generally, all the councilors performed well on the legislative scores. These scores focus on: participation in plenary as evidenced through debates; participation in committees;

moving of motions or resolutions in council; attendance at plenary and committee meetings; and provision of specialized knowledge to council or committees. This high performance is explained by the fact that most of the scores relate to attendance of council and committee meetings or contributing to plenary and committee discussions. By the way the councils operate, there is a financial incentive for councilors to attend council meetings because of the sitting and other allowances associated with such attendance.

5.2.2 Participation in lower local government councils

On the contrary, the lowest scores by the majority of the councilors were on their participation in lower local governments. Of the 229 persons covered during the assessment, at least 19 percent had not attended any lower council meeting while 12 percent had only attended one meeting for the whole financial year (Figure 13). The combined percentage of councilors who had attended only 2 meetings or less stood at a staggering 64 percent. In absolute terms, of the 229 persons assessed, 147 councilors had attended only 2 lower council meetings or none. It is important to recognize that unlike the district council meetings or monitoring programmes, there are no financial incentives associated with attending lower local government council meetings. Indeed, the councilor may even need to invest money and time to attend these meeting and hence the reason for this poor performance.

Figure 17: Councillors Participation in Lower Local Governments



5.2.3 Gender analysis and Special Interest Group Representation

a) Gender representation

The 10 district councils assessed are generally dominated by male councilors. With the exception of Kampala, most women councilors in all the other districts were elected to represent special interest groups. However, Women councilors generally had a good performance record including in Kampala where 4 out of the 5 best performing councilors were women. In Ntungamo and Kampala, the average performance of

women was better than for men standing at 61.1 for females to 60.6 for male and 64.8 for females to 61.4 for males respectively. In the rest of the 8 districts, women councilors obtained a far lower average score than men (see Annex 1). The poorest performing female councilors with 10% were from Moroto District which also had the worst performing male councilor with 13 %.

b) Performance of Councilors for Special Interest Groups

Finally, it is important to note that the councilors for the youth and the disabled scored generally poorly compared to the rest of the councilors. The key explanation for the poor performance is that these councilors generally exhibited very limited knowledge of their roles and how they could mobilize their constituencies since those constituencies are not specifically defined. They are also the only councilors who have the entire district as their constituency but receive no logistical support to service this constituency.

5.3 Performance of District Chairpersons

The district chairperson is the political leader of the district and head of the executive committee. Among the functions of the chairperson is to monitor the general administration of the district as well as the implementation of district council decisions. In addition, a chairperson is mandated to monitor and co-ordinate the activities of municipal and town councils and lower local governments as well as administrative units in the district.

On behalf of the council, a chairperson is also required to oversee the performance of persons employed by the government to provide services in the district. In line with these functions, the scorecard assessed chairpersons' performance along five major themes which included: i) political leadership, ii) legislative roles, iii) contact with the electorate, iv) participation in communal and development activities and v) monitoring of service delivery on national priority programme areas.

Box 3: DISTRICT EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE POWERS

- Power to recommend the appointment of members to the district service commission with the approval of the public service commission s.54 (2)
- Power to recommend for the removal of a member of a district service commission s. (4)

DISTRICT CHAIRPERSON POWERS

- Power to nominate the secretaries from among the members of the council s.19 (3)
- Power to assign one of the secretaries to be responsible for health and children welfare s.17(4)
- Power to revoke the appointment of a member of the executive committee s.21(a)
- The chairperson's signature has the sufficient power of authentication without the seal of the local council. Specified under the Third schedule part 6(s.29 (1)02
- Power to instruct the chief internal auditor to carry out a special audit and submit the report to the council s. 71 (2)(b)

Table 6: Performance of District Chairpersons

Name	District	Political Leadership (20)	Legislative Role (20)	Contact with Electorate (15)	Participation in Com- munal and Dev't Activities (15)	Service Delivery on NPPAs (30)	Total
Karazaarwe John W	Ntungamo	20	20	15	13	26	94
Al Haj Nasser Ntege Ssebagala	Kampala	20	18	15	13	19	85
Mr. Bernard Mujasi	Mbale	17	16	13	13	26	85
Omach Anthony Atube	Amuru	20	18	9	10	25	82
Mubiru Stephen	Kamuli	17	16	11	15	22	81
Ronald Ndwula	Luwero	20	5	15	15	25	80
Hon. Ochen Julius	Amuria	15	11	12	15	23	76
Wapokra John Pascal	Nebbi	15	9	7	3	27	61
Tinkamanyire Bagonza	Hoima	17	13	0	12	16	58
Lochap Peterken	Moroto	19	1	5	8	24	57
Average Score		18	13	10	12	23	76

The average performance of chairpersons was 76% as indicated in figure 4 below. Out of the 10 district chairpersons, seven (7) performed above the average mark while three (3) performed below the average mark of 76%. The best performing chairperson garnered a total score of 94% while the worst performing chairperson scored 57%.

5.3.1 Political Leadership

The best performed parameter for the district chairpersons was their political leadership with an average score of 18 out of 20 total points. In all the ten districts, all the chairpersons had presided over the meetings of the executive committee during the year under review. Evidence from the minutes of executive committee meetings from the districts across the board indicated that all the chairpersons undertook their monitoring and administrative roles through the implementation of council decisions²⁷.

²⁷ In Kampala district for example, evidence from the ordinary council meeting held on 22nd December 2008 indicates that the Mayor addressed council on the delay of implementation of council decisions. Herein, he pointed out the yard of sixth street, the lack of power in the chambers, and the failure to purchase some items for the Mayoral office – all of which had been agreed on at earlier council meetings. In Nebbi, the chairperson exhibited his administrative role by providing guidance in the performance of health personnel for the district. In addition, the chairperson solved a conflict on the location of the market between the boarder of Kucwiny and Panyango sub counties.

Evidence from the verification exercise undertaken by the research team further reveals that all district chairpersons had conformed to the statutory requirement of preparing a report on the state of affairs of their districts and these were discussed in council²⁸. Similarly, all chairpersons fulfilled their mandate of recommending to council persons to be appointed as members of the DSC and any other boards and exercised overall oversight over the performance of civil servants in their districts²⁹.

The chairpersons' performance of the legislative roles was only fair with an average performance of 13 out of 20 total points. While some chairpersons exhibited excellent performance³⁰ under their legislative role, others fell short on the same³¹. The good performance in Ntungamo³², Kampala³³ and Amuru, is attributed to the presentation of motions and bills by the Executive which were passed by council over the last three years. Although Nebbi district did not register very good performance in the overall legislative role score card, the research team accessed copies of three motions and policies that were passed over the last three years, including the year under review. The policies include 1) staff retention by increasing medical doctors remuneration, 2) policy on transport, procurement and logistics management, and a motion on the status of the now Zombo district. The poor performance in Moroto district on the other hand is attributed to the fact that there was no evidence of motions, bills or policies initiated in the district over the previous three years, including the year under review.

5.3.2 Contact with Electorate

Chairpersons' performance on their contact with the electorate was good with an average score of 10 out of 15 total points. Chairpersons from Ntungamo, Kampala and Luweero districts scored the total 15 points while chairpersons from Hoima and Moroto exhibited poor performance with 0 and 5 points respectively. The good performance is attributed to the evidence of chairperson's meeting with the electorate as well as the press releases and public notices on decisions of the council to the electorate. In Kampala district for example, evidence drawn from the ordinary council meeting held on 30th April 2009 indicates that the Mayor's communication on the Gaba market, parkyard market and Nakawa market had been communicated to the electorate through newspapers and were being discussed as council decisions. On the other hand, the poor performance in Hoima and Moroto is attributed to the lack of evidence regarding the chairpersons' follow up on issues raised by the electorate to the executive committee and the council.

5.3.3 Participation in Communal and Development Activities

In assessing chairpersons' participation in communal and development activities in their areas, the findings reveal very good performance with an average score of 12 out of 15

28 On the 15th of June 2009, the Mayor addressed the council on the state of affairs of the district. Refer to ordinary council details of the this meeting. In Nebbi district, the state of affairs report was read to the council on the 30th of October 2008.

29 Refer to ordinary council meeting minutes held on the 20th February 2009 wherein the Mayor recommended officers to the PAC and the Kampala District Land Board.

30 The chairperson of Ntungamo scored 20 out of twenty while both the chairpersons of Kampala and Amuru scored 18 out of the total 20 marks.

31 The chairperson of Moroto District scored 1 out of 20 points while the chairperson of Luweero scored 5 out of 20 points.

32 In Ntungamo district, the Roads gangs were approved by the district council as policy. This district is also implementing a District Development Fund.
33 In Kampala district, the parking policy currently managed by Mutiplex, infrastructural repairs of the new park and refurbishing of markets such as St. Balikuddembe are results of functional policies.

total points. The chairperson of Kamuli, Luwero and Amuria performed exceptionally well with a total score of 15 points followed by Ntungamo³⁴, Kampala³⁵ and Mbale who garnered 13 out of the 15 total points. Poor performance was, however, registered with Nebbi and Moroto³⁶ district chairpersons who scored 3 and 8 points respectively. The poor performance exhibited by the chairperson of Nebbi is attributed to the fact that there was no evidence of the chairperson's personal initiation of projects. The projects the chairperson initiated were all government led projects. On the other hand, while the district has a number of NGOs operating in the district, there was no evidence of any signed MoU between the district and the development partners or NGOs.

5.3.4 Monitoring Service Delivery

District chairpersons registered very good performance on the monitoring of service delivery on National Priority Programme Areas (NPPAs) score card with an average score of 23 out of 30 total points. Surprisingly, Nebbi district Chairperson did not only exhibit excellent performance but also emerged the best performer under this aspect. Similarly, good performance was registered with the Chairpersons from Ntungamo and Mbale districts, both of whom scored 26 points. On the other hand, the Mayor of Kampala City Council scored 19 while the chairperson of Hoima trailed scoring 16 out of the 30 total points. The good performance by the Chairpersons of Nebbi, Ntungamo and Mbale districts can be attributed to the fact that these chairpersons did not only undertake monitoring of schools, health centres, roads and agricultural projects, they also provided evidence of giving feedback from the monitoring to the council where their reports were considered or debated. In addition, excellent performance was registered in their participation in the media. The poor performance of the Hoima Chairperson is attributed to the fact that there was no evidence of his attendance of functional adult literacy sessions and visits to schools.

5.4 Performance of District Speakers

5.4.1 General Performance

District council speakers were assessed on all the parameters used to assess councilors although an additional parameter regarding presiding and preservation of order in the councils was added on their score card. The average performance of speakers was 62% as indicated in Table 7 below. Out of the ten speakers, five (5) performed above the average mark while the other five (5) performed below average. The best speaker scored 95 points while the worst performing speaker scored 38 points. In terms of gender, there was one female speaker from Kampala among the 10 districts assessed. Despite this under representation, the speaker came second with 79 total points with exceptionally excellent performance with regard to their contact with the electorate.

34 The chairperson of Ntungamo lobbied for the construction of the gravity flow scheme, construction of UPDF houses and the formation of circles in the district. In addition, the chairperson secured a grant of Ug. Shs 531 Million to support Ihunga polytechnic school from DANIDA.

35 KCC is implementing a Public Private Partnership with Pioneer Easy Bus Company that sought to decongest the traffic in the city. Through a signed MOU, KCC was able to secure road construction machinery from China during the year under review.

36 Evidence from the chairperson of Moroto district reveals that while he did not make any written advice to the community, he made material contributions worth Ug. Shs. 300,000 to Daniel Comboni School. He however, did not have any evidence of projects initiated personally but rather supervised district funded projects.

Table 7: Comparative Performance of Speakers from the 10 Districts

	Presiding & Preservation of Order in Council (out of 25)	Contact With Electorate (out of 20)	Participation in Communal & Dev't Activities (out of 15)	Participation In Lower LGs (out of 10)	Service Delivery On NPPAs (out of 30)	Total
Singahakye D - Ntungamo	23	20	13	10	29	95
Lukwago S - Kampala	21	20	13	1	24	79
Lakony M - Amuru	19	15	12	0	29	75
Nakibinge B - Luwero	23	9	13	6	23	74
Adiama R E - Amuria	17	20	13	1	14	65
Bamwore S - Kamuli	15	6	9	3	16	49
Masika W - Mbale	14	5	9	3	18	49
Mugabe Y - Hoima	16	7	11	5	9	48
Lomonyang J- Moroto	17	14	8	4	3	46
Obinyo F - Nebbi	17	4	3	2	12	38
Average Score	18	12	10	4	18	62

5.4.2 Presiding & Preservation of Order in Council

The best performed theme by the speakers was their presiding and preservation of order in the council with an average score of 18 out of 25 total points. With the exception of Hoima district whose speaker did not score on the adoption of rules of procedure, all the nine districts adopted and enforced the new rules of procedure with amendments³⁷.

In Ntungamo, Kampala and Luweero districts, the speakers had evidence of having delegated to their deputy speakers at least more than twice while the rest of the districts registered poor delegation across the board. In terms of provision of special skills or knowledge by the speaker to the council, eight out of the ten assessed speakers fell short of this with the exception of the speakers from Ntungamo and Kampala districts.

5.4.3 Contact with Electorate

Speakers contact with their electorate was performed fairly well with an average score of 12 out of 20 total points. Before anyone becomes a speaker, they are a councilor with an obligation of representing their constituency or interest group. Overall, there was a general relegation of the role of maintaining contact with their electorate on the part of the assessed speakers. On assuming the speaker's position, representation was then assumed at the district with the exception of Ntungamo, Kampala and Amuria speakers whose regular contact with the electorate was verified at the community level. On the other hand, the general good performance can also be attributed to the

³⁷ In Nebbi district for example, the new rules of procedure were adopted under minute No. 04/cou/2008. In Kampala, the district adopted their new rules in 2008, a copy of which the research team accessed.

fact that once a councilor becomes a speaker, he or she automatically gains access to a district office from which they conduct their duties. In these offices, some of the electorate are able to access their councilor/speaker. The poor performance exhibited by the speaker of Nebbi is attributed to various reasons including the fact that unlike the other district speakers, the Nebbi District speaker does not have a neutral functional office but rather uses the NRM office in Akella sub-county. For the electorate that does not subscribe to his party, this office becomes inaccessible.

5.4.4 Participation in Communal & Development Activities

Speakers' performance regarding participation in communal and development activities in their electoral area was rated good with an average score of 10 out of 15 total points. While most speakers indicated that they had initiated a number of community development projects in their areas, a number of the project were indeed funded by the district while others were joint venture initiatives between donors and districts where the speakers launched the projects as area councilors. Again the worst performance exhibited by the Nebbi district speaker is for this very same reason. However, the speaker like all the other speakers had made material contributions to communal projects and activities that included money, construction tools as well as food.

5.4.5 Participation in Lower Local Government Councils

The worst performance by speakers was their participation in lower local government councils. The average score for all the speakers was 4 out of 10 points. With the exception of the speaker of Ntungamo (10 points) and Luwero (6 points), all the assessed speakers had only attended two council meetings at the sub counties / divisions³⁸. While all

³⁸ Evidence from the subcounty indicates that the Ntungamo speaker had attended 5 meetings at the sub county. The research team was able to access 2 black books with follow up issues from the sub county meeting to the the district council. In Luweero, the speaker had attended 4 meetings and had copies of feedback information from the meetings to the district council

Box 4: DISTRICT SPEAKER

FUNCTIONS

- The speaker preside at the election and removal of a deputy speaker s.11(8) (8a)
- Preside at all meetings of the council s. 11 (9) (a)
- The Speaker ensures that debates are handled in accordance with the Rules of Procedure.

POWERS

- Power to determine a time and place where a local council shall meet for the discharge of its functions (Specified in the third schedule part 3 s.9(1))
- Has power to decide whether the council should meet in camera if the deliberations of a particular meeting are confidential (Specified in the third schedule part 3 s.9(3))
- Power to require any member of the public behaving in a disorderly manner to withdraw from the meeting, and may order security personnel to eject that person if she or he refuses to withdraw. (Specified in the third schedule part 3 s.9(4))
- Power to refer the matter for inquiry to a committee appointed by a council if in his or her opinion the speaker deems a statement made by a member is prima facie defamatory of any person (Specified in the third schedule part 3 s.13(2))
- Power to suspend that a member for two consecutive meetings where a member refuses to render an apology.(Specified in the third schedule part 3 s.13(4))
- Power to perform the functions of a chairperson in the absence of either the chairperson or the vice chairperson. s.18 (5a)

speakers claimed to have attended the meetings, records at the sub-counties indicated that their attendance was only during the budget meetings for which they had an incentive to attend. Consequently, the sub county / division meetings from which the speakers would ably share and get feedback from the district to the sub county registered poor performance from their poor attendance.

5.4.6 Monitoring of Service Delivery on National Priority Programme Areas

Despite the fact that the speakers had an average score of 18 out of 30 total points with regard to their monitoring of service delivery on national priority programme areas, extreme cases of poor performance were registered in the districts of Moroto and Hoima districts. This performance is attributed to the fact that while speakers (as councilors) are required to monitor service delivery on priority areas such as health, education, roads and agriculture neither of the speakers had evidence of giving this feedback to council. In Nebbi, the speaker's conspicuously poor performance under this theme is because he maintained that not only are speakers not involved in monitoring programs but they are also not sponsored to participate in any radio or TV talk shows. On the contrary, while most speakers had not appeared on TV to discuss district programmes, all the nine speakers had been to at least one radio talk show where they discussed development issues of the their districts. The good performance by some of the speakers is attributed to the fact that not only had the speakers monitored service delivery programs in the district, they had also filed reports of the same to council. Overall, there was generally good performance in the speakers participation in activities aimed at promoting sustainable environment and natural resource use through sensitization, tree planting schemes as well as the maintenance of good hygiene in districts across the board.

6. Score Card Performance and the Problem of Public Service Delivery

The results from the score card clearly present a paradox since the current state of service delivery at the local level is not consistent with the general performance of the district councils and their respective organs. According to the score card, district councils scored an average of 75 points while district chairpersons scored an average of 76 points out of a total of 100 points. The district speakers also score an average of 61 points out of a total of 100 points. In theory, this should imply that the quality of public services in the districts that scored more points should be above average or considered good by the citizens. Yet, the socio-economic background data shows unimpressive education performance standards, depressing quality of healthcare and generally a rundown or non-existent road infrastructure. Indeed, the case of Kampala City Council where the city road network has nearly collapsed and yet Kampala City Council and the Mayor scored high points raised a red flag for the score card team.

This contradiction between generally good score card performance and the poor quality of service delivery hence raises fundamental questions that ought to be answered. Based on the score card assessment and a review of the current policy architecture within which local governments operate, there are endogenous and exogenous factors that explain weak link between score card performance and service delivery. It is these factors that need to be addressed to ensure the local government councils become an effective institution in the current institutional configuration for service delivery and effective governance in Uganda.

6.1 Endogenous Factors

6.1.1 Lack of Knowledge about the roles of councils

There was a widespread lack of knowledge about the roles and responsibilities of councilors across the board. From the time of commencement of the assessment process, the majority of the councilors conceded that they did not have the full understanding of what their roles were as they are stipulated in the Local Government Act. This was further substantiated by the poor performance regarding councilors' contact with the electorate, their participation in communal and development activities, participation in lower local government and monitoring of service delivery on national priority programmes. The score card therefore immediately became an important learning instrument for the councilors. On the other hand, this lack of knowledge was apparent among the citizens most of whom did not know the extent of their councilors' roles. Indeed, research findings indicated that many citizens seemed more comfortable with councilors who provided them with material and financial assistance as opposed to their official performance in council. It did not matter how much of their legislative

roles councilors played but rather, how often and how much they contributed at burials, weddings and other forms of social gatherings.

6.1.2 Documentation and Record Keeping

The problem of record keeping was registered at two levels: among the individual political leaders and at an institutional level. At the level of the political leadership, most councilor had not kept any records of their discussions and contact with their electorate during the year under review. With the exception of district chairpersons most of whom worked with the help of office secretaries who managed their diaries, a wide range of the councilors fell short of basic record keeping documents such as diaries and note books. While most of them claimed to have such document, there was no evidence to this effect. At the institutional level, poor record keeping was registered in the offices of the clerks to councils across the board. In the recording of minutes, most councilors claimed to have made individual contributions including guidance to council, but these could not be traced in the official records. In fact, most council records do not attribute the contributions to individual councilors. This problem is attributed to the fact that the offices of the clerks to council are not adequately equipped with basic and modern equipment across the board. With the exception of Kampala City Council, the nine offices do not have any computers, photocopying machines any modern recording gargets.

6.1.3 Education qualifications

There are no minimum education requirements for one to become a councilor in any district in Uganda. As a matter of fact, there is no requirement to submit any form of academic papers to council on commencement of duty by councilors. To this end, anyone can become a district councilor. Findings from the assessment revealed that the quality of debates among the district councils was undermined by councilors whose educational levels were very low across the board. This was further confirmed through the research team's observation of the council proceedings where some councilors failed to express themselves during plenary sessions. Furthermore, the same councilors recorded poor performance when it came to making written contributions to the plenary or committee meetings. Evidence from the assessment further revealed that councilors with higher levels of education (Degree, Diplomas, Certificates or their equivalent) debated and contributed more significantly and objectively during plenary and committee meetings.

6.1.4 Non-resident councilors

In accordance with the Local Government Act, councilors are mandated to execute legislative and executive powers through the council which is the highest political authority in the Local government. To undertake such mandate, councilors ought to be

resident to ensure the much needed regular contact with their electorate. Findings from the assessment revealed eleven cases of nonresident councilors across the board. With the exception of Kampala where most of the nonresident councilors had migrated to, the role of representation of over 20,000 per councilor is undermined. While councilors like any citizens of Uganda have a right to establish homes in any part of the country, the roles and responsibilities of a councilors are undermined when they are not resident or do not regularly live among the people they represent.

6.2 Exogenous Factors



Besides the aforementioned endogenous, there at least 5 major factors that impact on the ability of local government councils to effectively run their local governments and therefore effectively provide appropriate public services and be accountable for any attendant failures. These same factors also have alienated citizens and undermined the accountability relationships between them and their local leaders as originally envisaged under the constitution.

6.2.1 Absence of Integrated Strategic Development Plans

The poor service delivery in the districts can be attributed partly to the absence of integrated strategic development plans. At the moment, all districts use the model of a 3 year district development plan model. While the assessment confirmed that all the districts had such plans, they are generally structured as annual work plans with no medium or long-term strategic priorities, benchmarks or and targets. Consequently, the district councils and the respective organs do not have strategic medium and long-term performance goals that can be related to the delivery of public goods and services in the district. For example, while the district development plan may contain budgets for constructing classrooms or teacher's houses, none of the districts has a clear indication of the target number of classrooms or teachers houses that need to be constructed over the planning period or the annual targets against which council can be measured. Indeed, none of the 10 districts have clearly articulated medium or long-term targets related to productivity output, investments, private sector development or even basic performance targets for key social sectors such as education or health.

6.2.2 The unfavorable national and local government budget architecture

The poor quality of service delivery at the local government level in spite of the impressive performance of the district councils also has a lot to do with an unfavorable budget architecture. First of all, the current budget architecture is distorted at the national level where 75% of the budget is spent on only five consumptive sectors while only 25 percent is spent on the major productive sectors of the economy. As shown in Figure18, 75 percent of the national budget for FY2010/2011 will be spent on education, health, roads and transport, defense and security, and public administration and management. The remaining sectors which include key economic sectors such as agriculture, environment and natural resources, trade and tourism, and industry are only allocated 25 percent.

Figure18: Budget Priorities for FY 2010/11

Source: Adapted from Lukwago, D (2010) "Where do our budget shillings go?" ACODE Policy Info Sheet No. 8, 2010. ACODE, Kampala.

Secondly, the local governments have no power over financial resources as the bulk of their funding comes from the central government. As was shown in Figure 14, all the local governments have no local revenue of their own and depend almost entirely on central government grants. The fact that the bulk of the central government funds are released as conditional grant removes any form of flexibility for planning and budget execution. Indeed, local government councils look at the funds availed to districts as central government funds and hence any monitoring is undertaken on behalf of local governments. Consequently, this budget architecture also undermines accountability as local governments' accountability efforts are geared towards central government rather than the electorate and the citizens.

Thirdly, even when the funds have been made available to the district local governments, there is a distorted relationship between political power and control over the budget. Legally and politically, local government councils are responsible for all local government functions as stipulated in the Local Government Act including: planning,

financial accountability and the delivery of public goods and services. However, besides the ceremonial action of passing the budget, the councils hold no controlling or other appropriate authority to determine or direct how the funds allocated to the district are utilized. The Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) who is the accounting officer of the district is appointed by the central government. Secondly, the various ministries including those responsible for local government and finance have developed a set of guidelines and procedures that limit the involvement of the local government council in the management of the district's financial resources including the procurement process. The guidelines and procedures enjoin the councils to oversee the use of funds by the technical agencies of the local government but to ensure that they do not get involved in the governance of these resources. This is popularly referred to as the "eyes on, hands off" approach to the governance of local government council financial resources.

6.2.3 Power Relations Structure and accountability relationships

The discrepancy between the local council performance and the quality of service delivery can also be explained by the existence of apparent distortions in the power relations structure and the absence of clear accountability relationships between local government power centres on the one hand, and between local government leaders and citizens on the other hand. In theory, the district council is supposed to be the ultimate planning and decision making authority at the district level exercising those powers and responsibilities through council decisions and the district executive committee. However, there are other alternative power centres that impact on the authority of the councils and hence blur the lines of responsibility and accountability. For example, the creation of the office of the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) and the Resident District Commissioner (RDC) as central government power centres constrain the space within which councils operate and make planning and development decisions. The dominant narrative is that major development programmes such as roads, NAADS, UPE are programmes of the President and not of local governments. When they fail, it is local leaders failing the President rather than the citizens and tax payers.

6.2.4 A Rural Economic Policy that has Disengaged Citizens from Government

The accountability relationship between citizens and local governments or central government has been diminishing over the years. The disengagement of citizens from government mainly arises from a rural economic strategy that is built around welfarism, tax relief and "administrative engineering". In the first place, Government adopted a welfare approach to addressing poverty and absence of public services by providing welfare programmes such as Universal Primary Education. Secondly, persistent complaints about poverty were addressed through tax relief actions where citizens are exempted from paying graduated tax, tax dues and other forms of direct taxes. The best example of the implication of the abolition of direct taxes is to be found in Kampala City Council. Before the abolition of road license fees and the introduction of a tax on fuel which is an indirect tax, there used to be widespread complaint about the quality of the road infrastructure in KCC.³⁹ Finally, demands for better services have

39 For more detail on the implications of the abolition of graduated tax, see Cammack, D, et al, (2007). Neopatrimonial Politics, Decentralization and Local Government: Uganda and Malawi in 2006. CDD/ESRF/ODI/CMI. London.

also been addressed through a process of “administrative engineering” whereby local governments are engineered into small administrative units disguised as a strategy to “bring services closer to the people.” In essence, administrative engineering not only increases the cost of public administration, it also temporarily buys off the local political elite who would otherwise demand for a more robust and strategic response to the poor quality of public services at the local level.

6.2.5 The Changed Character of Decentralization

The current system of financing and delivering public services is premised on strong local governments built around the decentralization principles enshrined in the constitution. Under the constitution, local governments are seen as autonomous governments with wide ranging executive, legislative, planning and service delivery implementation functions. In the decentralization nomenclature, the constitution envisaged a decentralization system of devolution where powers and responsibilities are devolved to the lowest possible unit of government. The underlying assumption is that citizens in general and voters in particular are able to demand for effective performance and accountability on the part of their leaders especially elected leaders.

However, the system of decentralization has systematically shifted from devolution to delegation. Yet, service delivery programmes and initiatives are still designed based on existence of strong and autonomous local governments. Indeed, recent studies have pointed to the emerging “crisis in local governance” and the need for constructing “new relationships between ordinary people and public institutions. The study “Tracing the Voice” commissioned by OXFAM GB in Uganda shows low level of trust in district administration (28%) and local councils (40%). There is a belief that local leadership has increasingly become partisan, autocratic and corrupt. In addition, the study shows low levels of awareness and participation in public sector development programmes; the least known⁴⁰ included Community Action Plans (45%), Local Government Development Plans (35%) and Poverty Eradication Action Plan (34%). The same study found that almost half of respondents felt that the distance between them and their leaders had increased⁴¹. Inadequate awareness implies that a good number of citizens do not take the opportunity to make their development preferences heard or implemented by their leaders. Corruption, unresponsiveness to the needs of the poor, and the inaccessibility and impenetrability of public institutions are the principal reasons for this growing disillusionment with local governments.⁴²

40 % responses of never heard about it

41 When public sector and political leaders or their representatives are available to be contacted and to meet with citizens to discuss their concerns within a short period, it can be said that such a leader is close to the citizens. If, on the other hand, an elected or appointed leader neither replies to written inquiries from citizens nor make themselves available or visible in the community, that leader can be considered to be very distant from citizens.

42 Oxfam GB, 2008.

7. Policy Recommendations and Proposals for Action

The failure of the public service delivery system and the breakdown in accountability relationships between leaders and citizens is rooted in the lack of civic consciousness in the local government leaders and the citizens alike. On the one hand, the current system of local government has emerged into a client-patron relationship that excludes the citizens in the power relations structure that is dominated by national and local government leaders. It is this power relations structure that also provides the context for the current supply-side monitoring of service delivery. Any interventions to improve service delivery and build appropriate horizontal and vertical accountability systems therefore ought to address both the policy distortions within the current decentralization policy framework and at the same time build the civic capacity of district councilors and citizens to demand for performance and accountability. Based on the score card assessment, there are at least two sets of proposed interventions that are presented. The first set of interventions focus on strengthening the capacity and building the civic consciousness of elected leaders and in the case councilors. The second set of proposals focus on addressing the current policy distortions that undermine local government autonomy and the accountability relationships between the government and the citizens.

7.1 Proposals to Improve the Performance of Councilors and Councils

7.1.1 Orientation of councilors on their roles and their accountability obligations to the citizens

During the assessment exercise, it was apparent that councilors were not adequately aware of their statutory roles as well as their accountability obligations to the voters and citizens in general. The assessment found that irrespective of how many years councilors stay in power, they still need refresher orientation on top of being inducted on their roles and responsibilities. One of the key interventions to address the current crisis in public service delivery is therefore to ensure regular training and orientation of the councilors on the broad range of council powers, functions and responsibilities. Training should also go beyond the basics of how council operates to include training the purpose and rationale for decentralization, government and citizens expectations on local government councils, and the mechanisms for responding to citizens demands and concerns.

7.1.2 Documentation and keeping of records

At the institutional level, local governments should prioritize the need to maintain well equipped offices with modern communication and record keeping technology. The offices of the speakers and the clerks to council should be adequately equipped with modern technological infrastructure to meet the demands of today's first changing information and communication technologies. Many councils and councilors lost on the scores because the current documentation of council proceedings did not allow for validation of contributions by councilors. At an individual level, councilors should take a personal initiative to use modern documentation options including basic desk and pocket dairies to draw up programs and record their appointments with the electorate. This will also ensure the management of an efficient contact system with the electorate. Furthermore, local governments should pass bylaws that require councilors to file quarterly reports from councilor's visits to their sub counties to the office of the clerk to council.

7.1.3 Non-Resident Councilors

The assessment found that councilors who were not resident within the jurisdiction of their local governments performed poorly with regard to the core card on contact with the electorate. Yet, contact with the electorate should be the foundation for building the accountability relationship between the councilors and their electorates. It is therefore recommended that Part III of the Local Government Act which provides for the eligibility for council membership be amended to include a requirement on residence.

7.1.4 Minimum Academic Qualification Requirements

Minimum academic qualifications should be set for anyone who wishes to take on the political leadership role of a district councilor⁴³. Politicians are expected to plan, legislate and monitor programs whose initiation lies in the hands of professional technical officers. Their monitoring role will yield much better results if their academic qualifications are satisfactory enough to substantially debate technical documents and hold the technocrats accountable. During the assessment, a majority of the councilors equally suggested that to improve the effectiveness of councils, minimum academic qualifications should be introduced especially for district councilors. It should also be made a requirement for councilors to submit their academic papers to council as they embark on their new tenure.

7.2 Proposals to Re-establish Accountability Relationship between Citizens and Leaders

The Score Card for the 10 local government councils clearly show that councilors are generally performing well in executing their mandates and responsibilities as stipulated under the Local Government Act. However, their work and impressive performance is

⁴³ Uganda Local Government Association (ULGA) made this same proposal during the presentation of their recommendations on the amendment of the Local Government Bill, 2009

not necessarily translating into effective delivery of public services. It is also striking that citizens are not actively demanding for better performance and accountability from their leaders. This lack of demand for accountability is attributed to the distortions within the current budget architecture and the absence of citizen agency at the local level. Consequently, the following the key policy and other reforms that are necessary to reestablish the accountability relationship between the citizens and the leaders on the one hand and the local leaders and central government leaders on the other.

7.2.1 Changing the current budget architecture

The starting point to reconstruct the power relations between the central government and local governments on the one hand and the government and citizens on the other, is to reform the current budget architecture. The reform of the budget architecture ought to address at least a number of critical issues. First, at the central government level, the budget allocations should be reformed to ensure an appropriate focus of the productive sectors of the economy which would lead to increased investments in agriculture, environment and natural resources, tourism and trade and other sectors that create new enterprise and income opportunities for rural people. The current situation where 75% of the budget is spent on social service and consumption sectors such as public administration undermines the accountability relationships between the citizens and the government.

Secondly, the national budget should be divided between the central government and the local governments so that there is a predetermined proportion of the budget that is spent directly by local governments rather than through central government transfers and conditional grants. This would secure the financial autonomy of local governments giving them both power and confidence to plan for the areas under their jurisdiction and directly accounting to both citizens and the central government. Any additional funds provided through sectoral conditional grants would be provided by the government based on clear understanding with the local governments.

Thirdly, Parliament must reconsider the introduction of selected direct taxes to ensure that citizens directly fund their governments and hence can demand for the delivery of public services. The removal of road license fees and the apparent disinterest of the residents of Kampala in demanding for better roads are clearly instructive on how indirect taxes can undermine citizenship and demand for accountability. Consequently, direct taxes remain an important policy instruments for keeping citizens engaged in government while building the accountability relationship required to improve service delivery.

7.2.2 Formulate and adopt medium and long-term strategic development plans

It has been argued that the current 3 year rolling development plan model is not helping in establishing strategic development targets around which progress in service delivery can be measured. For example, in all the districts assessed, their development plans did not provide any productivity, investments or other development targets. The councils operate on fairly ad hoc targets in the form of annual work plans. It is proposed that local governments be assisted with technical assistance in strategic planning so that they can set medium to long-term development strategies in key service delivery sectors such as roads development, private sector development, agricultural production, education enrollment and performance and the quality of health services.

7.2.3 Building the demand-side infrastructure of civil society, citizens' groups and other civic agencies.

The challenge of citizens' demand for better service delivery and accountability is rooted in the absence of citizen agency in the form of a network of civic organizations through which civic expressions can be articulated and pursued. As shown in the demand-side model of accountability in figure – below, demand for accountability and appropriate response by the responsible institution can be facilitated by a wide range of actors. These include: civil society organizations and citizens groups, religious institutions; and political parties. These institutions play an important role in building demand for accountability but also ensuring that institutions of state respond to citizens' concerns through appropriate mobilization for action. However, this infrastructure is still weak at the local level. Active and knowledge-based CSOs are largely still lacking or do not have the necessary financial and human resources to mobilize citizens and build their civic consciousness and competence. Religious leaders have been progressively co-opted emerged as the frontline for patronage politics mainly built through fundraising ventures and gifts to individual religious leaders by the President, ruling party and opposition politicians. Consequently, the extent to which both local and central government political and civil leaders respond to the demands for effective service delivery and good governance is dependent on how much we invest in building the civil society infrastructure at the local level.

7.2.4 Establishing a Leadership Awards for Local Government Leaders

Recognition of excellence in local government leadership may be essential on boosting the performance of local government leaders. Based on the local government score card, a series of awards can be established for local government leaders who excel in leadership as well as on key score card parameters. For example, recognition awards should be provided for the best performing chairperson, speaker, council as well as the female and male councilors. Other awards may be premised on selected score cards such as political leadership, legislation, accountability or contact with the electorate.

8. General Conclusions

The first score card report has provided a wide range of insights and lessons on the performance of local government councils. First, it is recognized that 10 districts out of 114 is so small a sample that could impact on the absolute generalization regarding the performance of local government councils in Uganda. However, the key findings from the score card present a clear pattern of performance across the 10 districts that were assessed to the extent that general recommendations on how to improve performance and building appropriate accountability relationships become tenable. Secondly, there were important lessons learnt with regard to the methodology. For example, the assessment established that most of the scores focused on processes rather than the substantive outputs whether they were on legislation, representing or monitoring. Related to this is the fact that the score card also lacked indicators that would help establish the causal-effect relationship between score card performance and the quality of service and governance in the respective local governments. Consequently, there are instructive lessons that have been learnt that will inform the future development and revision of the score card and methodology in preparation for the second assessment. Finally, the assessment has provided empirical information on how the councils and their respective organs are performing their statutory responsibilities. A number of recommendations have been presented to address both the performance deficits of the councilors but also the structural distortions in policy and accountability relationships. The last phase of the score card methodology which involves outreach and capacity building seeks to build partnerships that will address these deficiencies in order to create a new discourse in which citizens become the key drivers for service delivery and accountability through effective demand and citizen civic expression.

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Annex 1 Individual Performance of Councilors disaggregated by Gender

Annex 1 A: Amuria

Name	Gender	Legislative Role	Contact with Electorate	Participation in communal activities	Participation in LLGs	Service delivery on NPPAs	Total
Eceru Moses Aga	Male	19	17	13	10	22	81
Otim Moses Omuron	Male	19	15	15	2	19	70
Tebenyang John	Male	17	15	8	2	25	67
Engoru Charles Echeme	Male	16	16	9	5	20	66
Ebiru Paul	Male	16	11	8	10	18	63
Ocheng Samuel Aroca	Male	13	10	10	1	25	59
Opio Michael	Male	14	5	8	0	20	47
Elobu Patrick Angolu	Male	18	0	7	2	14	41
Engemu Moses	Male	6	5	13	0	11	35
Eteku George William	Male	8	2	9	3	8	30
Average Performance Male							55.9
Ilalu Irene	Female	15	10	10	0	16	51
Isamukere Florence	Female	12	7	8	0	21	48
Acam Hellen Beatrice	Female	14	0	8	2	23	47
Anango Jane Mary	Female	9	15	8	3	11	46
Apolot Rose	Female	11	5	3	0	22	41
Acen Rosemary	Female	17	0	8	0	15	40
Acuro Jane	Female	8	10	2	5	14	39
Asimo Jane	Female	8	10	6	2	11	37
Average Score Female							43.6

Annex 1 B: Amuru

Name	Gender	Legislative Role	Contact with Electorate	Participation in communal activities	Participation in LLGs	Service delivery on NPPAs	Total
Olanya Gilbert	Male	17	20	8	6	26	77
Ayero Evelyn Oyugi	Male	11	12	8	2	13	46
Oloya Justine Lungajul	Male	12	6	15	0	11	44
Odongpiny Bazil P'KIYO	Male	11	3	8	0	16	38
Okello Patrick Oryema	Male	12	4	3	3	14	36
Kinyera Denis	Male	12	4	4	1	11	32
Average Performance Male							45.5
Adong Getrude Odora	Female	6	3	8	2	16	35
Adong Margaret Ayugi	Female	12	3	3	2	12	32
Apiyo Catherine Oywa	Female	12	2	3	2	12	31
Akello Alice Ekanya	Female	12	3	3	2	10	30
Aceng christine Atanya	Female	5	3	3	0	12	23
Average Score Female							30.2

Annex 1 C: Hoima

Name	Gender	Legislative Role	Contact with Electorate	Participation in communal activities	Participation in LIGs	Service delivery on NPPAs	Total
Mugenyi Mulindambura	Male	21	10	10	5	12	58
Kakoraki Fred	Male	18	11	11	5	13	58
Kyamulesire Billy	Male	21	10	8	5	12	56
Muhindi Fred	Male	18	15	8	2	10	53
Byensi Alex Kabbusomba	Male	19	15	11	2	5	52
Bigabwenkya Tom Muhe	Male	17	11	5	2	13	48
Nyangabyaki Swaibu	Male	18	6	8	5	3	40
Kasanga B Lawrence	Male	15	5	9	5	2	36
Ayesiga Flossy	Male	15	5	8	0	3	31
Ali Tinkamanyire	Male	15	5	8	0	3	31
Kyahurwa William	Male	15	2	3	5	4	29
Kalyegira Azizi	Male	15	2	8	0	3	28
Kiiza Rugongeza Stanley	Male	15	2	4	2	5	28
Kadiru Kirungi	Male	12	2	8	1	4	27
Katusime Richard	Male	14	2	3	2	2	23
Average Performance Male							39.9
Nyangoma Alice	Female	18	5	11	2	10	46
Benadette Plan	Female	15	11	5	6	6	43
Nyangoma Mukoto Agnes	Female	15	10	5	5	7	42
Kusiima Dalson	Female	14	5	4	5	12	40
Grace Birungi	Female	16	5	9	1	4	35
Rwabugoma Cissy	Female	18	5	4	2	5	34
Rukanyanga Beatrice	Female	15	5	8	2	3	33
Biriboona Zaam	Female	13	5	8	0	3	29
Ashah Kabaramagi	Female	15	2	3	2	6	28
Average Score Female							36.7

Annex 1 D: Kampala District

Name	Gender	Legislative Role	Contact with Electorate	Participation in communal activities	Participation in LLGs	Service delivery on NPPAs	Total
Bona Jacob	Male	19	20	11	1	19	70
Daniel Kikomeko Ssali	Male	20	15	9	1	22	67
Badru Bakojja	Male	17	15	9	5	21	67
Apollo Mugume	Male	17	11	13	6	17	64
Asimwe Godfrey	Male	15	15	3	10	19	62
Abdu Mayanja	Male	18	15	8	1	20	62
John Mary Sebuwufu	Male	17	15	5	6	18	61
Charles Lwanga	Male	17	15	8	0	20	60
Kiwanuka Mayambala	Male	17	15	8	1	19	60
Yona Musinguzi	Male	18	4	15	1	21	59
Bernard Luyiga	Male	17	12	8	1	19	57
Zachary Mbereza Mawula	Male	15	12	4	6	19	56
Edward Kibirige Muwanga	Male	18	12	3	0	20	53
Average Performance Male							61.4
Florence Namayanja	Female	18	20	15	10	30	93
Doreen Nakaatya Nsamba	Female	21	11	11	10	23	76
Peninah Kabenge	Female	17	20	15	1	20	73
Madina Nsereko	Female	16	13	13	1	29	72
Lucy Mpanga	Female	18	15	8	5	19	65
Margaret Zawedde Kiryowa	Female	14	20	15	1	15	65
Nanyange Kibalama Dahlia	Female	15	16	8	1	22	62
Allen Kisige	Female	17	12	9	2	20	60
Joyce Odonga Acan	Female	17	12	11	0	17	57
Angella Kigonya	Female	13	7	9	6	19	54
Hadija Nassanga	Female	17	5	8	2	19	51
Nampeera Anne Wakabi	Female	17	12	8	0	12	49
Average Score Female							64.8

Annex 1 E: Kamuli District

Name	Gender	Legislative Role	Contact with Electorate	Participation in communal activities	Participation in LLGs	Service delivery on NPPAs	Total
Galisansana Vincent	Male	21	6	9	3	28	67
Wakabi Julius	Male	17	6	11	3	19	56
Koremu Edward	Male	17	9	5	6	19	56
Ngobi Robert	Male	18	6	8	6	16	54
Ngobi Fred Basoga	Male	17	6	8	6	16	53
Mpalabule Charkes	Male	18	6	9	3	17	53
Kabale Moses	Male	12	9	8	6	17	52
Byarugaba David	Male	16	6	8	3	18	51
Gwolaba Aaron	Male	15	9	8	1	17	50
Mbogo David	Male	17	4	9	3	16	49
Kanaku Michael	Male	16	6	9	3	13	47
Martin P Kyuka	Male	11	6	13	1	13	44
Nadhomi Magoma	Male	11	6	8	3	16	44
Isabirye Richard Kigozi	Male	11	4	9	1	18	43
Balinaine Peter	Male	13	6	9	3	12	43
Kifubangabo	Male	15	2	8	0	17	42
Alazia Ssozi	Male	10	6	8	3	14	41
Kibogo Wilson	Male	14	6	9	2	9	40
Buyinza Moses	Male	15	4	8	1	9	37
Kategere Thomas	Male	17	0	8	0	2	27
Muzaale Magabi Martin	Male	9	0	8	0	5	22
Average Performance Male							46.2
Hajat N. Watongola	Female	22	6	9	2	19	58
Bamutaza Norah	Female	16	9	9	3	16	53
Kagoya Mariam	Female	12	6	9	6	18	51
Kabenge Rose	Female	11	6	8	6	16	47
Kizito Sarah	Female	13	6	8	0	16	43
Betty Kalema	Female	13	6	8	2	13	42
Katalo Faridah	Female	7	10	5	5	9	36
Aisha Kanaku	Female	11	2	8	0	7	28
Average Score Female							44.8

Annex 1 F: Luwero District

Name	Gender	Legislative Role	Contact with Electorate	Participation in communal activities	Participation in LLGs	Service delivery on NPPAs	Total
Musisi Erasmus	Male	20	17	15	10	26	88
Musoke Omar Maalo	Male	22	17	11	10	25	85
Sheik Muhammed Kadala	Male	20	20	13	10	22	85
Tebasingwa Shaban Mukiibi	Male	15	20	13	10	26	84
Sempa Stephen	Male	16	10	15	10	26	77
Bwabye Richards	Male	20	17	10	10	20	77
Jonathan Kasule	Male	19	13	11	10	16	69
Mulindwa Rogers	Male	17	16	10	10	15	68
Luboyera Kyagaba	Male	17	17	3	10	16	63
Mbaali Jjunju	Male	17	16	1	10	16	60
Makumbi Swalleh	Male	16	10	9	10	7	52
Engineer Kaweesa John	Male	15	7	10	7	9	48
Kasule Abdul	Male	15	13	5	2	11	46
Mulwana Samuel	Male	15	9	4	3	10	41
Average Score Male							67.4
Rehema Kaaya	Female	15	13	10	10	17	65
Hellen Ndawula	Female	15	13	10	10	11	59
Nalubega Carol	Female	15	12	5	10	14	56
Namulindwa Joy	Female	17	9	8	5	16	55
Nakazzi Lilika	Female	15	9	4	6	19	53
Mirembe Joyce	Female	10	17	11	0	12	50
Kayaha Aisha Shamim	Female	15	9	9	2	12	47
Ndagire Aisha	Female	15	9	5	3	15	47
Nalubega Deborah	Female	16	9	8	0	13	46
Namanja Proscovia	Female	15	9	5	3	11	43
Katende Rosette	Female	7	9	3	3	13	35
Average Score Female							50.5

Annex 1 G: Mbale District

Name	Gender	Legislative Role	Contact with Electorate	Participation in communal activities	Participation in LLGs	Service delivery on NPPAs	Total
Mohammed Mafabi	Male	23	6	9	6	19	63
Mubajje Abdu Zak	Male	14	6	8	3	19	50
Musungu Michael	Male	13	6	9	6	16	50
Magomu Hussein Kahandi	Male	11	6	9	3	19	48
Nagwere Jonathan	Male	15	6	9	6	12	48
Wandwasi Robert	Male	18	5	9	1	14	47
Mabanja Nasuru	Male	15	6	4	3	15	43
Wasike Joseph	Male	13	4	8	1	16	42
Nabende Absolom	Male	10	6	5	3	16	40
Muliro Wanga Karim	Male	9	6	8	3	14	40
Kisolo Michael	Male	14	0	8	0	16	38
Mataki Solomon	Male	18	2	8	0	10	38
Khisa Kulusumu	Male	8	5	3	3	15	34
Nambuya L Massa	Male	7	5	3	3	15	33
Waboga Ali	Male	18	0	0	0	10	28
Menya Balonde	Male	7	4	3	3	9	26
Waniaala Charles	Male	15	2	3	0	5	25
Average Score Male							40.8
Wandeba Christine	Female	12	17	9	3	16	57
Makuma M Annet	Female	19	6	9	3	16	53
Buyi Elizabeth	Female	8	2	8	2	15	35
Nadunga Robinah Kutosi	Female	13	5	9	0	6	33
Wandyetye Rose	Female	5	5	9	3	10	32
Nabaya Rose	Female	11	4	9	0	7	31
Manita Margaret	Female	13	0	3	0	10	26
Npumbe Rebecca	Female	13	2	0	1	5	21
Average Score Female							36

Annex 1 H: Moroto District

Name	Gender	Legislative Role	Contact with Electorate	Participation in communal activities	Participation in LLGs	Service delivery on NPPAs	Total
Sagal George	Male	20	5	9	5	6	45
Moses Lorwa Loku	Male	21	1	8	5	6	41
Lomise Swaibu	Male	16	0	5	4	10	35
Longole Zakayo	Male	18	7	5	2	1	33
Iriama Calisto	Male	15	1	8	0	9	33
Atoh Peter Longok	Male	17	0	0	2	0	19
Lochungare Andrew	Male	10	0	4	0	5	19
Loput Mathew	Male	14	3	1	0	0	18
Napeyok Paska Lobur	Male	12	0	2	2	1	17
Longora John Ekamaripus	Male	5	0	4	1	3	13
Average Score Male							27.3
Lina Logetei	Female	8	2	1	5	0	16
Adero Rose	Female	13	1	10	0	5	29
Angella Linol	Female	14	2	3	2	1	22
Anna Grace Sabith	Female	5	1	0	5	7	18
Betty Lotimong Naree	Female	9	0	2	6	0	17
Magdalene Teko	Female	11	0	0	2	0	13
Friama Cissy	Female	6	0	4	0	0	10
Average Score Female							17.9

Annex 1 I: Nebbi District

Name	Gender	Legislative Role	Contact with Electorate	Participation in communal activities	Participation in LLGs	Service delivery on NPPAs	Total
Ongei Alfred	Male	20	10	4	10	28	72
Warom Charles	Male	17	10	8	5	22	62
Tingo Boniface	Male	18	7	3	10	23	61
Kakura Emmy	Male	15	10	7	1	26	59
Ocibre Gabriel	Male	18	7	5	5	23	58
Abedo Sam	Male	15	10	3	2	25	55
Othembi Briosis	Male	17	5	4	0	27	53
Yoacel Joseph	Male	17	3	7	2	22	51
Orieda Richard	Male	19	5	4	2	18	48
Ongei Francis	Male	20	5	3	2	18	48
Onyutha Sam	Male	15	7	3	0	22	47
Okumu Kwonga Andrew	Male	20	5	3	2	17	47
Combe Muchek	Male	13	5	3	5	17	43
Wathum Lawrence	Male	15	5	3	0	18	41
Nimungu Fred	Male	18	0	3	2	17	40
Wabitho Hillary	Male	17	0	3	5	15	40
Oyiki Jovan Jax	Male	18	0	3	2	15	38
Ogaba Charles	Male	10	5	3	2	17	37
Average Score Male							50
Odong Florence	Female	15	7	3	6	27	58
Odongtho Doreen	Female	17	6	5	2	27	57
Okori Jesca	Female	15	15	3	2	22	57
Ida Fuambe	Female	20	5	8	2	17	52
Angeiko Rosemary	Female	15	3	3	5	24	50
Kumaketch Jackie	Female	15	5	3	2	23	48
Binega B Proscia	Female	14	7	3	5	19	48
Ongetho Mary	Female	20	5	3	2	18	48
Nimungu Claire D	Female	12	5	8	0	15	40
Acen Dorine	Female	12	0	3	5	17	37
Ruth Fualiera	Female	15	0	3	0	18	36
Azazu Gloria	Female	10	1	3	2	15	31
Angala Celestina	Female	13	0	3	5	10	31
Amoditho Rose	Female	10	0	3	2	15	30
Average Score Female							44.5

Annex 1 J:Ntungamo District

Name	Gender	Legislative Role	Contact with Electorate	Participation in communal activities	Participation in LIGs	Service delivery on NPPAs	Total
Mugenyi Wilberforce	Male	21	20	9	10	23	83
Jacob Kafureka	Male	17	13	10	10	20	70
Byaruhanga Anthony	Male	17	17	7	6	22	69
Mugabi Sam K	Male	18	12	11	6	20	67
Twinomugisha Grace	Male	18	17	7	6	17	65
Baturaki Urban	Male	18	5	10	10	20	63
Atuhairi Elijah	Male	20	7	10	6	20	63
Rutagonya Vicent	Male	17	12	12	2	18	61
Buteera Dan	Male	18	4	7	6	25	60
Kahangire Ismail	Male	17	13	7	5	16	58
Bashaija Baguma	Male	17	9	10	2	16	54
Eng. Emmy Habyara	Male	19	4	4	10	16	53
Twebuze Alex	Male	19	7	4	2	19	51
Muhwezi Obadia	Male	17	0	0	6	8	31
Average Score Male							60.6
Mbabazi Shakila	Female	16	17	10	10	19	72
Maria Goretti	Female	15	17	5	10	24	71
Hajj Jafari Kauki	Female	19	11	8	10	20	68
Hajjati Aisha Myheki	Female	15	17	6	10	19	67
Musiime Peace	Female	18	13	8	7	18	64
Tumusiime Jolly	Female	17	7	10	10	17	61
Ketty Kapasi	Female	17	8	10	6	16	57
Kembabazi Alice	Female	12	9	8	6	21	56
Kyofuna Justie	Female	12	1	3	5	13	34
Average Score Female							61.1

Annex 2: Scorecard

Annex 2 A: Chairperson Scorecard

Performance Indicators in One Financial Year		2008/2009
CHAIRPERSON		
1. POLITICAL LEADERSHIP	(20)	COMMENTS
i) Presiding at meetings of Executive Committee a) None b) Chaired twice c) Chaired more than three times	0 1 2	
ii) Monitoring and administration a) None b) Monitoring administration of council decisions c) Implementation of council decisions d) Evidence of evaluation of performance of the council e) Evidence of decisions made on contentious issues f) Evidence of having solved problems/disputes forwarded from Lower local governments	0 1 1 1 1 1	
iii) a) Evidence of a report made to council on the state of affairs of the District b) None	2 0	
iv) Overseeing Performance of civil servants a) None b) One report to Council c) Two or more reports to Council	0 2 3	
v) Recommended to council persons to be appointed members of DSC and other boards/committees. a) None b) One report to Council c) Two or more reports to Council	0 2 3	
2. LEGISLATIVE ROLE	(20)	
i) Regular attendance of Plenary sessions, Committees a) None b) Attended six (mandatory) plenary sessions c) Attended three plenary sessions d) Attended more than two committee sessions	0 2 1 2	

ii) Motions/Bills presented by the Executive and passed a) None b) Motions for resolution on policy c) Motions for resolution of a bill/Ordinance	0 3 5	
iii) Initiated and formulated policies a) None b) Evidence of two policies c) Evidence of three or more policies	0 3 4	
3. CONTACT WITH ELECTORATE	(15)	
i) Evidence of a Programme of meetings with Electorate a) None b) Evidence of one programme c) Evidence of two or more programmes	0 1 4	
ii) Evidence of Reports/Press release/public notice of decisions of the Council to the electorate a) None b) One report/press release/Public notice c) Four reports/releases	0 1 4	
iii) Evidence of issues raised by the electorate to the Executive /Council a) None b) Two reports c) Four or more reports	0 1 4	
4. PARTICIPATION IN COMMUNAL AND DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES IN HIS/HER ELECTORAL AREA	(15)	
i) Projects initiated a) None b) One project c) Two projects or more	0 2 3	
ii) Contributions to communal Projects/activities a) None b) Written advice to the community c) Material contribution (money, manual labour, construction tools, food)	0 2 3	
iii) Linking the community to Development Partners/NGOs a) None b) Signed one Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) c) Signed more than two MoU d) Implemented MoU	0 1 2 2	

5. SERVICE DELIVERY ON NATIONAL PRIORITY PROGRAMMES AREAS	(30)	
i) Monitoring and giving feedback to Council a) None b) Evidence of one report c) Evidence of two or more reports	0 2 3	
ii) Attended NAADS/PMA/other programs meetings a) None b) Evidence of one report c) Evidence of two or more reports	0 2 3	
iii) Attended functional Adult literacy session a) None b) Evidence of one report c) Evidence of two or more reports	0 2 3	
iv) Visited Health units in every Lower local government a) None b) Evidence of one report c) Evidence of two or more reports	0 2 3	
v) Visited schools in every sub-county a) None b) Evidence of one report c) Evidence of two or more reports	0 2 3	
vi) Participated in a Radio/Television Talk show in any media. a) None b) Radio c) Television d) Written an article in a News Paper	0 1 1 1	
vii) Environment and Natural Resources protection a) None b) Participated in an activity that promotes Sustainable Use	0 2	
TOTAL	100	

Annex 2 B: Speaker Scorecard

Performance Indicators in One Financial Year	2008/2009	
SPEAKER/DEPUTY SPEAKER		
1. PRESIDING AND PRESERVATION OF ORDER IN THE COUNCIL	(25)	COMMENTS
i) Chairing lawful council/meetings a) None b) Chaired thrice c) Chaired Four times d) Chaired Five times	0 1 1 1	
ii) Rules of procedure a) Evidence of adoption of rules of procedure by council b) None c) Evidence of enforcement of rules of procedure d) None e) Caused timely production of minutes f) Convening council meetings on schedule	1 0 1 0 2 2	
iii) Business Committee a) None b) Convening and presiding over business committee meetings c) Production of minutes	0 2 1	
iv) Delegated to the Deputy Speaker at least once/ Evidence of deputizing the speaker in any activity a) None b) Once c) Twice	0 1 2 2	
v) Evidence of a records book with Issues/ petitions presented to the office a) None b) Available	0 2	
vi) Evidence of record of motions/bills presented in council a) Available b) None	3 0	
vii) Provided special skills/knowledge to the Council or committees. a) None b) Written and presented a paper to guide Council c) Written and presented a paper to guide a committee	0 2 3	

2. CONTACT WITH ELECTORATE	(20)	
i) Evidence of a written Programme of meetings with Electorate a) None b) Existence of one programme c) Existence of two or more programmes	0 2 3	
ii) Office or coordinating centre in the constituency a) None b) Existence of an office/centre c) Functional office/centre (visitors book, calendar, Files, contact person)	0 2 3	
iii) Evidence of Reports of decisions of the Council taken to the electorate a) None b) One report c) Three or more	0 1 4	
iv) Evidence of issues raised by the electorate a) None b) One report to the council c) Three or more to the council	0 1 4	
3. PARTICIPATION IN COMMUNAL AND DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES IN HIS/HER ELECTORAL AREA	(15)	
i) Projects initiated a) None b) One project c) Two projects or more	0 1 4	
ii) Contributions to communal Projects/activities a) None b) written advice to the community c) Material contribution (money, construction tools, food)	0 2 3	
iii) Linking the community to Development Partners/NGOs a) None b) Signed one Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) c) Signed more than two MoU d) Implemented MoU	0 1 2 2	

4. PARTICIPATION IN LOWER LOCAL GOVERNMENT	(10)	
i) Attendance in sub - county Council sessions a) None b) One meeting c) Two meetings d) Five meetings	0 1 1 3	
ii) Evidence of giving feedback to the sub-county Council from District Council. a) None b) One signed report c) Three or more signed reports	0 1 4	
5. SERVICE DELIVERY ON NATIONAL PRIORITY PROGRAMME AREAS	(30)	
i) Monitoring and giving feedback to council a) None b) Evidence of one report c) Evidence of two or more reports	0 2 3	
ii) Attended NAADS/PMA/other related programs meetings a)None b) Evidence of one report c) Evidence of two or more reports	0 2 3	
iii) Attended functional Adult literacy session a) None b) Evidence of one report c) Evidence of two or more reports	0 2 3	
iv) Visited Health units in constituent sub-county a) None b) Evidence of one report c) Evidence of two or more reports	0 2 3	
v) Visited schools in constituent sub-county a) None b) Evidence of one report c) Evidence of two or more reports	0 2 3	

vi) Participated in a Radio/Television Talk show in any media. a) None b) Radio c) Television d) Written an article in a News Paper	0 1 1 1	
vii) Participated in an activity that promotes Sustainable Environment and Natural Resource Use a) Evidence b) None	2 0	
TOTAL	100	

Annex 2 C: District Council Scorecard

Performance Indicators in One Financial Year	2008/2009	
DISTRICT COUNCIL		COMMENTS
1. LEGISLATIVE ROLE	(20)	
i) Adopted model rules of Procedure with/without amendments a) Evidence b) No action	4 0	
ii) Ordinances a) Passed at least one ordinance within 3 years b) Passed more than one ordinance within 3 years c) Evidence of implementation/dissemination d) No action	1 2 1 0	
iii) Passed motions for resolutions on policy a) Evidence b) No action	2 0	
iv) Evidence of legislative resources a) None b) Library c) Planning and Development office d) Clerks office e) Public relations office/Councillor's lounge	0 1 1 1 1	
v) Petitions & Focused Tours a) None b) Received Petitions/letters from Lower Local Governments, Civil Society c) Organisations d) Acted on them e) Evidence of Inter-District co-operation/visits/Tours f) Evidence of Reports on visits/tours	0 1 1 1 1	
vi) Held council meetings on time a) Evidence b) None	2 0	
2. ACCOUNTABILITY ROLE	(20)	
i) Public Accounts Committee (PAC) a) None b) Active PAC (holds regular meetings) c) Evidence of PAC reports discussed in Council	0 2 2	

ii) Public Funds a) None b) Evidence of display of public funds received on public notice boards c) Evidence of display of projects on notice boards d) None	0 2 2 0	
iii) Internal Assessment a) None b) Functional internal assessment report c) Evidence of Bills of Quantities and other Procurement requirements.	0 2 2	
iv) Public Hearings a) None b) Conducted public hearings on Bills being tabled c) Record of the views generated from the parties affected	0 2 2	
iv) Involvement of CSOs, CBOs, Citizens a) None b) In budgeting process c) Disclosure and dissemination of the Development Plan to citizens for them to know what activities will be financed and implemented	0 2 2	
3. PLANNING & BUDGETING	(12)	
i) Existence of Plans & Vision a) None b) Approved Development Plan c) Capacity Building Plan d) Revenue enhancement plan e) Vision and Mission Statements displayed	0 1 1 1 1	
ii) Existence of Local Government Budget Framework Paper a) Evidence b) None	1 0	
iii) Prior approval of the Development Plan before the Budget approval a) Evidence b) None	1 0	
iv) Approved budget within time according to the law a) Evidence b) None	1 0	
v) Active Technical Planning Committee a) Evidence b) None	1 0	

vi) Monitoring and Evaluation		
a) None	0	
b) Evidence of Participatory Planning Mechanisms	1	
c) Reports on Monitoring and Evaluation of the Development Plan;	1	
d) Evidence of gender mainstreaming performance	2	
4. SERVICE DELIVERY ON NATIONAL PRIORITY PROGRAMMES		
4.1 EDUCATION	(8)	
i) Enrolment & Gender equality		
a) None	0	
b) Increased enrollment in primary schools	1	
c) Pupils completion in schools @ per or above national average	1	
d) Improved academic Performance in primary schools	1	
e) Evidence of programmes that promote girl child education	1	
ii) Staff & Grants		
a) None	0	
b) Evidence of Teachers recruitment and retention	1	
c) Better utilization of UPE funds	1	
d) Functional Inspectorate Department	1	
e) Evidence of Reports submitted to sectoral committee.	1	
4.2 HEALTH	(8)	
i) Committees, Staff & construction		
a)None	0	
b)Functional committees	1	
c)Evidence of staff recruitment and retention	1	
d)Evidence of Health units constructed in every sub county and functional.	1	
ii) Immunization and Treatment		
None	0	
Availability of essential drugs	1	
Reports made to Council/Committee on purchases and utilization	1	
Evidence of Immunization/family planning services at health units	1	
Availability of HIV/AIDS services at health units (e.g. VCT, ART).	1	
Availability of Maternal & Child Health care services		
4.3 WATER AND SANITATION	(8)	
Water sources		
None	0	
Availability of functional safe water sources opened in every Parish	2	
Latrine/toilet coverage @ per or above national average	2	
Functional water user management committees	1	

Reports submitted to sectoral committee. Evidence None	3 0	
4.4 ROADS	(8)	
Maintenance and construction None Evidence of rehabilitated and maintained roads Evidence of new constructed Bridges	0 2 2	
Reports None Submitted to sectoral committee; And discussed.	0 2 2	
4.5 AGRICULTURE AND EXTENSION	(8)	
Reports on farming None Utilization of NAADS money/ other funds (e.g. inputs purchased and distributed) Evidence on farmers visited by extension workers Evidence of processing and agribusiness in various sub-counties Evidence of recognition of agro-entrepreneurs	0 1 1 1 1	
Reports on Livestock None Record on the population of livestock in the district Evidence of Livestock vaccinated Reports discussed by the sectoral committee.	0 2 1 1	
4.6 FUNCTIONAL ADULT LITERACY	(3)	
Community Development Officers None Existence of Community Development officers at every sub-county Evidence of their activities (e.g. enrolment and completion of learners, skills transfer, involvement of vulnerable groups, learners forum, designated infrastructure)	0 1 1	
Training tools & gender mainstreaming None Training Manuals e.g. Materials on multiparty system, political party manifestoes, human rights, gender equality	0 1	

4.7	ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES	(5)	
No action		0	
Existence of an ordinance/bylaw on environment		1	
Programme for environmental protection		1	
Evidence of regular production of District state of environment report		1	
Availability of trained staff			
Reports on environment & natural resources use discussed by the sectoral committee		1	
		1	
Total		100	

Annex 2: D Councilor Scorecard

Performance Indicators in One Financial Year	2008/2009	
DISTRICT COUNCILOR		COMMENTS
LEGISLATIVE ROLE	(25)	
Participation in plenary sessions None Debated once Debated twice Debated thrice Debated Four times Debated Five times	0 1 1 1 1 1	
Participation in Committees None Debated once Debated twice Debated thrice Debated Four Debated Five times	0 1 1 1 1 1	
Moved a motion for approval as Resolution of Council None Moved a motion without notice Moved a motion on notice	0 2 3	
Regular attendance of plenary and committees None Has attended 3 meetings of plenary (50%) Has attended all (6) mandatory meetings of plenary Has attended at least 3 committee meetings	0 1 2 2	
Provided special skills/knowledge to the Council or committees. None Written and presented a paper to guide Council Written and presented a paper to guide a committee Evidence of having provided explanation / guidance on a special issue during council proceedings after request by speaker.	0 2 2 1	
CONTACT WITH ELECTORATE	(20)	
Evidence of a written Programme of meetings with Electorate None Existence of one programme Existence of two or more programmes	0 2 3	

Office or coordinating centre in the constituency None Existence of an office / centre Functional office / centre (visitors book, calendar, Files, contact person)	0 2 3	
Evidence of Reports of decisions of the Council taken to the electorate None One report Three or more	0 1 4	
Evidence of issues raised by the electorate None One report to the council Three or more to the council	0 1 4	
PARTICIPATION IN COMMUNAL AND DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES IN HIS/HER ELECTORAL AREA	(15)	
Projects initiated None One project Two projects or more	0 1 4	
Contributions to communal Projects/activities None Written advice to the community Material contribution (money, construction tools, food, physical labour)	0 2 3	
Linking the community to Development Partners/NGOs None Signed one Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) / evidence of Lobbying a development partner Signed more than two MoU Implemented MoU	0 1 2 2	
PARTICIPATION IN LOWER LOCAL GOVERNMENT	(10)	
Attendance in sub - county Council sessions None One meeting Two meetings Five meetings	0 1 1 3	
Evidence of giving feedback to the sub-county Council from District Council. None One signed report Three or more signed reports	0 1 4	

SERVICE DELIVERY ON NATIONAL PRIORITY PROGRAMME AREAS	(30)	
Monitoring and giving feedback to council None Evidence of one report Evidence of two or more reports	0 2 3	
Attended NAADS/PMA /other programs meetings None Evidence of one report Evidence of two or more reports	0 2 3	
Attended functional Adult literacy session None Evidence of one report Evidence of two or more reports	0 2 3	
Visited Health units in the constituent sub-county None Evidence of one report Evidence of two or more reports	0 2 3	
Visited schools in every sub-county None Evidence of one report Evidence of two or more reports	0 2 3	
Participated in a Radio/Television Talk show in any media. None Radio Television Written an article in a News Paper	0 1 1 1	
Participated in an activity that promotes Sustainable Environment and Natural Resource Use Evidence None	2 0	
TOTAL	100	

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Godber W. Tumushabe Executive Director and policy analyst at ACODE and has published extensively on a number of public policy topics ranging from natural resources policy to governance, and science and technology policy. He holds a Juridical Science Master (JSM) degree from Stanford Law School and a Masters Degree in Law (LLM) from Makerere University. He has previously worked with the African Centre for Technology Studies (ACTS) in Kenya where he directed Africa-wide projects on environmental governance. He is co-editor with Prof. H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo of **Governing the Environment: Political Change and Natural Resources Management in Eastern and Southern Africa (1999)**. Tumushabe is currently pursuing further studies in the Juridical Science Doctor (JSD) Degree programme at Stanford Law School, Stanford University.

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Eugene Gerald Ssemakula is a Research Officer at ACODE with a background of Social Work. Eugene's works have mainly focused on Monitoring and Evaluation Methods and Practice. His current focus is on the functioning of Local Government Systems especially the fusion of political and technical functions in service delivery under decentralisation.



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